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 Summary 
University of Sussex 
Kristopher Grint 
James Mill’s Common Place Books and their Intellectual Context, 1773–1836 
This thesis is an intellectual history of James Mill’s political thought, which focuses on 
four specific topics: his ideas on parliamentary reform; on libel law, or the freedom of 
the press; education, or man’s ability to utilise his reason; and on established religion, 
primarily in the form of Mill’s attitude towards the Church of England. At face-value, 
the thesis’ main aim is to contextualize in detail Mill’s published writings on these four 
subjects (which comprise its four chapters) by virtue of comparing them with 
unpublished manuscript material present in his common place books, which were 
transcribed as part of this PhD project. 
Although the chapters are developed in such a way that they can be seen as independent 
studies of Mill’s thought, there are of course more general themes which run through 
the thesis as a whole, as well as specific links between particular topics. One notable 
example is the notion that Mill employed ‘dissimulation’ in his published writings, that 
is to say that he did not necessarily express in public the full extent of his ideas, because 
of a fear that their radical extent would attract intrigue or prosecution from the 
reactionary governmental or religious authorities in Britain. 
It is also prudent to note how Mill’s well-documented intellectual influences are 
incorporated into the thesis. By this we are referring to the importance of the Scottish 
Enlightenment background to Mill’s own education and upbringing near Aberdeen and 
in Edinburgh, and also the doctrine of Utilitarianism he adopted from Jeremy Bentham 
once in London. The particular nature of the material found in the common place books 
warrants a full re-evaluation of these influences, as well as an exploration of the 
possibility that additional influences beyond these two contexts have thus far been 
understated in studies of Mill. This suggests the value of the study to current Mill 
scholarship.  
 Contents 
Acknowledgements v 
Note on sources vi 
Prologue: ‘Keys of Knowledge’ 1 
Introduction 4 
1. ‘Quarries, not Ancient Temples’: A comparative study of James Mill’s 
published and unpublished writings on the liberty of the press 
14 
2. ‘A Cry for Philosophy’: James Mill’s politics of reform and the essay 
Government 
46 
3. ‘Democratical Sentiment and Indigent Orders’: James Mill and the essay 
Education 
117 
4. ‘A Monopoly of Spiritual Domination’: Secularism and the role of 
ecclesiastical establishments in James Mill’s religious thought 
149 
Conclusion 202 
Epilogue: ‘Unbounded Confidence’ 212 
Bibliography 213 
 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis relies extensively on a transcription of James Mill’s common place books 
made by the late Robert A. Fenn (1935–1993). I am very grateful to Mrs. Julia Fenn for 
permission to use the transcription for the basis of my research, and to Larry Johnston 
for his assistance in recovering it.  
My research has been funded by the AHRC, as a collaborative doctoral award project 
between the University of Sussex and the London Library. I am grateful to the Librarian 
and staff at the London Library, where the first four volumes of Mill’s common place 
books are held, for their help during the first three years of my studies, and for the use 
of their extensive collections. I have also made much use of the collections at the British 
Library, the University of Sussex Library, the Library of Somerville College, Oxford, 
and the British Library of Political and Economic Science at LSE, the latter of which 
holds the fifth volume of Mill’s common place books. 
My greatest expression of thanks, however, must go to my supervisors and colleagues at 
the University of Sussex, and more specifically at the Centre for Intellectual History, for 
their invaluable and seemingly limitless support given to me during the researching and 
writing of this thesis. I would like to thank in particular my supervisors, Richard 
Whatmore and Donald Winch. 
  
vi 
 
Note on sources 
The unpublished sources consulted in this thesis comprise a range of manuscript 
material in the five volumes of James Mill’s common place books held in the archives 
of the London Library (volumes I–IV) and the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science (volume V). The transcription of the manuscripts consulted is an unpublished 
typescript by Robert A. Fenn, which was finalised in about 1993 and substantially 
checked upon its recovery in 2009. In 2010, as part of the research objectives for this 
PhD project, Mill’s first four common place books, along with editorial and 
bibliographical material by Fenn, were published online under the auspices of the 
Sussex Centre for Intellectual History.
1
 
Citations of material in the common place books in this thesis refer to the physical 
manuscripts. They follow the form of the volume of the ledger followed by a reference 
to the folio and scrap from which the extract was taken (e.g. CPB II 2
ra1
 relates to the 
first scrap (
1
) in the first column (
a
) on the recto (
r
) of page 2 in common place book 
volume II). 
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Prologue: ‘Keys of Knowledge’ 
And with regard to the danger of training the people generally to habits of servility and toleration 
of arbitrary power, if their education be entrusted to Government, or persons patronised by the 
Government, – we can only say, that although we are far from considering the danger either as 
small or chimerical, it is still so very great and good to have the whole facility of reading and 
writing diffused through the whole body of the people, that we should be willing to run 
considerable risks for its acquirement, or even greatly to accelerate that acquirement. There is 
something in the possession of those keys of knowledge and of thought, so truly admirable, that, 
when joined to another inestimable blessing, it is scarcely possible for any government to 
convert them into instruments of evil. That security is – the Liberty of the Press. Let the people 
only be taught to read, though by instruments ever so little friendly to their general interests, and 
the very intelligence of the age will provide them with books which will prove an antidote to the 
poison of their pedagogues… But grant, a reading people and a free press, – and the prejudices 
on which misrule supports itself will gradually and silently disappear. The impressions, indeed, 
which it is possible to make at the early age at which reading and writing are taught, and during 
the very short time that teaching lasts, are so very slight and transitory, that they must be easily 
effaced whenever there is anything to counteract them. 
James Mill, ‘Education of the Poor’2 
In 1813 the Scottish philosopher, historian and journalist James Mill (1773–1836) 
contributed the article ‘Education of the Poor’ to the February edition of the Edinburgh 
Review. The piece was in one sense a restatement of the arguments Mill had advanced 
in the pamphlet Schools for All, published a year earlier, which had been both a robust 
defence of the Quaker Joseph Lancaster’s scheme for establishing monitorial schools in 
order to provide cheap education for the poor, and an equally strong rejection of a 
competing education system devised by the Church of England. The British and Foreign 
School Society, the organisation associated with Lancaster’s ideas, had advocated a 
method of instruction which was secular in nature, whereby reading of the Bible would 
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 James Mill, “Education of the Poor,” Edinburgh Review XXI, no. 41 (February 1813): 211–2. 
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take place, but nothing was taught about the doctrines of specific Christian creeds. This 
was the basis of the scheme’s ecumenical structure, since the children of dissenters 
could attend alongside those from Anglican families. For the Church of England, 
however, such an arrangement was untenable. It feared that its authority would be 
undermined if children were educated without also being instructed in its catechism, and 
sought instead to promote schools for the poor which would remedy such an omission, 
thereby excluding those from dissenting faiths. 
What is more important than the historical context to ‘Education of the Poor’ at this 
early juncture, however, is the fact that it contained a passage which effectively 
represents the four crucial aspects of Mill’s political thought that this thesis is expressly 
concerned with investigating. Mill surmised in the article that the population at large 
could avoid corrupt and arbitrary government by virtue of possessing two ‘keys of 
knowledge’. These keys were basic literacy, and the ‘inestimable blessing’ of a free 
press. Within the passage Mill also made mention of his attitude towards institutions 
such as the established Church of England, which can be read in his remarks about the 
‘poison’ of certain pedagogues, and how education is entrusted to ‘persons patronised 
by the Government’. These two latter statements reflected Mill’s specific concern about 
the Church’s aforementioned scheme for education which opposed the Lancasterian 
model. 
During his long literary career whilst living in London between 1802 and his death in 
1836, Mill would write extensively about political reform, libel law, education and 
established religion. In public such writings took the form of numerous published 
works, such as the aforementioned Schools for All or the famous essay Government 
(1820) for the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. In private, Mill worked 
upon these ideas and arguments in his common place books. It is an analysis of the 
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contents of these manuscripts, which have hitherto attracted relatively little scholarly 
attention, that forms the centrepiece of this thesis. They are utilised in an attempt at 
contextualising Mill’s political thought in detail, via the study of the four specific areas 
he alluded to in ‘Education of the Poor’. 
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Introduction 
The intellectual legacy of James Mill typically lies in shadows cast by the two towering 
figures with whom he was intimately acquainted: his mentor Jeremy Bentham, and his 
son John Stuart Mill. Mill acted as Bentham’s editor, and became an interlocutor 
between esoteric Benthamese and plain English in a vein similar to that of Étienne 
Dumont, who had worked on translating Bentham’s ideas into French. Bentham kept 
Mill close at hand. He subsidised Mill’s living arrangements, leasing him a house in 
Queen’s Square, London, from 1814, and invited him and his family to holiday with 
him on his summer vacations, such as those at Forde Abbey in Dorset between 1814 
and 1818. For some historians, Mill is the midwife to Bentham’s ideas on political 
radicalism, a role he is also judged to have taken up for David Ricardo in the domain of 
political economy, bringing the latter’s economic ideas to publication and taking in 
hand his general education with the object of making him an effective parliamentary 
spokesman for Philosophic Radicalism.
3
 With regards to the junior Mill, his father is 
infamous for prescribing him a zealous (albeit extremely thorough) education, which 
would eventually become a source of extreme consternation. Although John Stuart Mill 
was critical of his father for the upbringing which had made him into a ‘manufactured 
man’,4  that James had an extraordinary influence on John’s intellectual prowess is 
undeniable. 
Remembering James Mill primarily as either Bentham’s chief propagandist or J.S. 
Mill’s fervent schoolmaster does however obscure the scale of his own scholarly 
achievements, reflected in his prodigious literary output. A brief review of this material 
                                                 
3
 William Thomas, The Philosophic Radicals: Nine Studies in Theory and Practice, 1817–1841 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979), 33; Donald Winch, “Early Economic Writings,” in Selected Economic Writings, 
by James Mill (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 23. 
4
 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume I - Autobiography and Literary 
Essays, ed. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 162. 
5 
 
includes 12 essays for the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1816–1823); 
over 200 articles for The Literary Journal; ten articles for the Westminster Review 
(1824–1830) and another seven for the London or, as it would later become, the London 
and Westminster Review; the monolithic History of British India (1817, 6 vols.); 
Elements of Political Economy (1821), a ‘school-book’ expounding Ricardo’s economic 
thought; and two works on psychology: the Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
Mind (1828) and A Fragment on Mackintosh (1835). Such a corpus (and the preceding 
list is merely a selection from a near 33-year writing career) means that any historian 
wishing to work on the history of Mill’s ideas should, in theory, be well stocked with 
material from which to attempt an evaluation. A particular elephant trap in such a 
pursuit, however, is to view all of Mill’s work through the prism of a perceived strict 
duty to advance the ideas of Bentham, based on the intense nature of their working 
relationship. By writing on topics which were pro-reform and ostensibly anti-
establishment, the crux of an argument developed in this direction typically amounts to 
the idea that Mill purported to justify his ideas on representative government (or liberty 
of the press, or education, or whatever) using Bentham’s doctrine of Utilitarianism as 
the ethical and moral system underpinning his arguments. 
The problem with this approach is that it heavily discounts an additional intellectual 
influence which clearly also operated upon Mill’s thought: the ideas of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Mill’s upbringing and education was in Scotland, first in proximity to 
Aberdeen, the geographical area that is associated with Thomas Reid and the 
development of the Common Sense school of philosophy, and secondly as a student at 
Edinburgh University under luminaries of Scottish moral philosophy such as Dugald 
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Stewart.
5
 Many historians of the Scottish Enlightenment have worked diligently to 
recover the importance of this influence to Mill’s ideas. To some, Mill’s philosophical 
and political positions were for all intents and purposes set before he met Bentham in 
either late 1807 or early 1808.
6
 Since Mill was 35 at this point, the obvious question to 
ask is whether the lateness of this meeting in relation to Mill’s life means it is unlikely 
that there was such a degree of change in his thought that could constitute an 
abandonment of any intellectual inheritance derived from Scotland.
7
 But John Burrow 
interprets Élie Halévy as arguing that Bentham caused a distinct change in Mill’s 
thought: in terms of psychology, for example, Mill proceeds from denouncing Hartley 
and Helvétius pre-Bentham to becoming an ‘ornament’ of the Associationist school 
after.
8
 This seems a rather extraordinary turn of events given, for example, the fact that 
an argument can be made for the influence of the Common Sense school on Mill, which 
denied the Associationist claim of being able to ‘provide a model of the way the mind 
works which is more precise and has greater explanatory power than the ordinary, 
everyday account of concepts and motives.’9 
Burrow’s own arguments, as well as those of Duncan Forbes and Knud Haakonssen, 
recover Mill’s Scottish intellectual heritage in ways that show him as still influenced by 
Scottish moral philosophy in his later ideas. One of the key documents in this regard is 
Mill’s History of British India, because its creation spans a period that began before the 
intellectual relationship between Mill and Bentham developed. Halévy argues that 
Mill’s HBI ‘may be considered, in a certain sense, as an instrument of Benthamite 
                                                 
5
 A more thorough biographical account of Mill’s earlier years in Scotland (1773–1802) is given in part II 
of chapter 4 below. 
6
 Arthur Laurence Lazenby, “James Mill: The Formation of a Scottish Émigré Writer”, unpublished 
D.Phil. thesis (University of Sussex, 1972), 1. 
7
 Of course, an iteration of this argument could be applied to dismiss any influence of Mill upon 
Bentham’s ideas, who was approaching 60 years of age by the time of their first encounter. 
8
 J. W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), 59. 
9
 Ibid., 35. 
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propaganda’, 10  but Burrow and Forbes both point to the hallmarks of Scottish 
conjectural history present in that vast body of work. Indeed, Burrow labels it ‘not only 
the last, [but] also the most elaborate and detailed example of Scottish philosophic 
history.’11 Forbes depicts Mill as a true believer in the ‘progress of society’ (as were the 
Scottish ‘conjectural’ historians and, also, as was Condorcet) and the nature of the HBI 
means Mill’s ‘attitude to the civilizations of the East would have been substantially the 
same if he had never met Bentham or come under his influence.’12 
Haakonssen approaches this subject from a slightly different angle, one that describes 
both distinct schools of thought (i.e. Scottish and Benthamic) as possessing similar 
features. Although Mill’s use of conjectural history broadly adopted the ‘main ideas’ of 
the Scottish conception of such a subject, it is also possible to demonstrate a basic 
affinity between Utilitarianism and the ‘objectivist moral theory of the Common Sense 
school.’ 13  Since there are clear ideas within the Scottish legacy that seem 
commensurable with the later thought of the Utilitarian school that Mill was so heavily 
involved in formulating, this case-in-point makes for a particularly pleasing fit within 
Mill’s intellectual history. A.L. Lazenby helps to compound the notion of a Reidian 
influence on Mill, even going so far as to attribute it to the geographical factors of 
Mill’s birthplace. Born in the parish of Logie Pert, Forfarshire, the ‘extraordinary 
philosophies and beliefs’ developed in the area surrounding Aberdeen where Mill was 
raised, Lazenby argues, could not fail to have had a distinct effect on those initially 
educated within it.
14
 It was in Edinburgh, however, where Mill entered into membership 
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 Élie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, trans. Mary Morris (London: Faber and Faber, 
1934), 302. 
11
 Burrow, Evolution and Society, 48. 
12
 Duncan Forbes, “James Mill and India,” Cambridge Journal 5, no. 31 (1951): 24. 
13
 Knud Haakonssen, “James Mill and Scottish Moral Philosophy,” Political Studies 33, no. 4 (December 
1, 1985): 628–9, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1985.tb01585.x. 
14
 “[W]hat came to be called ‘Scottish’ critical views, as expounded by Francis Jeffrey, the editor of the 
Edinburgh Review, were originated and developed in the Aberdeen Literary Society by Thomas Reid, 
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of the ‘Select Society for General Subjects’, along with John Barclay, James Millar (son 
of John Millar, the works of whom Mill used as a reason to attack Sir William Jones, 
the famous philologist), James Carson, and James and Thomas Thomson, brothers who 
would provide Mill with letters of recommendation upon his departure from Edinburgh 
for London in early 1802. All members of this circle, including Mill, were originally 
trained for divinity, but four of them were also licensed as medical practitioners and all 
except Carson contributed articles to the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
15
 Lazenby argues 
for a significant scientific influence of the members of the society, despite their 
theological origins, on Mill’s later methods of inquiry.16 
The study of Mill’s intellectual history has until now primarily been concerned with 
judging the strength of influence upon Mill’s ideas from his Scottish and Benthamic 
contexts. This can be seen in analyses undertaken of Mill’s HBI, a work which, as 
aforementioned, Halévy saw as clearly Benthamite propaganda yet ultimately and 
undoubtedly had its roots in conjectural history of the Scottish school. Burrow 
attempted to explain the dichotomy between Mill’s use of conjectural history for the 
HBI and his Utilitarian outlook on the politics of nineteenth-century Britain by 
suggesting that Mill saw a break in history between uncivilized nations such as India 
and civilized countries like Britain. Thus, a barrier existed between these two concepts, 
and they never needed to come into contact. To borrow a term from Haakonssen, this is 
what could be labelled Mill’s modus vivendi between Scottish conjectural history and 
                                                                                                                                               
George Campbell, John Gregory, Alexander Gerard and James Beattie, and transmitted by these men and 
through Archibald Alison and Dugald Stewart to the whole generation of ‘Edinburgh Reviewers’. Since 
James Mill was one of that generation, and more particularly since he was greatly influenced by the 
writings of Thomas Reid, it might be suggested that his affinities for the Aberdeen school of criticism 
were partly a matter of geographical influences.” Lazenby, “James Mill: The Formation of a Scottish 
Émigré Writer,” 5. 
15
 Ibid., 12. 
16
 “Mill gained from his medical friends some insight into the techniques and methods of scientific 
analysis and investigation. Superimposed upon the cultural attitudes of the Montrose area of Scotland, 
with its taste for analytical argument and abstract discussion, Mill’s education predisposed him to treat 
social problems in logical terms and to seek the principles of human behaviour in a scientific way.” 
Lazenby, “James Mill: The Formation of a Scottish Émigré Writer,” 14–5. 
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Utilitarianism, or what Burrow describes as a ‘philosophy of history which teaches 
[Mill] to be a gradualist in India, just as he has a philosophy of man which teaches him 
to be a democrat in England.’17 The problem with Burrow’s suggestion, Haakonssen 
contests, is that in terms of institutions, Mill is not at all a gradualist in India, because 
his intention was ‘to debunk the idea that any aspect of [Hindu society] had reached any 
degree of sophistication’, and instead orchestrate a period of intensive rebuilding of 
Hindu political and cultural institutions along modern (i.e. British) lines.
18
 
This thesis does not dispute the importance of either the Scottish Enlightenment or 
Bentham’s doctrine of Utilitarianism to an understanding of Mill’s intellectual history, 
although it does stress the effect of the latter as superior to that of the former. Its major 
contribution to the scholarly debate on Mill comes in its assertion that the range of 
intellectual influences which operated upon Mill’s ideas and arguments is actually much 
wider than just these two contexts. Attention needs to be paid, for example, to the 
importance of certain continental Enlightenment thinkers, such as Condillac and 
Montesquieu, as well as philosophers closer to home, such as Edmund Burke and 
William Chillingworth. This claim is based on an analysis of the contents of Mill’s 
common place books, the five thick volumes of manuscript material tended to by Mill 
over the course of his career as a journalist and philosopher whilst living in London. 
Within these books Mill performed in parallel two things of specific academic interest. 
First, he documented his reading, collecting instances and passages from the books, 
newspapers, pamphlets and speeches he found intriguing and wished to use as either 
intellectual support or fodder in his arguments. Second, he actually honed and projected 
these political, religious and philosophical arguments themselves. Since some of these 
projections even form the basis of Mill’s published articles, such as the essay on 
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 Burrow, Evolution and Society, 61–2. 
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 Haakonssen, “James Mill and Scottish Moral Philosophy,” 635. 
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Government, what is effectively provided by the common place books is the ability to 
study Mill’s arguments as they appear in two separate guises: the public or published 
instance, and the private or unpublished. By way of simple comparison, therefore, this 
thesis can ask questions not only about the intellectual provenance of Mill’s ideas, but 
about the radical extent of them, and whether the thoughts he advanced publicly were a 
true representation of what he believed in private. 
It is the content of the common place books that dictates the major tenets of this thesis. 
In exploring Mill’s intellectual history, they function as a way of contextualising his 
ideas by showing the particular arguments of other thinkers which influenced him, and 
also as a way of providing commentary on these ideas, and demonstrating their extent 
when composed in a private guise. The common place books are also privileged as 
primary sources in this study, in that significant weight is given to their content above 
that of other sources. This is intentional. They have hitherto been underused in a 
scholarly sense as a source of insight into Mill’s ideas, and the close reading of them 
presented in this thesis contributes not only to a deeper understanding of Mill’s 
intellectual history, but also demonstrates their utility as a historical source for further 
investigations into extended, related topics, such as the growth of Philosophic 
Radicalism, the political context of suspicion and intrigue in Britain at the time of the 
first ‘Reform Crisis’, and the reading practices of nineteenth-century intellectual 
figures. 
It is necessary, however, to introduce some caveats about the objective to study Mill’s 
intellectual history primarily through his common place books. This thesis does not 
attempt to explain or investigate Mill’s thought, for example, in a very systematic way 
or on a very wide basis. One reason for this is that the manuscripts, when transcribed 
and printed, account in total for around 1,500 pages of text, meaning only four topics 
11 
 
have been selected for an intensive treatment: those pertaining to Mill’s ideas on the 
liberty of the press, political reform, education, and established religion. Neither is this 
thesis suitable as a biography. Whilst it contains biographical elements, these do not 
typically come from material found in the common place books. Moreover, the time 
frame of the manuscripts’ composition means little focus can be made on the earlier 
parts of Mill’s life in Scotland, or on the years leading up to his death in 1836, when his 
intellectual powers begin to decline. The majority of biographical context for these 
periods is therefore provided by reference to secondary works, such as the 1882 
biography of Mill by Alexander Bain, or the autobiography of Mill’s son John Stuart. 
Concentration is broadly maintained on the period which runs from just after Mill first 
met Jeremy Bentham, in 1807 or 1808, until about 1825, when his periodic occurrences 
of gout became more frequent, and his degenerating vision made it much harder for him 
to read and write for the purposes of his commonplacing. 
Nevertheless, the period synchronous to the majority of the contents of the common 
place books is a very fertile period to study. It features, for example, the composition 
and publication of Mill’s articles for the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
the most famous of which, Government, is a crucial text in understanding the context of 
the early nineteenth-century debate on the politics of reform and Mill’s place within it. 
It also encompasses Mill’s attempts at separating the Church and the State in the context 
of education provision, via his support for the Lancasterian movement and Bentham’s 
later plans in his Chrestomathia. The thesis is divided into four component chapters, but 
deep connections between the constituent parts are maintained throughout. The themes 
of these chapters reflect four distinct areas of Mill’s ideas identified as central to his 
political thought in the prologue, but they are also selected for an eminently more 
practical reason: they are the subjects which Mill paid significant attention to in his 
12 
 
manuscripts, and to which he devoted the largest amount of pages. Whilst the common 
place books are frequently chaotic in their composition, to his credit Mill managed to 
maintain a sense of order around the thematic organisation of his material, and these 
four collections of material also stand out for this reason. 
The first chapter of this thesis seeks to contextualise Mill’s essay on the Liberty of the 
Press, published in 1821, which reveals in particular his ideas about the law of libel. A 
significant portion of the chapter is given over to a critical appreciation of the common 
place books themselves, and establishes a reusable methodology for recovering Mill’s 
ideas and arguments from his manuscripts. The chapter also fully introduces the concept 
of ‘dissimulation’ in regard to Mill’s published writings, or the idea that what Mill 
could advance publicly in his early nineteenth-century British context was significantly 
limited by the political authorities of the day, who wished to restrict the distribution of 
writings they deemed politically dangerous or ‘seditious’. This theme is equally 
apparent in the second chapter, which focuses on the essay Government and allows for 
the assessment of both Mill’s specific ideas pertaining to political or parliamentary 
reform in the period widely referred to as the ‘Reform Crisis’ and his underlying 
theoretical approach to legislation. The third chapter is concerned with the essay 
Education, within which Mill advocated the importance of a population instructed in the 
pursuit of happiness and the exercise of its own reason. These were both crucial factors 
to Mill’s wider political thought, given that they contributed to the attainment of a 
popular ‘democratical sentiment’. Finally, in the last chapter, Mill’s thought concerning 
religion in the common place books is investigated, primarily in terms of his attitude to 
established religion, but also on the more complicated subject of his agnosticism, which 
itself presents an intriguing biographical question. Each chapter moves necessarily 
between commentary and context, in order to ascertain both the extent of Mill’s thought 
13 
 
and the various political, social, religious and intellectual influences which can be seen 
to be operating upon it. Significant space is also afforded to practical considerations 
regarding the nature of the particular manuscript material being studied, with regards to 
its date of composition and its location within the common place books. 
14 
 
1. ‘Quarries, not Ancient Temples’: A comparative study of 
James Mill’s published and unpublished writings on the 
liberty of the press 
I. 
Attached to the files of Robert Fenn’s transcription of James Mill’s common place 
books is a document entitled ‘Editing Principles’; a set of notes which outlined the 
small degree of fine-tuning necessary to complete what had become a lifetime’s work. 
Amongst these notes lies a simple but astute editorial observation about the common 
place books which is the inspiration both for this chapter and the wider thesis it is a 
constituent part of:  
If you compare [Mill’s] Britannica article ‘Liberty of the Press’ with the [manuscript] material in 
the various sections in [common place book volumes] I and II on the same topic you would be 
struck by what he did not use, and by what is not to be found.
19
 
The purpose of this chapter is to undertake the comparative study suggested by Fenn in 
his ‘Editing Principles’, and bring to light material that is omitted from the article on 
libel law Mill published in 1821 in the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(hereafter SupEB) entitled Liberty of the Press but which can be found in the common 
place books. A working hypothesis, also drawn from Fenn, is that the ideas sketched or 
expanded upon in the unpublished manuscript material but not present in Liberty of the 
Press will show that the article represents only a more moderate version of what might 
be considered Mill’s actual or true opinions about the subject. Connected with this 
objective, however, is a distinct methodological issue to address, concerning how the 
common place books actually function as a source for conducting the history of Mill’s 
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ideas in this way. This critique of the manuscripts – which forms part III of this chapter 
– aims to demonstrate their richness and breadth, and show that their content allows for 
the detailed contextualisation of Mill’s thought, more specifically by demonstrating the 
range of influences which operated upon it. In short, this chapter has both a very 
specific historical objective and functions as proof-of-concept for a method of 
investigating Mill’s intellectual history. In this latter role, the chapter’s outcome has 
clear implications for both the purposes of those which follow it, and the modus 
operandi of the wider thesis. 
The idea that Mill is censored, either through self-restraint or by external (e.g. editorial 
or political) influences, in an article which purports to examine issues of press 
censorship represents something of a paradox. This claim is not however necessarily 
contentious. Terence Ball, for example, has concluded that in Government, another of 
Mill’s essays published in the SupEB a year earlier and the subject of the next chapter, 
Mill ‘undoubtedly pull[ed] his punches and downplay[ed] arguments in favour of 
radically extending the franchise.’20 The distinct political context of early nineteenth-
century Britain, to be explored in both this and the next chapter of this thesis, meant that 
the espousal of very radical ideas in published form was highly susceptible to 
censorship from governmental authorities, and this in turn can explain a hesitance or 
reluctance identifiable in Mill’s published works. Indeed, the reactionary nature of the 
Attorneys General during Mill’s lifetime meant that moderation of the radical discourse 
was a practical necessity for writers who wanted to avoid the seemingly ever-present 
threat of prosecution for seditious libel. 
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An investigation which makes comparisons between what can be termed the public or 
published and the private or unpublished is methodologically complicated in the case of 
Mill, however, primarily because so little work has been done with the bulk of this 
private work: his manuscript material. If it is Fenn’s observations that there are 
significant discrepancies between the Liberty of the Press article and the associated 
sections within the common place books which motivate a comparative study, it is he 
who also dampens any initial enthusiasm that the common place books themselves 
might simply reveal more radical specimens of Mill’s published work ripe for such a 
comparison: ‘These [manuscripts] are not akin to Bentham’s manuscripts where large 
bodies of material in nearly complete form await the scholar’s hand and editorial 
judgement.’ The fundamental problem with using Mill’s common place books as 
sources in a comparative investigation is crystallized by Fenn with a turn of phrase 
appropriated as the title of this chapter. It also echoes resoundingly throughout the rest 
of the thesis: ‘the order of argument of the article is not to be found in the manuscripts. 
With few exceptions, the manuscripts must be seen as quarries, not as ancient temples 
slowly being uncovered by [Fenn’s] patient archaeological work.’21  
It therefore becomes obvious that the more straightforward proposed aim for this 
chapter – that is, the analysis of the difference between Mill’s writings destined for print 
(in this case the SupEB article) and what remained unseen or private (in his common 
place books), in order to show that Mill moderated his published output to make it less 
likely to attract censorship from governmental authorities – is not possible without 
establishing a methodology that grapples with the task of having to draw out Mill’s final 
argument from a source that is particularly fragmentary in nature. In turn, examining 
and attempting to combine the divergent material present in the manuscripts into an 
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authentic and coherent argument that is fit for comparison can give real depth to the 
question of what type of intellectual influences operated upon Mill’s thought. This is 
particularly relevant given the paucity of citations of other works which exists in Mill’s 
SupEB article. The common place books, conversely, actually function as veritable 
repositories of quotations, and allow a more thorough evaluation of such influences to 
take place. 
If this combining of objectives into an overall endeavour results in a modicum of 
success, it proves two things beyond the initial argument that Mill is more radical in his 
ideas about libel law than his published output suggests. First, it demonstrates that there 
is intrinsic value in the common place books as a source for providing context to Mill’s 
arguments about the liberty of the press. Second, it provides a justification to use such a 
methodology again in a comparative analysis of other topics that feature prominently in 
both Mill’s published and unpublished writings. The expansive nature of Mill’s 
bibliography – evidence of his intrepidness in intellectual endeavours – reveals a 
plethora of topics which interested him enough to warrant his own comment, both 
within the public and private domains. Within the confines of this particular thesis, 
further topics to be addressed using this methodology are on subjects pertaining to 
parliamentary reform, education and established religion, as outlined in the prologue 
and introduction. Fenn, thus far, appears to be the only scholar who has attempted a 
comparative analysis of a single topic that effectively straddles these two distinct realms 
of Mill’s work, when he used the common place books to widen his understanding of 
Mill’s true political philosophy. These results were particularly illuminating with regard 
to the different attitude towards the enfranchisement of the working classes expressed in 
the essay Government and in a reading of associated manuscript material, and some of 
18 
 
Fenn’s steps are retraced in the proceeding chapter. 22  Despite a synopsis of Mill’s 
common place books in existence as early as an appendix to Bain’s 1882 biography of 
Mill, however, very little other scholarly attention has ever been dedicated to them.
23
 
Before examining the nature and contents of Mill’s manuscript writings on the liberty of 
the press in earnest, some basic historical background to the inquiry needs to be 
provided. This involves brief definitions of what is meant by the term ‘radicalism’ in 
early nineteenth-century Britain, and also an examination of the structure of libel law, in 
particular the offence of seditious libel, employed somewhat fitfully by the state as a 
weapon against such radicalism during the same period. Both objectives help provide 
contextual understanding of, and justification for, what motivated Mill to write so 
vehemently and profusely on the liberty of the press around 1821, the year of 
publication of the SupEB essay. Simultaneously, these objectives supply the argument 
for why Mill was surreptitious in advancing the extent of his ideas in his published 
writings – a practice that this thesis refers to as dissimulation, or the art of not expressly 
saying what one thinks. 
It should be stated as a final introductory aside that this chapter treats the terms ‘liberty 
of the press’ and ‘libel law’ as interchangeable. Although clearly not synonymous, the 
terms are inextricably linked: William Blackstone saw libel law as ‘the key to the reality 
behind the phrase “liberty of the press”’, a sentiment echoed by Mill’s treatment of libel 
law in the introductory passages of the SupEB article.
24
 The offence at the heart of these 
terms – seditious libel – was defined at the trial of T.J. Wooler in 1817 as ‘a publication 
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calumniating his Majesty’s Ministers in the exercise of the Government’.25 It was, along 
with the religious equivalent of blasphemous libel, a major weapon used by the early 
nineteenth-century British governments to chill the press, and was a component of the 
infamous Six Acts, along with the outlawing of seditious meetings and the proscription 
of drilling, which followed the Peterloo massacre of 1819.
26
 Within the common place 
books, Mill effectively interchanged the terms ‘liberty of the press’ and ‘libel law’ and 
sometimes merged them together, for example in a personal memo when he sets out a 
desire to ‘point out the qualities desirable in a law for the liberty of the press. And then 
contrast them with the qualities of the supposed existing law.’27 A letter from Mill to his 
Britannica editor Macvey Napier further demonstrates this flexibility in terms by 
showing Mill’s nonchalance over what the article would eventually be titled.28  
Issues over technicalities spill over into one further basic observation when comparing 
the two types of source worth mentioning here: although in the SupEB article Mill 
ostensibly distinguishes between offences that might be committed by the press towards 
‘Private Rights’ and towards ‘Government’ by separating them into two sections of 
analysis, there is less effort to make such a partition in the manuscript. 
II. 
In order to bring the liberty of the press up to its status contemporaneous to Mill’s time 
in the early nineteenth century, more specifically when his SupEB essay was published 
in 1821, it is necessary to begin this study in the late seventeenth century, with the 
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lapsing of prepublication licensing laws. These laws, which had essentially allowed 
government control of the press, gave way to a new legal framework, introduced in 
1695 by Chief Justice John Holt, which considered all forms of defamation, be they 
personal attacks or those aimed towards the state, as national threats. Libel law therefore 
had its origins as a device to reinforce national integrity because it ‘protect[ed] the 
community from infighting and establish[ed] community standards for speech.’29 Mill 
would come to dismiss this ‘ground on which libel is prosecuted criminally’ as ‘the 
fiction that it tends to break the King’s peace.’30 In the eighteenth century, libels for 
political works continued to be criminally actionable when they were held to be likely 
to breach the peace, but the nature of the press itself was undergoing significant changes 
at this time which added complexity to the issue. Duplication technology and the 
development of provincial presses meant political information was now reaching further 
afield and attaining increased influence. Eckhart Hellmuth attributes the early 
radicalisation of the press in the 1760s – defined in part by their ruthless sarcasm and 
keen invective towards the political elites – as symptomatic of a developing popular 
political culture that these press advances contributed to.
31
 The political elites felt a 
distinction could be made between a ‘proper liberty of the press’ and this growing 
‘intellectual licentiousness’, or between what they labelled as ‘privilege’ and 
condemned as ‘insolence’. The press constantly undermined the traditional political 
elite’s monopoly of politics, so the elite continued to regard politics free of such 
populist pressures as an ideal. 
                                                 
29
 Kathryn Temple, Scandal Nation: Law and Authorship in Britain, 1750–1832 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 194–7. 
30
 Mill, CPB I 81
v
.
 
31
 Eckhart Hellmuth, “The ‘Palladium of All Other English Liberties’: Reflections on the Liberty of the 
Press in England during the 1760s and 1770s,” in The Transformation of Political Culture. England and 
Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century, ed. Eckhart Hellmuth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
471–3. 
21 
 
The political elites’ traditional conceptions of the press, its utility, and how it potentially 
threatened the mixed constitution were not at all shared by radicals or reformers, who 
found the publication of newspapers and pamphlets which propagated their ideas much 
more central and thus beneficial to their cause. Prosecutions for seditious libels 
increased exponentially in the years following the start of the French Revolution in 
1789,
32
 and in 1792, William Pitt issued a proclamation warning against the epidemic of 
‘wicked and seditious writings’ which sought to ‘excite tumult and disorder by 
endeavouring to raise groundless jealousies and suspicions’ in the King’s subjects.33 An 
attempt at reform of libel law in that year, Fox’s Libel Act, did have a noticeable 
reducing effect on the ability of the government to prosecute those accused of 
committing seditious libel, because it gave the jury the ability to decide not just upon 
the factual nature of a supposed libel, but crucially its inherent tendency to provoke a 
breach of the peace. The major concern of radicals, however, was the starkly arbitrary 
application of the law of libel by the government. Since there was ‘no predictable line 
of Home Office conduct’, ex officio informations (essentially court summons) and 
prosecutions were used to punish objectionable language a posteriori, and usually only 
during particular flashpoints of political volatility, such as following the Peterloo 
massacre of 1819 when a huge increase in prosecutions occurred, many of which were 
for selling the same pamphlet.
34
 Whilst the lack of consistency in the application of libel 
law may point initially to a relaxed approach to the press from government, in actual 
fact the uncertainty over action constituted a powerful weapon of oppression. Because 
the legal apparatus of the government in its pursuit of libellers could be financially 
ruinous to the accused, even for those acquitted, the scatter-gun approach of its 
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employment led to prosecutions for libel law effectively becoming like a game of 
roulette. At the turn of the nineteenth century, therefore, the government had a 
particularly strong legal capability to harass and suppress, if not convict, radicals, their 
supporters and the vendors of their literature, amounting to a concerted effort to control 
dissent by using libel law as an archetypal ‘Sword of Damocles’.35 Mill employed the 
words of Burke to describe this situation, which was termed ‘liberty by connivance’.36 
‘Radicalism’ itself covered a diverse section of the population – from working-class 
movements, to religious millenarianism, to the Benthamites who would become the 
Philosophic Radicals – but historically the term has been subdivided into two types: 
‘popular’ radicals, and middle-class or ‘intellectual’ radicals. Élie Halévy has described 
the latter grouping as giving doctrinal solidity to the former, whom he labelled the 
‘tumultuous and disordered radical agitation’.37 But although Mill is certainly to be 
called a ‘philosophic’ or ‘intellectual’ radical, it is incorrect to assume that writers of his 
ilk held a monopoly on the printed radical word that the state countered with threats of 
prosecution for seditious libel. By the same token, obviously the concerns that Mill held 
over the threat to the liberty of the press posed by the government and its associated 
legal actors (such as the Attorneys General) were not reserved only for his ‘philosophic’ 
brethren: he is very clear, both publicly and privately, on the importance of a liberal 
press, because it was a truly effective path to good governance (Mill also believed it the 
only real check on state power, because ‘public spirit’ in most men was ‘weak’.)38 This 
notion can be reinforced by the fact that when William Cobbett, the radical 
pamphleteer, was prosecuted for treasonous libel in 1810, Mill privately condemned 
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Cobbett’s subsequent imprisonment in Newgate as being for a ‘pretend crime’, despite 
the clear ideological cleavage apparent between the two.
39
 
A principal reason for a strong appetite for radical agitation in this period was the 
effects of the long war conducted on the continent. Whilst the political context of 
nineteenth-century Britain is of crucial importance to the next chapter on parliamentary 
reform, it is worth restating some basic details here. The conflict with France, at an 
approximate cost of £1,500 million, and a subsequent depression produced clear 
economic factors that exacerbated tensions at the start of the nineteenth century.
40
 Very 
basically, the post-1815 resumption of industry on the continent meant Europe had less 
need of the products of English labour. In turn, English industry had less need of 
workmen, and the workmen on lower wages ‘could no longer tolerate the regime of dear 
bread.’41 Indeed the influence of France’s role in explaining British nineteenth-century 
radicalism can also be seen from a rather different angle and much earlier than 1815, 
since Harling argues that it was the inherent fear of Tory ministers that they were facing 
a French-style revolution that led them to entertain using ‘the mailed fist [of the law of 
libel]… even in the heart of London’.42 In a similar vein, industrial relations had begun 
to suffer well before the cessation of European hostilities, with explosions in working 
populations and associated declines in working conditions aggravated by 
maldistribution of political power (Cornwall, for example, boasted twice as many MPs 
as Yorkshire but had a population only one quarter of the size), a limited electoral 
franchise, rotten boroughs, and flawed government policy decisions, such as the 
outlawing of trade unions in the Combination Laws of 1799. Halévy points to a general 
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revival of liberal and democratic opinions within the country in the first fifteen years of 
the nineteenth century which, when taken in light of the aforementioned economic and 
political concerns, can begin to reveal some, if not all, of the fundamental motivations 
for journalists to pen (and vendors to publish) ‘radical’ texts attacking the government, 
its actors and its various props, such as the Church or the legal system.
43
 In the opinion 
of the state, if these writings were to be considered a threat to national integrity then the 
authors and distributors could be prosecuted for seditious libel. 
It is not difficult to find within Mill’s common place books evidence of his own 
contempt for the prosecution of radical journalists on the grounds that their writings 
amounted to seditious libel, as the aforementioned reaction to Cobbett’s imprisonment 
shows. ‘If a tendency towards the breaking of the peace was a libel,’ writes Mill in one 
particular witticism, ‘then the selling of gin is the worst of libels.’ 44  However, an 
interesting more general point about the prosecutions for seditious libel is that the 
process began to be exploited by radicals for propaganda purposes, the public nature of 
the trials giving the accused ‘a forum [to] force the state to make its attitudes public … 
[and] by the 1820s the radicals had developed sophisticated methods for exploiting 
show trials and had high hopes for their political efficiency.’ 45  The most striking 
example of this, the trials of T.J. Wooler and William Hone, ended in ‘spectacular’ 
acquittals and forced a rethink of government policy on the effectiveness of libel law as 
a tool of repression.
46
 These observations, initially in tension with the evidence of 
Mill’s clear disdain for the libel prosecutions that took place in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, actually chime significantly with what this chapter will come to 
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term Mill’s ‘meditations’ on libel law found in the common place books: long, 
courtroom-based speeches set out as if Mill is the litigant addressing the jury at a trial 
for seditious or criminal libel, and where he seeks in his defence to mercilessly expose 
the logical and moral shortcomings of the current law. 
It cannot be said with conviction that Mill subscribed to this idea of utilising trials for 
propaganda purposes – in spite of his role as the Utilitarian propagandist-in-chief – 
because despite frequent controversy (primarily in the literary periodicals of the day) he 
never appeared to be personally in danger of being prosecuted, and some of his material 
appears to have been written well before this practice of exploiting the trials for political 
gain began in earnest. Mill did oppose the likes of Sir Samuel Romilly, however, 
concerning the decision on whether to publish Bentham’s Elements of the Art of 
Packing as Applied to Special Juries, printed in 1809 but not sold until 1821. Both 
Romilly and Bowring felt that the attorney general, Sir Vicary (“Vinegar”) Gibbs, 
would certainly prosecute Bentham for what was essentially ‘an attack upon the whole 
administration of justice’. 47  Mill’s use of the dialogue form in his manuscripts 
pertaining to libel law is, nevertheless, a fascinating and unexpected contribution to the 
overall utility of the common place books as a way of examining Mill’s own position on 
the liberty of the press. It is perhaps also the closest one may get to a reproduction of 
how Mill spoke. It is to a textual description of these meditations, as well as a critique 
of the other collated manuscript material on this subject present in the common place 
books, that this chapter now proceeds. 
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III. 
Robert Fenn’s image of Mill’s manuscripts as ‘quarries’, cited at the start of this 
chapter, is a particularly apt description of the common place books, given that they 
consist of scraps of material probably composed between 1810 and the mid-1820s 
which were merged, ordered and reordered into not always coherent forms throughout 
this time. Fortunately, the material with which this chapter is concerned is organised 
much more consistently than sections dedicated to Mill’s other interests.48 The content 
found under the title ‘Liberty of the Press’ exists across two of the volumes (I and II) 
and can be readily classified into two categories. The first category consists of extracts 
from other works such as books, pamphlets and newspaper articles. This compilation of 
material selectively quoted by Mill mimics the traditional ‘Lockean’-style of common 
placing, that is to say each extract from a source is referenced to an edition in Mill’s 
collection (or one to which he presumably had access) so that it could be recovered later 
for use in compositions.
49
 These extracts are particularly valuable in providing context 
to Mill’s ideas, because an impression can be conjured of the range of works he 
consulted whilst writing, as well as an idea of what comprised his personal library. This 
initial category can be further subdivided, the first subsection consisting of shorter 
passages from a multitude of other works, where fables (primarily cited from Sir Roger 
L’Estrange’s Fables of Aesop and Other Eminent Mythologists),50 the Bible, classical 
philosophy in both Latin and Greek, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and 
many Burke essays and speeches are the most frequently cited. The second subcategory 
consists of longer extracts (sometimes entire pages are copied verbatim) occasionally 
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complete with sparing commentary from works such as Francis Holt’s The Law of Libel 
and William Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. 
The inclusion of Holt’s work in the second is a typical example of the duality that some 
material in the common place books possesses, and also corroborates an argument 
advanced by William Thomas that the purpose of Mill’s common placing was to collect 
extracts for ‘controversial’ use, rather than for ‘private rumination’.51 Holt’s The Law of 
Libel was probably primarily read for its scrutiny of libel law as it stood in 1812, since 
the published essay Liberty of the Press was intended to provide a synoptic evaluation 
of the law of libel as it stood at the time of its publication. Yet it unmistakeably also 
contains interpretations of this law that Mill would find irresistible to argue against. 
When Holt affirms that libel law ‘contains nothing contradictory to the spirit of the 
[English] constitution’, for example, Mill can be envisaged issuing a rejoinder along the 
lines of ‘the course [lawyers] are pursuing is the very way to destroy the constitution of 
England.’52 The use of Paley’s Principles is similarly illuminating. It was a popular 
work made mandatory for Cambridge examinations from 1787 into the nineteenth 
century, and was probably useful to Mill in an elementary sense, for example where he 
uses it as evidence ‘to expose the evil of punishing without a legislative enactment’,53 
but the work’s religious principle of utility was a prompt for Bentham to pen his more 
secular Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation in 1789, and it was also 
rejected by the likes of Dugald Stewart, a scholar to whom Mill clearly owed a portion 
of his intellectual heritage, having studied moral philosophy under him at Edinburgh.
54
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To this extent the Principles seemingly also had a secondary employment as Mill’s 
intellectual fodder. The labelling of some material as ‘controversial’ can perhaps be 
expanded to include items Mill kept that assisted in normalizing his own opinions that 
had potential to be externally perceived as radical. Here, Mill’s collection of historical 
or literary instances that professed logic similar to his own arguments can be seen as 
devices which essentially helped moderate his output.
55
 His citation of Poggius 
Florentinus’s fable ‘A Priest and Epiphany’ alongside comments on the necessity to 
allow a ‘liberty of blame’ towards public functionaries to be as extensive as the existing 
‘liberty of praise’, is one such example of this technique being employed. Further, more 
striking examples of this technique will be illustrated in this chapter’s conclusion.56 
The second category of material comprises the items which have previously been 
described as Mill’s meditations on libel law, essentially dialogues written from the 
viewpoint of a presumably radical writer accused of seditious libel and defending 
himself at court. The word ‘Gentlemen’ is frequently found interposed in these pieces, 
as if the meditations were in fact a script with which to address the jury. These longer, 
more developed tracts dominate the material on the liberty of the press within the 
common place books, and they are key to developing a commentary which depicts 
Mill’s true position. In particular instances, the extracts show that Mill has distilled his 
thoughts and reading on libel law into sharpened rhetoric, in this first instance showing 
what Mill has taken from Paley’s Principles: 
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This is what Paley says. Wherever there is no precise definition, to give the judge a power of 
punishing, is just so much tyranny. Gentlemen the case is clear. There is no definition of libel. 
All punishment, as for libel, then, is just so much tyranny.
57
 
However there are considerable swathes of argument in the dialogues of the common 
place books that, much like the article Liberty of the Press, do not have verifiable 
literary references. Thus, suggestions of influences on Mill from other sources have to 
be tabled. In this example, the use of the term ‘master packer’ appears to allude to 
Bentham’s aforementioned Elements of the Art of Packing: 
This juries, even when fair—when unbiassed [sic], have been too ready to [yield up their 
decision to the will of the judge]—When they are chosen by the master packer, for their known 
servility, where the principal [sic] of selection operates upon the speciality of juries, the case is a 
case of sheer corruption, and flagrant injustice.
58
 
Stylistically there is much to describe about the meditations that is interesting. The 
arguments presented are methodical and the reasoning expressed by Mill, acting as the 
litigant, is impressive, for example: 
They say libel cannot be defined; yet they say that twelve unlettered men can in each individual 
instance tell what it is, and what it is not. But how can any man tell what is, or is not included in 
a general rule, if he knows not what the rule is?
59
 
Whilst maintaining a style laced with unrelenting logic and showcasing an ability to 
transform the abstract into elegant explanations which are not uncommon to his SupEB 
essays, what is very different within the manuscripts is a demonstration of Mill’s 
capability to argue passionately, which is a quality not particularly utilized in his 
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published writings, Mill usually preferring to attend to his arguments with cold 
rationality and withering logic: 
Why was not Ld. Erskine punished for his pamphlet on the war—Burke for his Thoughts on the 
cause of the present discontents, etc.? Did these men mean to raise sedition? Was Ld. Erskine a 
Jacobin—Did Mr. Burke mean anarchy—was Chatham an enemy of social order, legitimate 
government and holy religion—Was Mr. Locke an incendiary? No—Gentlemen—these great, 
and ever venerable patriotes, did not believe with the lawyers that censorial writings on 
government had no tendency but to make men seditious.
60
 
Alas finally, however, it is worth showing that a peculiarity of the meditations is that 
there are more rhetorical flourishes present within them than in any of Mill’s published 
writings, to the extent that, in spite of accounting for the nature of the courtroom setting 
and its perceived decorum, they verge towards the ridiculous: 
Had I but the talents and experience which are this day exerted against me, and unhappily 
against the cause, what a flame of holy, of consecrated zeal, consecrated to the good of 
humanity, should I kindle within you.
61
 
If the meditations can deliver snatches of Mill’s thought in a form that appears 
unhindered by a necessity to moderate, then they point to what can be deemed Mill’s 
unfettered opinion about the law of libel, and this is extremely valuable to the chapter’s 
wider objectives. One issue that persists, however, is how to arrange these extracts into 
some kind of chronology. The conundrum of dating applies to both types of manuscript 
material thus far described but in varying degrees. Since Mill rarely dated anything, 
three different approaches can be used to determine when parts of the material on 
liberty of the press were written. Much can be gained by Fenn’s detective work with 
regard to the physical construction of the manuscripts. Since a significant proportion of 
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the material is written on the back of envelopes and letters – which is not an unexpected 
practice given that paper was an expensive commodity in the early nineteenth century – 
a useful offshoot of this hoarding of scraps is that the postmark of the envelope or 
watermark of the paper provides a way of accurately determining the date after which 
the particular text was written, which is at least a partial remedy for aforementioned 
chronological concerns. One issue is that a postmark of 1820 cannot guarantee 
composition began at that time, since the manuscripts frequently contain passages 
written over several scraps which have different dates. At best, one can gauge a range 
over which the material might have been composed. An augmentation of the ability to 
determine dates of scraps comes in the analysis of Mill’s hand, in that the distinct 
enlargement of this, attributed to his poor eye sight and crippling gout, allows for the 
identification of later work such as the material towards the end of the collection in 
volume II.
62
 Finally, Mill’s typical common placing, that is expressly the noting of 
extracts from the various works he had read, assists in the fact that the publication dates 
of these items, if contemporary to Mill’s time, can help anchor the particular scraps they 
are written upon – a point which is obviously valid when applied to clippings from 
newspapers, speeches, and references to political events, for instance the citing of the 
1809 case against Denis Hogan, who was accused of libelling the Duke of York in a 
pamphlet.
63
 It is, of course, necessary to concede that Mill may not have read every 
contemporary item he cited in the year of its publication, nor comment on events within 
the year of their occurrence. 
The conclusions drawn by Fenn about the dating of the material are worth repeating 
here: the second section of material in CPB I (between folio pages 81
r
 and 105
v
) has 
nothing later than 1812–13, that is to say well before the SupEB article was published. 
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Therefore any similarities in tenets held or arguments found will suggest an intellectual 
position held for at least a decade. The first section in that volume (between folio pages 
3
r
 to 19
v
) has material up to the mid-1820s, i.e. contemporaneous to the publication of 
Mill’s article in 1821. The material in CPB II probably comes from the late 1810s, as a 
significant number of scraps have been dated 1817–18, until the early 1820s since, as 
aforementioned, some scraps are in Mill’s later enlarged hand. All of these conclusions 
have clear ramifications on the issue of determining the intellectual influences on Mill 
within the sections on ‘Liberty of the Press’, since they all date after the introduction of 
Mill to Bentham and, in effect, correspond to the period where their working 
relationship was at its closest. In particular, it should be noted that a significant number 
of scraps written on the reverse of the envelopes found in volume 2 reveal addresses of 
various Bentham residences, such as Forde Abbey in Somerset.
64
 
IV. 
In accounting for the differences that arise between the essay Liberty of the Press and 
the manuscripts when considering the content of their respective arguments, it is 
prudent to separate the instances where comparisons have been made into categories. 
These categories make progressively greater contributions of value to this chapter’s 
objective of determining whether Mill moderated his position for the published SupEB 
article when it is compared to the radical ideas found in his common place books. Such 
categories are delineated as follows: 1) comments by Mill on the contemporary legal 
status of the law of libel and the associated criticism levelled at lawyers and judges who 
exploit it; 2) Mill’s argument that a strong correlation exists between a free press and 
good governance, which includes the virtues of criticism and the dangers of false praise; 
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and finally, 3) the overwhelming belief expressed by Mill in truth as an effective 
counter to false facts, including against even the grossest of libels. 
It is in the final section of the SupEB article where Mill begins to attack the ‘manifold 
deformities of the English law of libel’ – its unstable nature owing to a lack of statutory 
definition. Mill progresses logically, starting from the perceived legal doctrine that ‘all 
indecency in discussion should be punished as a libel’, to show that ‘decent’ and ‘what 
the judge likes’ are generally synonymous. This leads Mill to explode the fallacy that 
only true opinions are decent, arguing that if that is so, it is a short road to describing all 
discussion as indecent.
65
 This sentiment is reproduced in the manuscripts in a more 
radical guise when Mill, in one of his courtroom dialogues, explains to the jury that 
definitions of libel law propagated by lawyers would, if executed consistently, result in 
‘put[ting] almost every man in the country in a prison.’66 Indeed the manuscripts show 
Mill repeatedly resorting to this question of the meaning of libel within the wider law. 
In demonstrably earlier passages Mill complains that the press enjoys libel ‘under 
connivance’, and that it is, echoing Burke’s Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant 
Dissenters, ‘like the law of pains and penalties against dissenters. It is not enforced – it 
is not executed in one out of a thousand cases in which it is violated.’ There is ‘nothing 
positive’ about a law of libel that is ‘still unwritten, still vague’.67 In admirable foresight 
of the market for his SupEB article, he acknowledges that it is ‘not easy to make 
[ordinary minds] perceive the Mischief of a vague, unwritten law’,68 whilst in later parts 
probably written in 1819, since there is a reference on the reverse side of the same scrap 
to an article from the Morning Chronicle written in that year, Mill refers to the legal 
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‘conspiracy’ that refuses to define seditious libel, because ‘they’ know that to do so 
would shock the population.
69
 
Even though the dating of material in this category of analysis shows Mill’s concern 
over the questionable legal status of libel law was certainly long-running, it is not 
possible to show that the argument found within the common place books is inherently 
more radical in content than that which Mill makes in his SupEB article. Mill’s logical 
reasoning – based on the idea that libel law is without definition and therefore without 
substance and, thus, legally dangerous and morally bankrupt – is essentially the same. 
Nor is Mill’s complaint original or radical per se, since Mill refers both to Burke, who 
expressed a corresponding sentiment as early as 1771, and to the noting of a protest 
signed by a number of Lords on the passing of the bill for restricting the liberty of the 
press in December 1819, which ‘points out very strongly the importance of defining a 
libel.’70 Fundamentally, the principles of Mill’s argument are also in line with that 
found in Bentham’s Elements of the Art of Packing, a work published in 1821 but 
printed several years beforehand, in which it is surmised that if the law of libel were to 
be ‘consistently and completely executed’ it would reduce the government of England 
to despotism.
71
 
Strong differences do exist, however, in the treatment reserved for judges and lawyers 
in the common place books. Mill rephrases his accusation found in the SupEB article 
that judges set their own standards for decency, but he is much more inflammatory, 
insinuating that they ‘make libel law whatsoever they please’. Mill also deliberately 
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questions their impartiality, arguing that the government has an interest in corrupting 
them: 
English judges have always been ready to abet the executive government in its warfare upon the 
liberties of the people … if we depend for [virtue in judges] upon individual merit, we shall be 
disappointed. Men are men – and yield to temptation.72 
Even if Mill’s opinion on judges can be somewhat tempered by him attributing their 
behaviour to either a human sense of fallibility or, couched in more Benthamic terms as 
necessary for them to receive a reward, Mill’s accusations against lawyers seem to bear 
less internal restraint, for lawyers force authors to ‘only write in applause of them and 
other instruments of evil’ in order to avoid prosecution, which for Mill is intolerable: 
If we see a man who, to our eyes is guilty of mischief to his country, and unless his conduct is 
exposed will continue to work mischief—must we praise him? [I]f so, we must aid him, in 
ruining our country.
73
 
In an allusion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, Mill calls English lawyers ‘stoicks’, who equate a 
censure of the government with the burning down of a city.
74
 Whilst the incendiary 
nature of Mill’s comments seems indicative of a more general, pressing desire to 
remedy injustices within the English legal system, their analysis can only lead to 
rudimentary conclusions when used to answer the more general question about the true 
extent of Mill’s radicalism. The remarks undeniably portray Mill as a vicious 
commentator on both the failings of the law itself, and the character of the actors 
associated with it and who propagate its misuse. They are also reminiscent of the 
acerbic comments made about judges in Bentham’s Art of Packing, in which their 
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particular actions are divided into two accusatory groupings relating to either corruption 
or deception.
75
 But in these points Mill is fundamentally circumspect on what 
intentions, radical or otherwise, he might have to fix the broad problems he ascribes to 
the incumbent legal system, beyond the rehashed and unoriginal requirement for 
statuary definition of a libel. It is therefore obvious why these passages on judges and 
lawyers found within the manuscripts are not included in Mill’s published article: they 
were too critical of public functionaries, of course, but moreover, they were 
unconstructive. Beyond this conclusion, in considering that the overarching purpose of 
Mill’s SupEB articles was in one regard to act as expositions of Utilitarian doctrine, the 
need to exclude exasperated, sometimes unfocused criticism of this nature against the 
incumbent legal system beyond a dignified critique seems obvious. This marks the limit 
to which the existential factors of nineteenth-century libel law affected Mill’s writing 
upon the subject, and the rest of this essay’s conclusions focus on the manuscript 
content concerned with matters not essentially rooted in the contemporary legal debates 
of the day. 
On the subject of the utility of a free press to the state, Mill’s opinion is forthcoming in 
his published article, where he deems it the only adequate check on government, and 
argues that restraint upon it leads directly to despotism.
76
 Within the common place 
books Mill cites the example of America to rail against the Attorney General’s 
assumption that a free press is actually the very reverse of this position, i.e. that it would 
destroy government: 
… one would suppose pandemonium to exist wherever there is a free press. Do the feelings of 
the Americans, the men who experience this curse, correspond with his speeches? Do they hate 
their own country? for this is what was to be expected. Do they curse their own institutions? Do 
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they prefer those of other countries? One would suppose, if the Attorney General speaks the 
truth, that not a rational creature would live in America, who could get away from it.
77
 
Equally prevalent is a warning about the dangers of ‘undeserved praise’ of public men, 
which Mill considers ‘as mischievous as undeserved blame’, because the permitting of 
only favourable sentiments towards such figures in the press can establish an inherently 
dangerous public opinion, skewed by unrealistically positive perceptions.
78
 As 
aforementioned, one might consider here what Mill owes to Burke for this argument, 
since there is a reference within the common place books to Burke’s speech of 27 May 
1790 during the Trial of Warren Hastings, in which is highlighted his concerns about 
the ‘venality of the press’.79 The usefulness of a free press and the dangers of false 
praise, which are both subjects given some regard in the SupEB article,
80
 are also 
integral notions to Mill’s more general theory on the utility of criticism, a concept 
afforded significant depth in the manuscripts, and which Mill is effective at employing 
in two related ways. Initially, Mill is keen to outline the effects of a ‘grand fallacy’, 
which is the belief that criticism of the government comes from those who wish to 
destroy it: ‘either praise or hold your tongue… is Bonaparte’s doctrine’, argues Mill in 
an early scrap.
81
 Such a fallacy is promoted because ‘men do not like to have their faults 
pointed out; and the very use of a free press is to point out the faults of public men’ 
even though, in actual fact, ‘the stronger a man’s love to good government the stronger 
naturally his hatred of bad[.] [C]riticism of government therefore is so far from a proof 
that a man wishes to destroy government that it is the very reverse.’82 Mill collated 
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historical and classical examples to prove this last point. Cromwell had, in the words of 
Clarendon at least, the ability to ‘bear ill language and reproaches with less disturbance 
and concernment than any person in authority had ever done.’ Louis XII did not take 
vengeance on the playwright who ridiculed him on stage, because ‘they [did] me 
justice; they believe[d] me worthy of hearing the truth.’ Isocrates, to Nicocles, said: 
‘Regard as your most faithful friends, not those who praise everything you say or do, 
but those who criticize your mistakes’.83  
The second exploration Mill conducts into the utility of criticism sees an amalgamation 
of his theory of its virtues with the previously discussed problem of the lack of statutory 
definition for the law of libel and the related inconsistency in its execution, which Mill 
uses to build a logical justification to encourage active libelling of the ruling classes. In 
an example found in both volumes of his common place books, Mill rhetorically asks 
why an employer’s reference on the character of a servant, when it portrays them 
negatively and disrupts their chances of new employment, is not defined as a libel. Mill 
states that the lawyer’s justification in such a case would be thus: whilst such injury to 
their character may be ‘unfavourable’ to the servant, it is inherently ‘useful’ to the 
employer and, thus, the community.
84
 Mill transposes the tenets of the argument into a 
more general, ‘admirable’ rule: that ‘wherever the good of the community is served by 
freedom of speech, that freedom is legal, however hurtful to the individual against 
whom it is applied.’85 He then lambasts the perceived hollow logic of lawyers that this 
particular development has revealed: 
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But Oh, gentlemen, what a difference between the case in which the lawyers allow this freedom, 
and that in which they do not allow it. Where they do allow it the advantage is insignificant 
compared with that in which they do not allow it—work the difference.86 
The inference from Mill’s argument is clear: if it is permissible to libel servants because 
it is ‘useful’, there is nothing to suppose that the libelling of public figures is not equally 
useful. In one occurrence of this argument, which Mill writes on paper watermarked 
1815 but which refers to a report in the Morning Chronicle published in January 1818, 
his repeated use of the phrase ‘good for the community’ to describe libels is instructive. 
Whilst Mill appears to be discussing only the necessity of libels against public figures to 
ensure good governance, his argument appears flexible enough to be applied to the 
writing of all libels irrespective of their targets, that is to say without the distinction that 
exists in the SupEB article between offences towards individuals and towards 
government. This flexibility is apparent because Mill repeatedly implies a communal 
benefit arising from a more liberal acceptance of libels, using language that seems 
remarkably similar to the sentiment of Holt’s legal framework of 1695, which employed 
the law of libel to set community standards for speech. Mill has effectively inverted 
Holt’s original argument for introducing libel law, and has brought its utility full circle: 
if one is concerned with the good of the community, texts that may currently be 
considered ‘libels’ actually need to be encouraged rather than punished. 
The same tenets for this argument can also be found in material written much earlier 
(i.e. no later than 1813) in the manuscripts. This early occurrence is also interesting 
because, on the same scrap, Mill affixes a memo to ‘[c]ollect all the instances of this 
sort’,87 presumably in a similar vein to where he collated examples of public figures and 
classical authors accepting criticism and lauding its benefits. Mill’s continued 
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motivation for adding legitimacy to his ideas through the crafty use of general historical 
and philosophical examples may be because it was a useful device to moderate ideas 
that would be perceived as radical, if it can be proved that what he prescribed was 
merely a reformulation of thought that had prior-existence in certain more venerable 
minds. However, this second instance of the argument is also crucial in that it implies an 
uncertainty to Mill’s position, with regards to what limits should be placed on the 
publishing of libels. On the reverse of this earlier scrap can be found Mill explicitly 
stating the idea that freedom of speech ought not to be permitted in cases where it is 
injurious to the nation, or injurious to individuals without benefitting the nation, which 
Mill, in another example of mixing ‘libel law’ and ‘liberty of the press’, extrapolates 
into what he might consider a general maxim of the press.
88
 This is a notion seemingly 
transferred wholesale to the SupEB article, particularly in the section dedicated to 
offences of the press versus individual rights.
89
 Yet there is an obvious tension here 
between the ‘positive’ intervention in the liberty of the press to prevent injury that Mill 
develops in the pre-1813 scrap, and the ‘negative’ concept of an unrestrained practice of 
libelling for the communal good found chronologically later: one clearly cannot have 
both, and the rather flimsy assurance that Mill gives within the SupEB article with 
regards to building consensus on what particular truths (such as those inherited at birth) 
could be forbidden to prevent injury hints at where Mill’s true opinion eventually lies.90  
However, even if it is possible that Mill favours no restraints upon the press, what still 
remains is how one accounts for the potential damage to reputations that might occur 
from the torrent of statements that his general encouragement of libels seems destined to 
create. In one response to these concerns, Mill engages the abstract idea of indefatigable 
                                                 
88
 Mill, CPB I 91
v
. 
89
 Mill, “Liberty of the Press,” 104–5. 
90
 Ibid., 110. 
41 
 
truth, a concept which comprises the final category of analysis between manuscript and 
article. The defence Mill routinely employs against the danger of false libels – to 
personal reputation and to government alike – is an unrelenting belief in truth as ‘the 
remedy to false facts’.91 Indeed, the importance in establishing truth in cases of libel 
wholly eclipses any talk within the common place books of methods for obtaining 
compensation for injuries to reputation that occur when damaging falsehoods are 
propagated to the extent that truth takes on a dual role as both the defence to false libels 
and seemingly the only reward necessary in the event of dismissal of such falsehoods. 
This is in distinct contrast to Mill’s discussion of pecuniary recompense measures in the 
SupEB article.
92
 This idea of indefatigable truth is critical in an attempt to establish 
Mill’s final position with regards to the liberty of the press and the associated law of 
libel, and predictably also represents the most radical component of his thought not 
revealed in his published writings. Within the common place books, Mill argues that 
‘freedom of the press [is] the cure for its own evils… false accusations can never be 
dangerous, except where freedom of speech is first annulled’,93 but he builds upon this 
argument to a more drastic, albeit nuanced, position than that expressed in his SupEB 
article. Even if the press published ‘all imputations, just and unjust, without 
punishment,’ Mill argues that ‘members of government would not be without 
protection. Just defence [is] naturally more powerful than unjust attack.’94 Mill regards 
the inherently powerful nature of truth as practically sufficient to secure society against 
the dangers of falsehoods perpetrated in the press. If all opinions are expressly 
permitted, truth will always supersede any machinations intent on propagating 
falsehoods. 
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Thus the position that Mill appears to reach in the common place books is an argument 
for the revocation of the law of libel. Simply put, there should be no restrictions on what 
can be said in the press, because to do so may prevent truth being disseminated. This is 
clearly a significant departure from what might be perceived as an acceptable opinion to 
advance publicly, and again Mill is found employing the technique of using historical 
examples – in this case classical references – to help reinforce his logical outcomes and 
portray them as not, therefore, technically or particularly ‘radical’. In one instance, Mill 
cites Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric to help compound his argument: quoting that ‘generally 
speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more 
likely to persuade.’95 Despite the precarious nature of this conclusion, drawn out from a 
source which has been demonstrated as problematic, there are undoubtedly echoes of 
Mill’s sentiments about truth within the SupEB article itself. For example, in Mill’s 
assertion that ‘the rule of permitting truth ought to be universal’,96 or in his argument 
that limiting unfavourable opinions on government infringes the benefits of a free press 
to such an extent that ‘hardly any security for good government can remain.’97 Mill 
even employs an expressly Utilitarian calculation which hints at this position, when he 
suggests that the benefits of establishing truth in cases of ‘really hurtful acts’ are 
seemingly greater than the ‘inconvenience’ experienced by a ‘[small] number of 
persons’.98 
The inherently radical nature of Mill’s final position in advocating the revocation of the 
law of libel gives the clearest indication yet of proof of this chapter’s original 
hypothesis: that Mill restrained his published output by paring down his ideas on the 
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liberty of the press. But in pushing this judgement further, the question that arises from 
having shown that Mill logically arrived at such a radical position is to ask precisely 
why such revelations were then not included in published work such as his SupEB 
article. This particular question can pave the way to a more general summary of this 
chapter’s conclusions. 
V. 
One reason that this chapter has frequently used to account for the differences in 
argument advanced in the published and the private instances of Mill’s thought is his 
political context. It has been argued that Mill, as a radical journalist, felt compelled by 
external influences to moderate his output for fear of prosecution for seditious libel, the 
very thing his writings on the liberty of the press was designed to undermine. A 
different way to portray the moderation of Mill’s thought, however, but using the same 
context, may be to describe him as a shrewd manipulator of the press, and such a 
distinction places him much more conspicuously within the activities of the Philosophic 
Radicals. Joseph Hamburger observed that the significance of Mill’s proposals in 
Liberty of the Press lay ‘in the way they reveal his view of the press as an instrument 
for provoking a constitutional crisis that might be resolved by the concession of 
fundamental reforms.’99 In essence, the conclusions drawn in this chapter echo such a 
thesis: despite Mill’s privately held opinions on the law of libel, his fundamental 
understanding of using the press as a way to destabilise government meant that, if his 
objective was the advancement of a grand Utilitarian reform project, only a moderate 
account of his beliefs was initially necessary in the SupEB article. Because Mill had a 
rational grounding in the politics of the day, which led to an understanding that 
wholesale change was practically impossible in the current political situation but 
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piecemeal reform was attainable if radical tracts could be devised properly, there was 
less need to advance the more extreme parts of his argument at the time of the 
publication of Liberty of the Press. Such a conclusion, of course, also mirrors Terence 
Ball’s argument for Mill’s moderation of the essay on Government outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, that Mill deliberately downplayed his arguments on 
extending the franchise. 
If contextual reasons can thus account for why Mill may have moderated the full extent 
of his ideas in his SupEB article, and suggest that he may never have intended to write a 
tract that reflected his real position in relation to the liberty of the press, what remains is 
to judge how effective the particular methodology employed in this chapter has been in 
revealing this more radical position. The comparative study of Liberty of the Press and 
Mill’s manuscripts was crucial here for placing the more controversial passages of the 
common place books in sharp relief. This chapter’s analysis of the manuscript material 
was also useful in establishing the primary intellectual influences on Mill’s writings 
about the liberty of the press. In this regard one of the main conclusions drawn is the 
role Bentham plays in the content of Mill’s common place books. This is in opposition 
to the conclusions of Halévy, who thought Mill’s opinions on press freedom were set 
without influence from Bentham.
100
 Fenn, however, saw the majority of the manuscript 
writings about the liberty of the press as part of a wider ‘Benthamite concern over the 
proper theory and practice of rewards and punishments’.101 
The importance of the liberty of the press to Mill’s wider political thought expressed in 
his manuscripts can also be assessed via reference to this thesis’ prologue. A free press 
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was a ‘key of knowledge’ for the population, and along with the provision of basic 
literacy, it would provide them with reading material that would act as an antidote to 
any corruptive or tyrannical opinions handed down by the institutions of political 
power, such as the government or an established church. Thus even if Mill seems 
willing to concede on the extent of the freedom offered to the press for the benefit of the 
pressing political objectives of the day, it is undeniable that a truly free press was a 
fundamental component of his wider political thought. It is towards another important 
aspect of this thought, Mill’s ideas pertaining to how the population could attain good 
government through democratic innovation, that this thesis now turns, where the 
methodological approach first advanced in this chapter is applied to Mill’s writings on 
parliamentary reform. 
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2. ‘A cry for philosophy’: James Mill’s politics of reform and 
the essay on Government 
I. 
[I]s it not strange that a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, avowedly founding his arguments on 
utility… should deliberately, in the very threshold of his argument, put aside one half the human 
race, of all ages and all characters and conditions, as unentitled to consideration? 
William Thompson, Appeal of One Half the Human Race
102
 
This chapter is a study of James Mill’s ideas on parliamentary reform, and focuses in 
particular on determining the radical extent of such ideas in their early nineteenth-
century British context. Whilst each chapter in this thesis purports to study an aspect of 
Mill’s political thought, it is this one in particular where two of Mill’s most discernibly 
political texts are considered for comparison. The first of such texts is the essay 
Government, perhaps the most well-known apparent exposition of Mill’s politics, 
published in the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (hereafter SupEB) in 1820 
and subsequently in a collection of essays in 1823. The second text selected is not 
constituted in anything like as formal a way; it consists instead of manuscript writings 
primarily concerning the issue of parliamentary reform found in Mill’s common place 
books, from about 1812 onwards, and heretofore subject only to fleeting scholarly 
attention.
103
 Naturally, both primary sources come with a range of methodological 
problems, not least how their particular selection can be justified out of Mill’s colossal 
bibliography. It is the purpose of this introduction to address such matters, as well as 
introduce a range of contextual and conceptual issues which also surround this 
particular topic. These issues are primarily concerned with a difficulty of definition 
                                                 
102
 William Thompson, Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women: Against the Pretensions of the 
Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political, and Thence in Civil and Domestic, Slavery; in Reply to a 
Paragraph of Mr. Mill’s Celebrated “Article on Government”. (London: Richard Taylor, 1825), 4. 
103
 See for example Fenn, “The Nature and Structure of Mill’s Political Arguments.” 
47 
 
which persists when studying Mill’s political thought, relating to both his objectives and 
his vocabulary. 
According to Mill’s biographer Alexander Bain, Government was ‘a principal factor… 
in the train of events culminating in the Reform Bill of 1832.’104 Other more-or-less 
contemporary observations of the essay, however, were far less emphatic in praise of its 
discernible virtues. One major and indeed infamous tenet of Government – its argument 
for a limited extension of the franchise which would exclude women, children, and men 
under 40 – attracted particular controversy. According to J.S. Mill, the justification for 
such an exclusion sat uncomfortably with his fellow Philosophic Radicals, whilst he 
himself thought it was the worst paragraph his father had ever written.
105
 It also deeply 
troubled William Thompson, who criticised it as a betrayal of Mill’s philosophical 
principles. It inspired his book-length Appeal of One Half the Human Race, a quotation 
from which, that hints at a perceived reticence or restraint in Mill’s writing, forms this 
section’s epigraph. Yet to most establishment (i.e. Whig and Tory) politicians, the 
extension of the franchise even this far was dangerously democratic.
106
 A basic, if 
predictable, problem with perceiving Government’s radical extent, therefore, is that 
contemporary judgements about such a feature rest wholly on subjective interpretations 
of its content. 
More modern analyses, meanwhile, are unsure even of the true purposes of 
Government. Some run counter to Bain’s perception, regarding it as far too abstract or 
theoretical and hence of limited practical value to the reform politics of the 1820s and 
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1830s.
107
 One notable feature of the essay was that its argument rested on a priori 
foundations, Mill professing that political laws were to be deduced from a science of 
human nature, where experience had been condensed into axioms. Along similar lines, 
Government has also been criticised for giving little insight into Mill’s true ideas, 
because the language employed in it was deliberately ambiguous,
108
 or the literary 
equivalent of someone rolling with the punches.
109
 Other commentators, moreover, see 
the essay’s main function as a thinly-veiled Benthamite critique of contemporary 
approaches to reform.
110
 In other words, it is an exposition of all that Mill detested 
about other attempts to reform the British political system which had come to be 
colloquially known as “Old Corruption”, but it professed little by way of its own 
remedy. If any, all, or a combination of these three later readings are true, one wonders 
whether Government can actually divulge anything about Mill’s political thought at all. 
Concerns about utility can also be raised about the extracts this chapter selects from 
Mill’s common place books, although they themselves offer a different set of 
challenges. Many of these issues are an echo of the broader methodological problems of 
this thesis initially outlined in chapter 1. In terms of construction, these manuscript 
writings do not really represent a text in any publishable or easily-consumable form. 
Instead they are a collection of fragments, either passages of Mill’s own writing, or else 
extracts from, and analyses of, the works of other authors, organised together into 
chapters in a fashion which is not always entirely lucid. The ability to date the material 
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is of pivotal importance, because it helps explain a certain limitation these selections 
impose on the chapter’s wider objectives. They commence after Mill first met Bentham, 
and the majority were also composed after Mill’s apparent conversion to Benthamite 
Utilitarianism, which, it is argued, can be seen played out in issues of the Edinburgh 
Review between 1808 and 1813.
111
 There is little that can be positively identified as 
coming from post-1825, and this is one reason why Government is compared to the 
manuscripts, rather than a later text such as the Fragment on Mackintosh (completed 
1832, published 1835). The Fragment was also an exposition of Mill’s political thought, 
if wrapped in a concerted attack upon its eponymous Whig target. 
In addition to the dating of material, Mill’s organisation of it is also critical. The 
headings given to chapters which have a primarily political focus are inconsistent, and 
from this the first instance of the aforementioned difficulty of definition in this topic can 
be glimpsed. The manuscript sections utilised in this chapter are to be found under a 
range of titles, from the more recognizable ‘Reform’/‘Parl.[iamentary] Ref.[orm]’112 (of 
which three separate chapters have been discerned, separable by date of composition) 
and ‘Miscellaneous Politics’, to the more obscure ‘Aristocracy’, ‘Speculation & 
Practice’ and ‘Ins and Outs’. Interestingly, the heading ‘Government’ is not used 
anywhere. 
Despite this range of misgivings about the primary texts consulted for this chapter, from 
problems regarding subjectivity and reticence in Government to issues of provenance 
and obfuscation in the manuscripts, both the published essay and the common place 
books are eminently fit for this chapter’s purposes of a study of Mill’s political thought 
pertaining to parliamentary reform when the two sources are considered together. Such 
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an argument is leveraged upon the fact that within the common place books can actually 
be found the working material for the SupEB essay, and it is from this discovery that a 
methodological justification for how this chapter proceeds is developed. Such working 
material exists in two distinct forms. Some extracts can be used to understand Mill’s 
devotion to the deductive or a priori delineation of political laws, which was the 
method employed extensively in Government and also the subject of much of its 
criticism. Other selections contextualise the actual content of Government, that is to say 
the particular political reforms it advocates, and this in turn allows for commentary on 
what Mill’s intended objectives actually were when he wrote the essay. 
In a similar vein to Robert Fenn’s conclusion about the relationship between Mill’s 
article Liberty of the Press and its related manuscript material stated in the previous 
chapter, a complete draft of Government is also not to be found within the common 
place books. A similar attempt at reconstruction of an unpublished version of the text is 
thus required. But the nature of the material present in the manuscripts does allow for 
the exploration of a major recurring question of this thesis: is Mill’s thought more 
radical in scope than his published writings demonstrate? A comparative analysis 
between published and unpublished material, based on the conviction that Mill’s pen 
would be far less restrained when writing privately, certainly seems the most productive 
way to outline such radicalism. This task constitutes one of the core objectives of this 
chapter. 
In assuming that such a comparative study will show Mill to be more radical in thought 
when writing privately, a distinctly related question follows, namely: why would Mill 
moderate his published output? This itself finds its answer in the chapter’s other major 
objective: the investigation of Mill’s political and intellectual context. However, since 
such a pursuit has other functions – it provides, for example, a large degree of narrative 
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scene-setting for the period of interest – the chapter’s contextual study actually precedes 
the comparative one, and is taken up in parts II, III and IV below. 
Questions about Mill’s context, when combined with a perceived problem of definition 
when talking about his politics, provide a third more conceptual argument for 
comparing Government with the common place books. The fact that some working 
material for the essay exists in a manuscript chapter entitled ‘Reform’ or ‘Parl. Ref’ 
warrants an attempt to pin down what is meant when we talk about Mill’s political ideas 
in this chapter. More precisely, this is a question about the true nature of his reform 
objectives, and by extension the depths of his radicalism. Mill’s commitment to the a 
priori or deductive method raises particular questions about his specific attitude to 
parliamentary reform. The question is whether the logical product of Mill’s theoretical 
approach to legislation is actually compatible with the realities of the political context 
he inhabited, where piecemeal or pragmatic approaches to politics ran up against more 
radical, wholesale or revolutionary interpretations. 
An analysis of the context within which Government was written – a period of 
extraordinary political commotion in Britain – for the purposes of explaining 
differences between his published and unpublished political writing is also a very direct 
route into understanding the range of influences operating upon Mill. These influences 
can broadly be seen as apportioned into two major types. First, those relating to Mill’s 
political context in both broad and specific terms. In the former this regards, for 
example, the impact of the French Revolution and its ensuing wars on Britain. In the 
latter it concerns, say, the importance of the Whig Party’s position on parliamentary 
reform in the 1820s. Second, those influences identified as intellectual in character, such 
as that of the Scottish Enlightenment on Mill’s upbringing and education, and the 
importance of Bentham and his doctrine of Utilitarianism to Mill’s ideas following their 
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first meeting and subsequent collaboration as leading theorists of the Philosophic 
Radicals. These are the contexts, identified in the thesis’ introduction, which previous 
studies of Mill’s intellectual history have typically sought to illuminate. Beyond these 
two particular examples of intellectual influence, however, lie Mill’s more understated 
literary influences. This is predicated to a greater extent on the extensive source 
material available in the form of the common place books, which clearly demonstrates 
Mill’s voracious appetite for reading. Although any glance at Mill’s bibliography of 
review articles can attest to such a trait, Mill’s common place books actually provide 
what is at times a daily record of this activity. Evaluation of what kinds of texts are 
found in the manuscripts can lead towards conclusions about how they too were of 
significance to Mill’s political thought. They suggest a distinct and hitherto under-
explored continental Enlightenment influence on Mill. 
II. 
Our initial interest in this chapter lies with Mill’s political context. This is because, 
generally-speaking, its delineation helps provide a narrative within which this study of 
Mill can be anchored to the wider historical period. This period is to be referred to as 
the ‘Reform Crisis’ of late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century Britain. 
More specifically, however, is the fact that there existed during this time a proscription, 
by reactionary and intransigent British political and religious authorities, of the 
dissemination of ideas purported to be philosophically or popularly radical, licentious, 
or seditious. Here, links can rapidly be formed with the previous chapter which 
discussed the political context to Mill’s ideas on the law of libel. This chapter will argue 
that this factor can explain the above-mentioned reticence in the language of Mill’s 
Government, and in turn it can be used to account for the differences between the 
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published essay and the corresponding manuscript material that this comparative study 
seeks to explore. This perception of a general opposition towards radical ideas can be 
reinforced by several particular instances in Mill’s life which suggest he was aware of 
such limitations. J.S. Mill’s observation in his Autobiography, regarding his father’s 
distinct lack of optimism for ever seeing the prospect of ‘good government’ achieved in 
his lifetime, is one such example.
113
 Another is found in a letter to Macvey Napier, on 
the proposed content of Government, where Mill reassures the editor of the SupEB that 
his essay would contain ‘nothing capable of alarming even a [W]hig.’114 A third can be 
seen in an 1836 article for the London Review, one of the last published in his lifetime, 
in which Mill rails against what he saw as the perjuring of philosophy by both state and 
church, and consequently their “cry” against it, which was both a self-conscious and 
self-interested resistance to all attempts at change.
115
 
In suggesting that Mill was inhibited by the nature of the political context within which 
he composed Government, it is possible to argue that, in spite of the essay’s reputation 
as the radical plan of parliamentary reform of the Benthamite sect, it was actually 
hamstrung as a representation of Mill’s true thought. If this comparative analysis can 
provide evidence that such was the case by showing his manuscripts to be more radical 
in extent, then it is a contextual analysis which may explain the reasons for such 
differences. Whilst this is not to suggest there is concrete evidence for Mill 
acknowledging his practice of what the previous chapter has defined as dissimulation, 
instead reference is made to it because, prima facie, it seems that the advancement or 
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promotion of very radical political ideas appeared beyond the limits of what was 
achievable in Mill’s context. Thus, he moderated his published ideas accordingly. 
But given Mill was writing during a period identified as the ‘Reform Crisis’, which was 
dominated by a political discourse geared towards the pursuit of reforms in some guise, 
it is patently false to suggest the situation was such that nothing could be said publicly 
about the topic at all.
116
 Even concerted government actions against the propagators of 
very radical reform ideas, such as the passing of sedition or blasphemy laws to inhibit 
orators such as Henry Hunt, pamphleteers such as T.J. Wooler and printers such as 
Richard Carlile were not able to arrest the growing popular demand for change, easily 
found in the various protest and petitioning movements of the later 1810s. It is also 
incorrect to assume that all reform ideas circulating at this time had radical roots, since 
some initiatives to reform parliament were distinctly conservative in origin, even arising 
from within the aristocratic or oligarchical establishment known as “The Thing” itself. 
What is brought to mind at this juncture is Edmund Burke’s ‘rhetoric of prescriptive 
conservatism’, rejected by Mill in his common place books, and the notion expressed by 
Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France that a state without some means of 
reform was unviable.
117
 It thus seems sensible, when talking about Mill’s political 
context as a way of explaining why he engaged in dissimulation, to also orientate his 
position in relation to these other movements for reform, from both radical and 
conservative quarters, to obtain a sense of the wider political discourse of the ‘Reform 
Crisis’. 
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An evaluation of these aforementioned popular movements for reform, such as the 
Association movement of 1792–3, or the various actions that many see as giving rise to 
the events of Peterloo in 1819, is inherently useful for the wider understanding it gives 
to this period of study. But of significantly more importance is the groundswell of 
support for political change in this period by certain figures identifiable as Whigs. More 
specifically, this came from a reconstituted Whig Party, first, in opposition, under 
Charles James Fox, and later, in government, under Earl Grey. The support for 
parliamentary reform by the Whigs forms the backdrop to a more specific series of 
events: the dispute between Utilitarians such as Bentham, Mill and George Grote, and a 
number of Scottish (or Scottish-influenced or ‘Philosophic’) Whig writers notable for 
their contributions to the Edinburgh Review, such as Mackintosh and Macaulay. 
Beginning with the publication of Bentham’s Plan of Parliamentary Reform in 1817,118 
the debate was fiercely contested for much of the following decade.
119
 Its analysis 
specifically ties Mill to the wider narrative of the ‘Reform Crisis’, and also facilitates a 
transition from a discussion of his political context to his intellectual one. 
The support for a distinctly ‘Burkean’ or gradualist approach to reform found in the 
Edinburgh Review puts Mill’s diametrically-opposed deductive method employed at 
length in the essay Government in stark relief. It raises two conceptual questions for the 
remainder of this chapter to address. The first, touched on above in the description of 
Mill’s deference to the a priori method, is that Mill’s drawing down of political laws 
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from a science of human nature appears to signify a very philosophical, far-reaching 
approach to politics which can itself be perceived as very radical. This poses a specific 
conundrum regarding the definition of his political objectives, and whether the 
theoretical basis to his politics meant Mill’s true thought aimed for something which 
transcended the limited concept of parliamentary reform. A second question arises from 
the fact that since both Mill and a number of these Whigs shared a distinct philosophical 
inheritance – the Scottish Enlightenment – and yet since they seemed to differ so greatly 
about method, there is an interesting biographical point to consider about the extent to 
which Mill’s upbringing and education, first near Aberdeen but then subsequently at 
university in Edinburgh, was an influence upon his later thought. Simply put, the 
question is about the provenance of Mill’s philosophical views on deduction, and 
whether his particular aversion to the Scottish Whigs’ support of induction is indicative 
of a wider, more general disengagement with this Scottish Enlightenment legacy. 
III. 
Everything run, and was connected, with the Revolution in France; which, for above 20 years, 
was, or was made, the all in all. Everything… literally everything, was soaked in this one event. 
Henry Cockburn, Memorials of His Time
120
 
This chapter has thus far appropriated the notion of a nineteenth-century ‘Reform 
Crisis’ to refer to the historical period it is concerned with. It is the primary aim of this 
section to offer some attempt at depicting the nature of this crisis as a way of exploring 
the context within which Mill’s political thought can be seen to have developed. Whilst 
the end of this period might generally be perceived as 1832, when the first Reform Act 
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finally passed Parliament,
121
 ascertaining where to begin is more complicated. This 
study will actually commence with an event which, though occurring in the late 
eighteenth century, echoed resoundingly into the nineteenth: the French Revolution. 
Since Mill was only sixteen when the Bastille was stormed in 1789, some justification 
should be offered for this choice (instead of, say, 1773, the year he was born, or 1802, 
the year he arrived in London). Simply put, it is the particular and pivotal importance of 
the French Revolution, both to Mill and the wider British political consciousness as a 
whole, which marks it out as a suitable starting-off point. The French Revolution, as 
well as its ensuing wars, were responsible for a reconceptualization of politics in 
Britain, as perceived by Henry Cockburn, whose contemporary observation is cited in 
the epigraph above. Such a reconceptualization created a hostile and difficult political 
atmosphere in Britain at a time characterized by immense insurrectionary suspicion at 
home and a distinct military threat from abroad, which radical political ideas had to 
percolate through. The distinct fear that the events in France would be repeated in 
Britain led the reactionary British political and religious authorities to clamp down on 
utterances deemed seditious or blasphemous, particularly those originating from the 
press, which had a distinct impact on attempts to propagate political ideas which the 
establishment perceived as radical.
122
 
Mill’s own responses to the violent excesses of the French Revolution and in particular 
the legacy those events bequeathed to philosophy are particularly interesting. In his 
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common place books is found evidence of a particular frustration toward the obstinacy 
of the government towards matters of political reform, especially regarding what Mill 
calls their ‘perjuring’ of or cry against philosophy in the formation of such reform ideas. 
Mill cast the French Revolution as a ‘true gift from heaven’ to conservative enemies of 
reform, precisely because of the damage it did to the reputation of philosophy as a 
vehicle for establishing sound political laws which sought to protect, rather than 
destroy, property.
123
 The concept that giving power to the people would lead to the 
destruction of property, a foundation of conservative opposition, was dismissed by Mill 
as ‘the most extraordinary argument that ever was brought, to impugn a good case.’124 
Mill especially lamented the opposition towards philosophy because the violence in 
France was itself a political warning missed by the government: the French state’s long-
running refusal to give consent to reform, and their subsequent giving of it with so 
many conditions attached, was in part a reason why it the Revolution was so 
unsuccessful and unfortunate.
125
 For Mill, contrary to political authorities’ supposed 
objectives of keeping revolutionary fervour at bay, such activity was actually more 
likely to provoke a similar scenario to that witnessed in France once a certain threshold 
had been reached. 
Yet whilst reference to the ‘Reform Crisis’ clarifies this study by defining the period of 
investigation, it can also cloud the perceived objectives. This is because despite its 
copious use thus far, the term ‘reform’ clearly does not encapsulate all that is meant by 
‘politics’. With specific regards to Mill, a pressing issue at this juncture is how these 
two terms can be correlated satisfactorily, along with a third, ‘government’, the eventual 
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title of his 1820 essay, in an attempt to define his objectives. This problem arises from a 
fact stated in this chapter’s introduction, that whilst Mill’s manuscripts seem to contain 
material being worked up for Government, this is primarily within a section referred to 
by Mill as ‘Reform’ or ‘Parl.[iamentary] Ref.[orm]’. The natural supposition to make, 
therefore, is that the published essay is a tract on this very issue. But Government itself 
was both a very synoptic article, in that it purported to give a detached, scientific 
account of three ‘systems’ of government (monarchic, aristocratic and democratic) 
along with definition for its ‘means’ and ‘ends’, and the proposals it expounded were 
deduced by Mill a priori from a science of human nature. Both of these features suggest 
that if the essay had political objectives, they lay beyond the remit of ‘mere’ 
parliamentary reform, even if the organisation of Mill’s own manuscripts postulates that 
his political ideas were tightly bound up with such a particular theme. This very 
question of Government’s objectives troubled John Stuart Mill, and Donald Winch has 
highlighted how conceding that the essay was merely a reform act would have been 
impossible, given Mill’s deference to such a philosophical method.126 
Some previous scholarly attempts at squaring Mill’s objectives specifically regarding 
parliamentary reform with his wider political philosophy have relied on Mill’s practical 
activity to portray his thought as a two-stage process. Joseph Hamburger has argued that 
Mill viewed reform – ostensibly the 1832 Reform Act – as a first step to the inevitable 
securing of greater constitutional changes. This can explain why instances of Mill’s 
practical involvement in politics, such as his letters to Brougham, then Lord Chancellor, 
on the eve of the passing of the Reform Act in the early 1830s, appear to concede vital 
political ground in a way that seems incompatible with his philosophic principles.
127
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Robert Fenn may offer some support to Hamburger’s argument, describing it as one of 
the great ironies of Mill’s politics that the deductive position championed so rigorously 
in his manuscript writings was nothing like the practical one he actually adopted.
128
 
William Thomas, in this regard, sees Mill as essentially uninterested in the practical 
consequences of his own political arguments, and claims that this is one reason why 
younger Utilitarians found Government wanting as a concrete ‘plan for the present’, 
because it was actually a rather more abstract ‘vision for the future’.129 Biancamaria 
Fontana, meanwhile, sees Mill as a victim of his own pursuit of a rigorous philosophical 
language with which to express the demand for reform, which became somewhat 
immobilizing in terms of practical application as he ‘plunged himself more deeply into 
theoretical inconsistencies’.130 The comparative analysis of Mill’s manuscripts, in part 
V with regard to his philosophical approach to knowledge, and in part VI concerning his 
ideas pertaining to parliamentary reform, makes an attempt at clarifying the issue of 
Mill’s true political objectives at the chapter’s conclusion possible. 
That Mill’s practical endeavours appear to conflict so greatly with his own philosophy 
goes some way to explaining the nature of this particular section’s narrative, which 
portrays in broad strokes the political context within which Mill would have thought 
and wrote about his political ideas. What is notable is how disconnected portions of said 
narrative appear to be from the actualities of Mill’s political life. Naturally, this is partly 
explained by the fact it commences in 1789, over two decades before Mill arrived in 
London and began his literary career in earnest. At the other end of the scale, 
Government was itself published in 1820, thus over a decade before the first Reform 
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Act was eventually passed in 1832.
131
 But by this sense of detachment reference is also 
made to various peculiarities regarding Mill’s lack of involvement in key aspects of the 
‘Reform Crisis’ more generally, such as the fact that he did not write for the more 
‘popular’ radical newspapers which advanced radical political ideas and who were the 
primary targets of the repressive legislation of the period (such as Thomas Wooler’s 
satirical The Black Dwarf). Or, that he was never a participant in any form in the mass 
reform meetings that descended into riot or violence, such as at Spa or St. Peter’s 
Fields. Or, that he did not sit as an MP – independent, Whig or otherwise – in the House 
of Commons, even if he had a hand in the election of some of his friends and associates, 
such as David Ricardo.
132
 It must be asserted, then, how relevant such events are to 
wider purposes. Quite simply, their inclusion is necessary for the underlining they give 
to the notion that any publicly advanced attempt at instigating change in the political 
system in Britain, in whatever degree, had to be couched in extremely modest terms, so 
as not to attract attention from either a suspicious, anti-philosophical governmental 
authority, or a public possessed of a distinct anti-revolutionary sentiment. Their 
contribution is as evidence for the perception that writers such as Mill had to employ 
dissimulation when publishing political texts which could be labeled radical, in order to 
avoid the prospect of prosecution for seditious libel. Nowhere does this overarching 
reactionary nature in Britain, as well as the French Revolution’s contribution to its 
origins, seem more effectively highlighted than in the experiences of William Pitt when 
subpoenaed at the treason trial for John Horne Tooke in 1794. The Prime Minister had, 
in his earlier political career, campaigned for a degree of parliamentary reform. But the 
tenets of his arguments delivered pre-1789, it was pointed out in court, were actually 
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eerily similar to those of the accused.
133
 The impact of the French Revolution had 
utterly changed what was acceptable to say about reform in the political discourse of 
early nineteenth-century Britain. In wishing to advance ideas on reform, Mill had to 
adapt his published writings to this discourse or face potentially ruinous censure. 
IV. 
From 1789 onwards the suppression of revolutionary fervour akin to that witnessed on 
the continent became a de facto objective of government. One finds manifestations of 
this policy throughout the history of the period, from the aforementioned Pitt, to the 
succeeding Pittite ministries of Perceval and Liverpool and the Whig ministry of Earl 
Grey. A major subtext to the desire of political elites to prevent Britain replicating 
events in France was the development of hostility towards espousers of political ideas 
which were perceived as going beyond notions of acceptability, that is to say radical. 
This was a European-wide development, but Britain is perhaps particularly notable 
because of the emergence of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1790, 
which came to be regarded as the cornerstone of philosophical conservatism.
134
 
Burke’s text encapsulated the sentiment that Britain abhorred revolutionary change, and 
that reform, by definition, could only be performed experimentally, the ‘faults of the 
state’ approached in the same manner one would attend the ‘wounds of a father, with 
pious awe and trembling solicitude.’135 Burke vehemently rejected any revolutionary 
interpretation of politics, and the deduction of such interpretations a priori by 
philosophers. Interestingly, these two objections would be later seen by the Whig critics 
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(and heirs of Burke) of Mill’s Government as hallmarks of that essay. 136  The 
Reflections, a response to the radical sermonising of Richard Price, in turn prompted its 
own responses, such as Mackintosh’s Vindiciae Gallicae and Thomas Paine’s Rights of 
Man.
137
 The initial effect of Paine’s text in particular was to educate and enthuse 
radicals, who subsequently called for parliamentary reform and changes along the lines 
of those enacted in France, whilst simultaneously attracting a sustained government 
effort to repress such demands.
138
 
This ideological battle between radical and reactionary forces in Britain was 
supplemented but then supplanted by a real-life war. From Pitt’s assertion to Parliament 
in 1792 that ‘unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country, when, 
from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of 
peace’,139  the continent descended into the Revolutionary (1792 to 1802) and then 
Napoleonic (1803 to 1815) Wars. Whilst the instability of France had obvious positive 
connotations for Britain in its early stages of development, the British government 
became increasingly concerned that events there could eventually be mirrored at home, 
either by product of internal conspiracy or external invasion. In what might be seen as 
the state’s own initial attempts to win the ideological argument, it began to fund loyalist 
periodicals from October 1792, including a new daily newspaper, the Sun.
140
 In May of 
that year, Pitt had issued a proclamation targeting printers and booksellers, warning 
against an apparent epidemic of ‘wicked and seditious writings’ which sought to excite 
‘tumult and disorder’.141 As outlined in the previous chapter, the size of the press had 
been increasing since the 1770s, and the public dimension it had given to politics since 
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meant it became a natural government target.
142
 The tailor Francis Place, later a close 
associate of Mill and a Philosophic Radical, described the late 1790s as Pitt’s own 
‘Reign of Terror’, complaining that a ‘disloyal word was enough to bring down 
punishment upon any man’s head’.143 
With the onset of the Revolutionary Wars the necessity for the British government to 
defend the existing order from both external and perceived internal threats became even 
more pronounced. Many opposition Whig politicians, such as the Duke of Portland, 
supported the government on the war issue, leaving an anti-war Whig rump in 
Parliament under Fox. A sustained crusade by the government against radical agitation 
for reform also took place, which was primarily manifested as a legislative campaign 
aimed at curbing the liberties of the press. Paine’s aforementioned Rights of Man is one 
of the most illuminating instances of this attempt to do away with ‘seditious’ works. It 
had by this point allegedly reached over 2 million people, approaching a quarter of the 
total population of Britain.
144
 Paine was indicted on a charge of seditious libel in 1792, 
and eventually tried (and found guilty) in absentia. In 1794 Habeas Corpus was 
suspended and 1795 saw the passing of the ‘two bills’ or ‘Gagging Acts’, ostensibly due 
to an attack on the royal coach as George III rode in state to open Parliament. These 
legislative acts – the Seditious Meetings Act and the Treasonable Practices Act – 
extended the law of treason to include inciting hatred of the King, his heirs, his 
government or the constitution. They also restricted public meetings to fifty people, 
unless prior consent had been obtained from a magistrate. On 16 November 1795 Fox 
had addressed an (ultimately unsuccessful) protesting rally against the passing of the 
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treason bills of between two- and thirty-thousand people.
145
 It marked the end of a 
particularly fractious year, with the country also suffering economically from famine. 
By 1799, the government’s persistent legislative attack on the diffusion of ‘seditious 
words’ was arguably complete when it successfully outlawed the London 
Corresponding Society, one of the major proponent groups of political reform. 
The history of Britain synchronous with the start of the French Revolution in 1789 and 
ending either with the rise of Napoleon as First Consul in 1799 or the end of the 
Revolutionary Wars in 1802 therefore seems not particularly notable for any real type of 
achievement for supporters of reform. A combination of economic conditions, a 
coalescing of widespread popular movements in support for reform measures (as 
exhibited in the petitioning and protest movements of the 1810s and 1820s), and a more 
pronounced Whig influence in the reform debate, however, all appeared to signal 
change at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is towards this last factor, 
concerning the reconstituted Whig Party under Fox, which this study is most drawn to, 
for the express relevance it has to Mill’s aforementioned dispute with the Whigs of the 
Edinburgh Review in the 1820s. 
The realities of Britain’s economic situation make a compelling case for reform 
agitation increasing in the nineteenth century, specifically post-war in 1815. Although 
Élie Halévy has pointed to a more general revival of liberal and democratic opinions 
within the country in the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century, the crux of the 
matter appears to be economic. Whilst 1815 saw the return of peace, there was no return 
of prosperity. Post-war resumption of industry on the continent meant Europe had less 
need of the products of British labour. In turn, British industry had less need of 
workmen, and the workmen on lower wages became unable to purchase essentials such 
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as bread.
146
 Whilst economic problems were by no means a product solely of the years 
of peace – Luddites had broken machines in South Yorkshire, Lancashire and the East 
Midlands since 1811, for example – the post-war slump exacerbated the situation, and 
popular support for reform began to be seen as directly proportional to the extent of the 
economic difficulties.
147
 In this regard 1815 is also notable for Parliament passing the 
Liverpool administration’s infamous Corn Law, which kept both food prices and, 
subsequently, social tensions high. 
Popular pressure for reform in the early nineteenth century manifested itself in three 
particular ways, as the public meeting, the mass petition, and in the popular radical 
press. The freedoms of the press, a topic depicted in detail in the previous chapter, was 
heavily circumscribed by particularly disastrous instances of the public meeting, such as 
those held in London at Spa Fields in late 1816 and in Manchester at St. Peter’s Fields 
in August 1819. The riot which followed the second meeting at Spa Fields provided 
Lord Liverpool’s government with enough evidence of an insurrectionary conspiracy to 
orchestrate a concerted legislative attack on supporters of reform on a level echoing the 
repression of Pitt’s ‘Reign of Terror’. The pretext for the new ‘gagging acts’ and the 
renewed suspension of Habeas Corpus was the inflation of an incident in January 1817, 
which saw the Prince Regent’s coach attacked en route to Parliament.148 The ‘Peterloo’ 
massacre which followed the meeting at St. Peter’s Fields can also be counted as 
evidence of further government success against the reform movement. It yielded the 
ability to introduce more legislation, this time in the form of the ‘Six Acts’, including 
the Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act and the Publications Act.
149
 Bentham, 
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resuming his writings on parliamentary reform from 1816, felt Britain was ‘at the very 
brink:–reform or convulsion, such is the alternative.’150  
The existing political order appeared to weather the discontent and agitation until the 
economic recovery of the 1820s. Indeed, according to some commentators, the 
government never lost control of events in this period.
151
 But whilst trade revived the 
economy, there remained a motivation amongst political elites to adapt at least parts of 
the old regime as a necessary practical response to the ‘virulence of popular protest’, 
such as at Spa Fields and Peterloo, and an ‘existence of real revolutionary conspiracies’, 
such as on Cato Street in 1820.
152
 There appears to be a redefinition of the political 
agenda here, whereby an establishment-led attempt at parliamentary reform, which was 
thought required to off-set the threat of revolution, took over from the reform demands 
of radicals. Ostensibly, the reform cause was taken up by Whigs keen to relieve the 
popular pressure for change that had resulted in the political violence and sedition of the 
late 1810s. However, additional motivations for advancing electoral change lay in the 
Whig desire to engender a requisite change in the franchise, which in turn would head 
off concerns about the despotism of the incumbent Pittite governments. 
It is around this growing interest in the reform agenda by establishment political actors 
identified as Whigs which the focus now tightens. The term ‘Whig’ has its own 
convoluted history, and particular reliance is made here on the work of J.G.A. Pocock to 
navigate its fluidity, as well as that concerning the related term ‘Tory’. It is important to 
emphasize that any increasing interest the Whigs had in the parliamentary reform debate 
of the early nineteenth century should not necessarily be interpreted as either novel or 
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opportunistic. By the 1790s, Fox was an advocate of a broad household suffrage, and by 
1797 that well-educated women could receive the vote.
153
 In 1810, the Whig MP 
Thomas Brand’s notion that the suffrage should be given to all male householders 
secured over one hundred votes in the Commons.
154
 There was thus no distinct 
‘entrance’ of the Whigs into the reform debate, and it is incorrect to suggest that the 
occasion was a true volte face. Nevertheless, the take up by the Whigs of the reform 
cause in the 1820s was conducted in a piecemeal and apologetic fashion. 
The nature of this Whig position requires some unpacking before it can be seen as 
conducive to the overarching investigation: as the inductive, experimental counterpoint 
to Mill’s philosophical or deductive method of determining political laws. At the same 
time, the analysis provides an insight in to Mill’s own intellectual history, particularly 
regarding his Scottish Enlightenment influence, explored in part V of this chapter below 
and again, more substantially, in chapter 4, as well as the foundations of his own 
political radicalism as a Benthamite, a topic of part VI below. Mill detested the Whig 
approach to reform, and the extent of his disagreement can be seen in the sharp essay 
Periodical Literature written for the first issue of the Westminster Review. As well as an 
interesting critique of periodical literature, portrayed as published (i.e. book-length) 
literature’s emaciated, reactionary sibling, it was a well-structured attack on how such 
organs propped up the aristocracy. Mill makes frequent use of the ‘seesaw’ analogy to 
explain the Whigs’ political behaviour, the alternating advancement of popular (or 
radical) causes with aristocratical (or despotic) causes in the pursuance of a ‘middling’ 
or moderate way, communicated in the vaguest of language, which essentially 
constituted the giving of one hand to the cause of political reform, and the taking away 
with the other, with a perennial preference for maintaining the power of the aristocratic 
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body regardless. The Tories were only marginally different, according to Mill’s 
description. Because they were the ministerial party, they believed the aristocracy were 
the country, and thus there was never any need to pander to public opinion.
155
 
Periodical Literature is also inherently useful for the frank assessment Mill makes in it 
of the incumbent political system, along with the most basic delineation of his 
objectives for parliamentary reform. Mill was targeting the accrued political power of 
the aristocracy but this term itself had a complex definition. It of course encompassed 
the ‘small number of leading families’ who returned the majority of the members of the 
House of Commons. These ‘great families’ possessed the representation of the counties 
exclusively, and also nominated or influenced the return of members for a large 
proportion of the boroughs. Alongside the great families in the composition of the 
ruling aristocratic body were two ‘props’, the church and the law (or the clergy and 
lawyers respectively). The population in general had fallen into a state of dependence 
upon these two classes of men, and the governing power was thus obliged to secure 
their services by dealing out ‘certain minor shares’ of the ‘profits of misrule’ to them. 
Other electors in the boroughs, meanwhile, found it in their interest to sell their votes to 
the highest bidder. This opened the door to a ‘class of monied men’ to also become 
‘sharers in the possession of the powers of government’ and join the aristocracy. But 
Mill could ascertain little real difference between a borough elector who sold his vote, 
and the borough or county elector who gave his vote, out of habit, to their lord. Both 
were instances of clear and obvious corruption; they were the constituent parts of a 
government in place not for the good of the community, but for the ruling body. Mill’s 
objective to allay such corruption was simple: to place the ‘right of voting for members 
of parliament on such a footing, that it shall not be for the interest of the voter to give 
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his suffrage from any other motive than the verdict of his conscience, preferring the 
fittest man.’156 This would effectively make the interest of men and their duty coincide. 
It was this simple demand, Mill felt, that singled him and his fellow Utilitarians out as 
political ‘radicals’. 
The term ‘Whig’ has been used as a byword to define the aristocratic domination of 
British politics since the early eighteenth century, frequently in tandem with the terms 
‘oligarchy’ or ‘supremacy’. British radicalism had often been expressed as a sustained 
attack on the Whig aristocracy, and their corrupt control of politics, patronage and 
finance. But by the late 1820s, the group that would become the reformers of 1832 are 
identified by Pocock as ‘New Whigs’, who, although retaining the outlook of an 
aristocracy, had found a language which enabled them to reform themselves 
internally.
157
 There were also organisational changes to the Whigs in this period which 
allow for a more solid definition of the term. The foremost of these appears to be the 
aforementioned reconstitution of the Whig Party as the anti-war parliamentary rump 
under the initial control of Fox. This group appropriated the name ‘Whig’, in part 
thanks to the Morning Chronicle newspaper, which announced that the ‘great body of 
Whigs of England had sat in judgement on the disputes between Burke and Fox and 
pronounced in the latter’s favour.’158 A Tory, meanwhile, had become an ‘inflexible 
defender[s] of the Revolution-Hanoverian Whig regime’ – a supporter of “Old 
Corruption”. There is thus a clear distinction to be made between the Whig Party 
(Burke’s ‘New Whigs’) and the century-old Whig regime that Burke’s ‘Old Whigs’ 
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(now Tories) defended against its enemies via their support of the Septennial Act, the 
Toleration Act, and the national debt.
159
 
The Whigs took up a reform agenda which included tolerating both a limited franchise 
and rotten boroughs, and advocated ‘virtual representation’, which was in contrast to 
actual representation, and maintained that one class could virtually represent another 
because their ‘interests’ were identical. This agenda was supported in the pages of the 
Edinburgh Review, the quarterly magazine founded in 1802 by Henry Brougham, 
Sydney Smith and Francis Jeffrey. It is this periodical, perceived as ‘both the manifesto 
and major vehicle of propaganda for parliamentary reform’, which explicitly ties Mill to 
this broader narrative.
160
 Mill had much in common with the Edinburgh reviewers: he 
was a Scottish émigré writer, a devoted pupil of Dugald Stewart, and an alumnus of 
Edinburgh University. He had even written for the Edinburgh as early as 1808.
161
 But 
by the time Mackintosh, now a convert to Burkean ‘philosophical conservatism’, 
attacked Bentham’s aforementioned Plan of Parliamentary Reform in a review of 1818, 
Mill had taken up the cause of philosophic radicalism.
162
 Mackintosh’s review became 
the first shot of what was to be a long-running ideological battle between the competing 
approaches to reform of these Whigs and the Philosophic Radicals. Government, 
regarded as Mill’s response, followed in 1820. 
The language used to describe the conflicting positions toward reform argued by the 
Edinburgh reviewers and the Philosophic Radicals respectively (‘ideological battle’ and 
‘competing approaches’) insinuates that they were incommensurable. Many 
commentators have actually highlighted the opposite, suggesting both concordance in 
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ideas between the two sides, and even the maintenance of friendships across the 
divide.
163
 Other interpretations see the real differences as only due to the scale of 
reforms suggested, with the Whigs unable to stomach the true extent of philosophic 
radicalism.
164
 Whilst the radical extent of such ideas will be explored more fully in part 
VI below, what is of particular notice at this point are the differing philosophical 
foundations of the two approaches. There was a chasm-like disagreement engendered 
on this topic, and it particularly animated Mill in his manuscript writings. The Whigs 
had broadly argued that any reform should be inductive, that is to say experimental, 
above all moderate, and that parliamentary reform in particular was a matter of political 
expediency designed to alleviate revolutionary sentiment rather than principle. There is 
a clear Burkean legacy to these ideas, but the philosophy of those in the orbit of the 
Edinburgh Review also had specific roots in the Scottish Enlightenment, and this too 
helped define their opposition to philosophic radicalism. 
There are two elements to this concept of the Scottish Enlightenment context that are 
worth making explicit here for their particular relevance to Mill’s intellectual history 
expounded in the following section. The first comprises the ideas of Thomas Reid, and 
his contribution to the Scottish ‘Common Sense’ school, which held that principles 
common to all men formed the foundation of all reasoning. The second is the legacy of 
Dugald Stewart upon his pupils at Edinburgh University, in particular his instruction in 
the investigative field coined ‘conjectural history’ – history extrapolated from 
scientifically established principles of human nature. Mill’s History of British India, 
published in 1817, was regarded as one of the last instances of this tradition. Jeffrey, for 
example, who became the first permanent editor of the Edinburgh, was regarded as 
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‘continuing the war of the eighteenth century Scottish Common Sense philosophers 
against sensation psychology’, which he now saw as represented by Bentham. Bentham 
himself had dismissed Common Sense as a euphemism for unreasoning prejudice.
165
 
Macaulay, meanwhile, was extremely critical of the use of Mill’s deductive method in 
Government, and saw it as incompatible with the ‘very different method of 
investigation’ found in the History of British India, which was more in line with what 
he perceived as Mill’s ‘Scottish interest in conjectural history’.166 
That the inductive approach of these Scottish Whigs was anathema to Mill represents an 
intriguing point in his biography, originating from the fact that although he seemingly 
had as valid a claim to a Scottish Enlightenment inheritance as the philosophic Whigs, 
he came to adopt a very different methodological stance regarding reform. Does this 
suggest he veered away from such a legacy? The debate on whether Mill consciously 
abandoned his Scottish education in preference for a different philosophic position (e.g. 
one which had its origins in Bentham’s thought) has never been definitively settled, and 
many studies, such as those cited in this thesis’ introduction, have wisely argued for a 
degree of conflation between the two contexts.
167
 As has been insinuated, Mill’s own 
Scottish credentials in this regard were certainly in order. The case for a pronounced 
Reidian intellectual influence has been made strongly in one particularly study, which 
goes as far as linking such an influence to the proximity of Mill’s upbringing to 
Aberdeen.
168
 Similarly, whilst Jeffrey, along with fellow Edinburgh editor Brougham 
and frequent contributor Francis Horner had all ‘sat at the feet of Dugald Stewart in the 
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lecture halls of Edinburgh’,169 Mill had seemingly done the same, and with as much 
devotion.
 170
 Furthermore, there is also the notion to consider that these Philosophic 
Whigs were not actually representative of the Scottish Enlightenment tradition 
themselves, given Burrow’s appraisal that Common Sense philosophy in Whiggish 
hands degenerated into ‘becoming literally common sense without capital letters’.171 
Even the casting of Mill as an advocate, along with Bentham, of sensationalist 
psychology by a contemporary critic (and perceived staunch defender of Common 
Sense) like Mackintosh is problematic, since Mill himself was still opposed to 
Associationist psychology as late as 1806, and subsequently seemed only to undergo a 
change of heart once he had met Bentham just after this point. Although Hartley’s 
principle of association, along with the Greatest Happiness principle derived from 
Priestley and, to a lesser extent, Helvétius, was of immense importance to Bentham’s 
doctrine of Utilitarianism which Mill adopted, this particular change in Mill’s view has 
been explained in one study as a separation of his philosophy of history from his 
philosophy of mind. It can therefore not be construed as a complete break from Scottish 
moral philosophy, because the radical political philosophy that Mill deduced from the 
latter was congruous with (if not identical to) the former.
172
 Haakonssen’s 
aforementioned argument that a particular strand of Common Sense philosophy – the 
school’s ‘objectivist moral theory’ – did possess longevity in Mill’s ideas, in the sense 
that it has some affinity with the philosophical stance exhibited in writings such as 
Government, is also of relevance here. Mill, along with Stewart and Mackintosh, were 
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all supporters of the idea that ‘the moral world is in principle completely well ordered’ 
and therefore without uncertainty. Whilst this was used as an argument ‘against large-
scale intervention’ in society by the Whigs, it was just as useful a justification for the 
philosophic Radicals’ argument ‘for such intervention’. What resonates loudly from the 
idea of a complete moral theory is one convincing explanation for why Mill favoured an 
a priori approach to political matters, because he felt that from such a position 
‘derivative sciences’, such as politics, ‘could be conceived with deductive certainty.’173 
The purpose of this section originated in an attempt to understand the meaning of, and 
interplay between, the terms ‘politics’, ‘reform’ and ‘government’ to a study of Mill’s 
political ideas, by examining both his political and intellectual context. More 
specifically, it asked the question of whether the nature of this context problematizes the 
conception of Mill’s true political objectives, and if these objectives can be viewed as 
orientated towards the cause of parliamentary reform, or if their perceived radical extent 
transposed the limits of such a concept. The apparent need for writers such as Mill to 
practice dissimulation when attempting to convey their political ideas to a wider 
audience, coupled with Mill’s opposition to the Whigs’ inductive approach to reform, 
which preached gradual and piecemeal changes to the existing political system, and his 
belief that legislation should be derived from a science of human nature, all point 
towards the suggestion that his political thought was much more radical than he was 
ever prepared to advance publicly. What follows in part V, below, is a more concerted 
utilization of the material found in Mill’s common place books to explain why Mill 
deferred to the a priori method, and an investigation into the potential provenance of the 
ideas that underlined it. By doing this, a route is prepared for part VI, which turns to a 
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more specific consideration of the content of Government and in particular the reform 
ideas portrayed in it, an essay steeped in the language of this method. 
V. 
‘Speculation’ and ‘practice’ are the shorthand terms used by Mill to explain his 
theoretical or a priori approach to knowledge, which, he argued in Government, should 
be used to deduce political laws from a science of human nature. These terms form the 
title of a manuscript chapter in the common place books which contains Mill’s most 
meaningful arguments in support of this theoretical, ‘deductive’ method. All of Mill’s 
published writings appear to be based on deeply held convictions concerning the 
importance of these abstract philosophic principles.
174
 Deduction consisted of the 
correct balance of theory with practical evidence, what Mill defined as ‘systematized 
experience’ or ‘the results of experience put into order.’ Since ‘[t]he business of 
legislation is wholly theoretical’, Mill believed that he could accurately ascertain sound 
political principles using such an approach.
175
 The opposite approach was one of 
induction, characterized by an insufficient (or non-existent) application of theory, and 
too heavy a reliance on a limited degree of experience – a method one might term 
‘experimental’. Mill criticised this as ‘random imitation,’ or ‘the generalization of one 
or two particular cases’ which was then paraded, mistakenly, as truth.176 To actually 
legislate from such premises was disastrous: ‘to put [politics] under the dominion of 
practice is an attempt to put it under that which just so far as it acts upon it, is sure to act 
wrong.’177 
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In the common place books, Mill juxtaposes the strengths of his deductive or theoretical 
approach against the logical fallacies and errors of the contrasting ‘inductive’ method, 
which he characterises as the experimental approach to politics dominant in 
contemporary Britain. As has been intimated in the previous section, Mill projected this 
a-theoretical or experimental stance on to the approach to parliamentary reform adopted 
by establishment politicians such as the Whigs.
178
 This section analyses both Mill’s 
argument pro the deductive method and contra the inductive method by virtue of a 
close reading of the relevant manuscript writings and associated published works on this 
topic. Its objectives are three-fold: to define in precise terms what the deductive method 
for Mill entailed, as both a system of deducing laws and a tool for critiquing existing 
approaches to reform; to trace the particular intellectual and literary influences that 
impacted upon these ideas; and finally to comment on how responsible the method 
might be for the perceived radical nature of his politics. This last objective is intended 
to facilitate a bridge to the next section of the chapter, which will analyse the radical 
extent of Mill’s political ideas as expressed in their differing published and private 
guises in Government and the common place books respectively.  
As has been recounted both in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, there are two 
broad intellectual contexts to Mill’s thought which dominate many studies of his ideas; 
the Scottish Enlightenment background of his upbringing and education, particularly 
whilst at Edinburgh University, and the doctrine of Utilitarianism he later adopted from 
Bentham. A typical question derived from such studies is to ask to what extent these 
contexts influenced him concurrently. There exists an interesting methodological 
problem, however, when attempting to use the common place books to contextualise 
Mill’s ideas regarding his support for the deductive method in this way: there is nothing 
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discernibly of Bentham’s thought in the manuscript chapter, and there is very little 
Scottish material. Such facts should of course not form the basis of a drastic claim, viz. 
that Mill was not influenced by either Scottish moral philosophy or Bentham in the 
development of this philosophical method, but their absence or scarcity from the 
manuscripts does raise some salient points about the nature and efficacy of the source 
material. 
A few reasons can be posited as explanations for this situation. The first is to ask 
whether this study misinterprets the content of the manuscript chapter ‘Speculation & 
Practice’ and, by extension, the common place books in general. By this it is meant 
whether such material should be judged, as William Thomas has argued, as being only 
for ‘controversial’ use, that is to say as a repository of material which Mill could use to 
sharpen his own argument against, rather than as using their citation as proof of 
influence upon Mill’s thought, or agreement with the ideas of the original author.179 
This chapter will argue that whilst Thomas’ judgement has merit in some instances, it 
cannot be applied to the manuscripts as a whole, since it is undermined in this particular 
respect by the fact that it is clear that the material Mill does cite (such as extracts from 
works by Wolff, Montesquieu and Madame de Staël, all outlined below) has 
concordance with his own position. As a useful counter-example, however, the material 
collated by Mill on the Whig statesman (and follower of Burke) William Windham in 
the manuscript chapters on ‘Liberty of the Press’, can clearly be seen as a collection 
made for provocative use, not least because it underscores Mill’s aversion to 
Windham’s conservatism. 
A second argument for the paucity of expected material is that since the major tenets of 
such ideas were either internalized by Mill, or perhaps even common placed elsewhere, 
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a lack of citation here should not necessarily constitute a corresponding lack of 
influence upon his own thought. In terms of a Scottish influence, Mill would have read 
the key works whilst studying for or at Edinburgh.
180
 As the common place books rarely 
possess material from this period of his lifetime (indeed there is only one scrap that 
definitely comes from the 1790s, the time synchronous with Mill’s attendance, and that 
is merely a note on a lecture on moral philosophy given by Dugald Stewart found in 
volume IV) it is sensible to suggest that their lack of appearance within his manuscripts 
should not constitute a deliberate shunning.
181
 Against this hypothesis, however, lies the 
example of Plato. Plato’s Works was the book Mill borrowed the most during his 
theological studies at Edinburgh, as noted in the library lending record reproduced in 
Bain’s biography.182 It is also heavily cited by Mill in the common place books. Mill 
did however employ other systems for recording his reading beyond that of 
commonplacing, such as the collection of notes and marginalia made in the pages and 
end leaves of a set of 66 books that he left to his son John Stuart, and which are now in 
the library of Somerville College, Oxford. Works that are Scottish in origin, such as by 
David Hume, Adam Smith, and Dugald Stewart can all be found within this collection, 
and its existence in turn belies a further methodological issue with the common place 
books: although of clear value, they cannot be taken as the sole source for 
contextualising Mill’s ideas. 
                                                 
180
 See, for example, the analysis of Mill’s university borrowing record in Lazenby, “James Mill: The 
Formation of a Scottish Émigré Writer,” 9 as well as the treatment of this subject in chapter 4 below. 
181
 This argument is an appropriation of one by J.R. Dinwiddy about the general lack of material 
attributable to Bentham’s direct influence in the common place books on a wider scale. Dinwiddy argues 
that ‘[o]ne would hardly expect Mill, in a passage in his own commonplace book, to restate the first 
principles of utilitarian theory and to explain that what he meant by calling something good was that it 
was conducive – and by calling something bad or evil that it was inimical – to the aggregate happiness of 
the members of the community. So much could surely be taken for granted.’ Radicalism and Reform in 
Britain, 1780–1850, 266. 
182
 Bain, James Mill, 18. 
80 
 
In attempting to rectify this methodological issue, this section assumes that two 
different types of influences can be perceived on Mill’s ideas regarding his preference 
for the deductive philosophical position: those that are explicitly cited, and by virtue of 
such citation can be seen as of particular interest to Mill because he recorded them 
within a manuscript chapter entitled ‘Speculation & Practice’, and those that are implicit 
or less pronounced in his manuscripts, but which his intellectual biography suggest 
influenced him. It is to this latter category that the aforementioned Scottish and 
Benthamic contexts are predominantly placed. With regards to the former category, the 
perception resulting from this study is that Mill had a much more varied set of 
influences on his philosophical method than previous studies have suggested. 
In forging an effective definition of what Mill’s deductive method entails, much should 
rest on his high regard for political economy, which can be evidenced from an article 
published in 1836 in the London Review (the organ which the Westminster had 
amalgamated with), entitled ‘On Whether Political Economy is Useful’. Although this 
constitutes one of Mill’s last articles published before his death, it is notable that the 
themes present in the article are apparent even in Mill’s earliest literary writings.183 The 
article performs a dual role: at the same time as lauding political economy as an 
example of a complete science, it professed to demonstrate the virtues of the method 
from which its laws were deduced. Mill’s perception of the utility of political economy 
arose from the fact it was concerned with ‘the things which [man] denominates the 
matter of wealth – the great object to which almost all the toils and cares of human 
beings are directed’.184 Since Mill’s politics have been regarded as ‘an attempt to create 
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… a political analogue of the competitive market process’, much can be made of the 
apparent relationship between Mill’s political economy and his philosophic method, and 
the parallel pursuit of what he calls ‘good’ legislation, i.e. his politics. Clearly, Mill felt 
the method was applicable to both sciences.
185
 Mill seems to have found the ability to 
widely apply his philosophic position exhilarating, believing that a ‘commanding view 
obtained by the mind over a most interesting and complicated mental scene’ was a 
‘gratification of the highest value.’186 
Political economy has long been regarded as at the heart of Philosophic Radicalism. 
Leslie Stephen, for example, saw the belief in Malthus’ theory of population as ‘the 
most essential article of their faith’.187  It was by no means, however, an exclusive 
domain. Early nineteenth-century political economy evoked a wide range of different 
political positions, and sharply contrasting expectations in the minds of many, including 
Whigs.
188
 Mill’s own ideas came to be heavily influenced by Ricardo, whose 
contribution to the debate surrounding the ‘Bullion Controversy’ had caught his interest 
in 1809. Mill has been regarded as the primary motivator behind Ricardo’s eventual 
publication of Principles of Political Economy in 1817, whilst his own Elements of 
Political Economy (1821) was a distillation (a ‘school-book’) of the Principles. Despite 
both being Philosophic Radicals (even if Ricardo was the more politically moderate), 
neither of their positions on political economy, nor the idea that political economy could 
be ‘understood as a science of laws’,189 can be seen as coming from Bentham. Both Mill 
and Ricardo were, however, clearly influenced by Adam Smith. Ricardo had chanced 
upon the Wealth of Nations in 1799, ascertaining from it that political economy could 
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be treated as an abstract science.
190
 Mill had defended Smith’s ‘doctrinal and policy 
views’ in much of his early economic writing, and, of course, had also been instructed 
by Smith’s pupil, Dugald Stewart.191 Halévy makes sense of this by dividing the social 
science of the Philosophic Radicals into two constituent groups of laws. The physical 
laws of political economy were derived from Ricardo and, by extension, Malthus and 
Smith. The psychological laws, via Bentham, came from Hartley, Priestley and 
Helvétius.
192
 Indeed, Mill’s use of political economy in the doctrine of Utilitarianism 
may have been as a ‘stabilizer’, giving doctrinal solidity to Bentham’s more abstract 
notion of the ‘felicific calculus’.193 
The majority of the ‘Speculation & Practice’ manuscript chapter is related only to Mill’s 
1836 article on political economy’s second role: justifying the deductive method’s 
ability to produce sound principles. In this case, the objective is not the deduction of 
political economy but of political principles, or what might be termed the objective of 
legislation. Mill sees the speculative approach of the deductive method – and the 
resulting ‘commanding view’ which is only attainable by a ‘theoretical’ man or a 
‘philosopher’ – as the most conducive route to good government, because ‘the business 
of legislation is thinking.’194 In direct opposition to the ‘theoretical’ man, who thinks, is 
the so-called ‘practical’ man, who is governed by his senses rather than his reason: 
‘[t]he theoretical [man] draws his general rules from a full induction of particular cases: 
the practical man generalizes his own individual case, and makes it a rule for all 
others.’195 Whilst this is Mill’s critique of contemporary British politics writ large, later 
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chapters of this thesis show that Mill also applied this argument to matters of education 
and religion. 
For Mill, the population of Britain consisted of practical men, or ‘hackneyed 
performer[s] of mechanical operations.’ Constraining this sentiment to a more 
conventional attack upon the aristocracy sees Mill accuse them of cynically ‘fashion[ing 
a new] wisdom followed in England [sic]… to plunge into action without deliberation’. 
Such behaviour has elsewhere ‘been looked upon as characterising beings altogether 
irrational or approaching to irrationality’, and what Mill finds particularly disturbing 
about the British case is that even Aristotle thought that the principle that theory was the 
only thing on which practice could be safely built was so obvious that it did not need 
illustration, yet here was the ‘wisest of all nations’ extolling that ‘thought is 
dangerous’.196 The allusions between a statement of this sentiment, and the investigation 
into the hostility of Mill’s political context explored earlier in this chapter, which saw 
him lambast the ‘cry’ against philosophy, are clear. 
It is worth considering at this juncture whether Mill is casting a critique of empiricism, 
such is the apparent devotion to rationalism found in the above manuscript examples. 
Indeed, the Whigs had attacked the Philosophical Radicals in this very way, accusing 
them of ‘violating the principles of sound “Baconian” inductivism.’ 197  Such a 
consideration appears misguided: Mill seems not to be actually critical of the empiricist 
approach to knowledge (and the Philosophic Radicals as a whole were both ‘convinced 
their methods were empirical’ and ‘at a loss to know what the fuss was about’),198 
merely that the theoretical man, and here Mill cites Madame de Staël, will ‘[appreciate] 
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things from reason, and not from habit.’ 199  Mill’s stance can again be seen to be 
reflective of that of Stewart’s, who saw experience as ‘a blind and useless guide’ 
without theory, and that a legitimate theory ‘necessarily presupposes a knowledge of 
connected and well-ascertained facts, more comprehensive by far than any mere empiric 
is likely to possess.’200 Thus, ‘[a]ll men generalize’, believed Mill, but ‘in the ignorant 
mind the parcels [of knowledge] are few… [t]he philosopher therefore is the man who 
comes down the nearest to particulars.’ In a rare citation of Smith, Mill states that this 
idea is ‘finely illustrated in [Adam] Smith’s Essay on the History of Astronomy’.201  
In expanding upon the status and use of empirical evidence to the philosopher in 
deducting legislation, Mill argues that a certain type of person is required to think 
theoretically, essentially one who is ‘instructed with a less scattered knowledge’.202 In 
one of the longest extracts used by Mill, from Christian Wolff’s Preliminary Discourse 
on Philosophy in General, it is actually argued that the theoretical man is not someone 
who needs an enormous historical knowledge, because such a necessity is bypassed by 
an ability to apply philosophic knowledge instead. Mill cites Wolff’s belief that to apply 
our philosophic knowledge to the problems of human life is much more effective than 
relying on what we know historically. Whilst the philosopher ‘perceives the condition 
under which something is predicated of a being, and consequently, he does not attribute 
the predicate to the being unless he sees that the condition is present’, history: 
[Tells us] only that a thing can be or occur, and not why it can be or occur. Therefore it 
frequently happens that in dealing with the problems of human life we attribute a predicate to a 
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being without the condition under which the being possesses the predicate. As a result, the 
judgement is false.
203
 
The position on history exhibited within these manuscript citations has distinct 
similarities with the Scottish tradition of conjectural history, which Mill likely imbibed 
during his education at Edinburgh. Mill’s subservience of history to philosophy, in a 
way which produces a scientific account of human nature for the philosopher, also 
evokes David Hume’s ‘chief use’ of history.204 There are also echoes of this sentiment 
in Bain’s biography of Mill, which, in attempting to justify why Government had a lack 
of historical references, alluded to this separation between the historical and the 
philosophical thinker, and their associated utility to society: 
[Mill] knew as much history as any man of his time … [but W]hat was wanted [in Government] 
was a formal and exhaustive setting forth of the generalizations of historical facts, widely 
examined, sifted, and compared; a process that John Mill would have been the first to do homage 
to, as the only complete and satisfactory supplement to his deductive positions.
205
 
Mill’s own idea of the historian, posited in his review of Fox’s History of James II in 
1808, concords with both these analyses. He states that the historian’s task was to 
delineate the natural laws of man’s progress in society and avoid ‘a dry statement of 
vulgar, historical facts’.206 Later in the ‘Speculation & Practice’ manuscripts, in an item 
identifiable by Mill’s enlarged handwriting as coming post-1824,207 and hence after the 
publication of Government, Mill clarifies the use of knowledge of a practical nature by 
the legislator’s (or philosopher’s) use of experience: 
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The man who theorizes, provided only he does it well, is the only man who applies experience, 
that is the knowledge of the past, to the regulation of the future, in a way calculated to ensure 
correctness.
208
 
This statement is important for two reasons. First, it can be construed as an argument 
justifying Mill’s own deliberate omission of facts in the essay Government. Facts were 
important to Mill because they were to be used in a calculation – as Bain’s descriptive 
‘exhaustive setting forth’ process implies – to ensure the correctness of his philosophy, 
but their presence in a discourse promoting such philosophy was largely irrelevant. 
Second is that the advancement of the notion that a correctly delineated theory can be 
used for the ‘regulation of the future’ directly links Mill’s use of history to the 
delineation of legislative principles, that is to say it gives a distinct political angle to this 
application, one that could be used to justify the advancement of specific political laws 
or reforms. 
A good proportion of the manuscript material is dedicated to building an argument for 
placing a philosopher – a rational thinker with an ability to generalize – at the head of a 
legislative body of government. Since the business of legislation is theorising or 
thinking (Mill uses both terms), and because practice by its very nature only deals with 
the particular, it is not possible to use it to acquire skills in theorising, or making general 
rules, that is to say, the principal goal of legislation. Thus, paradoxically, being 
practised in legislation is not an ideal quality in a legislator. Mill appropriates an 
argument from Lettres persanes to reinforce this point, where Montesquieu argues that 
one should pass over officers for promotion who have spent time patiently waiting in 
junior positions, because ‘they [will] have become narrow-minded by attention to 
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detail’.209 But Mill has to juggle his logic somewhat when describing exactly who can 
act as a legislator in order to avoid a contradiction, because whilst he is so dismissive of 
practical men, the only type of person skilled enough for legislation is someone who has 
practice in theorising. This is the philosopher, ‘he alone it is that has practice in that 
which is the distinctive operation of the legislator.’210 
Drawing upon another of Mill’s articles for the London Review in 1836, ‘Theory & 
Practice’, sees the employment of similar rhetoric explicating the belief that the 
theoretical approach was superior to more practical endeavours, particularly regarding 
the art (or in Mill’s terms, ‘the business’) of legislation. It can also be seen, like its 
predecessor, as containing working material from the manuscript chapter ‘Speculation 
& Practice’. The article has a distinct importance, however, for the contemporary twist 
Mill gives to the text, bringing his argument for a deductive approach to politics to bear 
against the reform pursuits underway in nineteenth-century Britain, as discussed in the 
earlier parts of this chapter. Whilst only superficially distinct from the thought projected 
within the common place books, the article does contain perhaps the starkest 
justification yet for Mill’s deductive or a priori approach, encapsulated in the belief that 
Mill saw philosophy as soon able to discover the ‘sequences’ to all human knowledge: 
If philosophy shall ever discover these sequences, and it is making constant advances, all 
knowledge competent to human nature will be correctly summed up in a few propositions and 
mistaken practice will be no longer possible.
211
 
Where this specific article is of further enlightenment is in its final stages, where the 
protagonist of the dialogue offers some examples of current malpractice within the 
British political system. The comments here are very similar to those found at the 
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beginning of Mill’s manuscript chapter, and are aimed at the two Houses of Parliament, 
whose members are dismissive of theory as a method of improvement. In essence, Mill 
argues that a ‘conjuring trick’ has been performed on the population, whereby a false 
dichotomy between theory and practice, when in fact the latter is but an unrefined 
instance of the former, has convinced man to think less of philosophy. Mill complains 
that the term ‘philosopher’ is now pejorative, and that Parliament, the origin of such 
contempt, ‘will be the last place on earth where, in an assembly of men pretending to be 
educated, philosophy will be treated with disrespect’. He even goes as far as introducing 
personal targets of his attack, citing by name all the ‘great men’ who have been ‘equally 
eager in the use of the same language’: Windham, Fox, Pitt, and Burke.212 
From the attempt to define exactly what is meant by Mill’s philosophical position when 
it is argued that he had a deductive approach to politics, and the suggestion that there is 
a distinct Scottish legacy to his method, it is towards a further contextualisation of his 
ideas, based on the contents of the common place books, that this section now proceeds. 
By virtue of Mill’s biography, and in particular the importance he ascribed to classical 
texts in the education of his son John Stuart, it is not unsurprising to find a distinct 
classical influence in a manuscript chapter related to method. Mill makes a particular 
reference to Plato’s seventh book of The Republic, of which almost the whole ‘is on the 
vast importance of general over particular knowledge ([t]heory versus practice)’.213 Yet 
Mill also relies on more contemporary sources, as attested by the citations heretofore 
mentioned from Montesquieu, Wolff and Madame de Staël. These employments, it 
should be noted, are generally limited to particular quotations seemingly used to 
buttress Mill’s own position or give further illumination to his own argument.  
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The common place books also support the perceptions of J.H. Burns and Donald Winch 
of a discernible philosophes influence upon Mill.
214
 More specifically, this influence 
appears to be that of Condillac, of whom Mill cites two chapters from his Treatise on 
Systems. Such a speculation needs to be approached with caution. Mill had presented 
Condillac’s Traité des Sensations to his son upon the latter’s return from his sojourn in 
France in 1821, however John was quick to assert that a resemblance between the 
respective ‘systems’ of Condillac and his father’s was superficial. 215  His father’s 
citations of Condillac within the common place books, however, do highlight a striking 
similarity with regards to the philosopher-legislator figure that goes beyond 
superficiality. According to James Mill, Condillac’s chapter from Traité des systèmes, 
‘De la nécessité des systèmes en politique, des vues et des précautions avec lesquelles 
on les doit faire’ (‘On the Necessity in Political Systems of Views and Precautions with 
which They Ought to be Constructed’) is a ‘good chapter on the use and abuse of 
systems’. The tenets of the argument in Condillac’s chapter appear very similar to 
Mill’s overarching argument found in ‘Speculation & Practice’ and his approach to 
political reform. Condillac states that: 
[We] cannot blame those who want to introduce changes in government, but we should invite 
them to acquire all the knowledge needed to do so strictly in accordance with the situation … 
Those who do not bring all this circumspection to governmental reform run the risk of 
precipitating the destruction of the state.
216
 
Such a passage certainly evokes the contemporary concerns of Mill regarding the 
inductive approach to reform advanced by the Whigs. It is also analogous to the 
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argument proposed by Burns, who sees the legislator of Mill’s HBI (who deals with 
‘genera’ not ‘particulars’) as very similar to Condillac’s machiniste.217 
Mill quotes more extensively from chapter 17 of Traité des systèmes, where Condillac 
argues that ‘metaphysical analysis’ is responsible for 
giv[ing] the true system of each art. It is only that which can rise to the creation of rules, which 
can reduce those rules to the smallest possible number, and render the theory of the arts as useful 
as it is possible for them to be.
218
 
Such a quotation is striking for the similarity it bears to the one to Mill’s concerning the 
philosophical discovery of sequences found in ‘Theory and Practice’ and quoted above. 
More generally, both of Condillac’s chapters cited within the common place books offer 
lines of reasoning similar to Mill’s own argument. He argues, for instance, that 
prejudice towards political systems is not the fault of the system itself, but the 
behaviour of those who construct it. For Condillac, the mechanic or engineer 
(‘machiniste’) is someone who can manipulate the system to maintain its function 
(‘restores the springs and winds up the whole machine as circumstances require’), based 
on the fact that they have a full induction of its various constituent processes. A state or 
political society is a complex machine, but it is a machine none-the-less, and that means 
it follow the same laws as physics: 
In a complex machine, there is a progression of causes and effects whose principle lies in a first 
cause, or a progression of phenomena that is explained by a first cause. Thus the universe is just 
a huge machine.
219
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Analysing Condillac’s own intellectual influences can act as a useful bridge back 
towards the theme of a Scottish context of Mill’s ideas on method, and towards a 
conclusion to this section. Whilst the implicit influence of Scottish moral philosophy, 
particularly that of Dugald Stewart, on Mill’s ideas was explored at the beginning of 
this section, Condillac’s thought also has a distinct Scottish affinity. Hans Aarselff, for 
example, sees both the ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith, stirring people into social 
action, and David Hume’s example of two rowers in a boat instantly recalled by 
Condillac’s conception of the progress of language as a process of development 
requiring repetition, well-formed habits and steady social interaction.
220
 Since extracts 
from both these two Scottish authors also appear in Mill’s manuscript chapter 
‘Speculation & Practice’, one could posit that Mill’s use of Condillac is because it 
reaffirmed his own position. This can even be forged into an explanation supporting the 
lack of Scottish material within the common place books advanced previously: its 
influence was instead felt indirectly. 
Of the Scottish material that is present, a reference to Smith’s Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects, which Mill used to justify his remark on the philosopher being the man ‘who 
comes down the nearest to particulars’, has already been accounted for. Two further 
scraps relate to David Hume. The first instance is in reference to the dispute between 
Francis Jeffrey and Dugald Stewart following Stewart’s publication of his Philosophical 
Essays in 1810. This debate was centred around the status of metaphysics as an 
experimental science, and Jeffrey accused Stewart of scepticism in this regard. Mill saw 
a reading of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature as a way of settling the argument ‘very 
well’, and the work draws Mill to the conclusion that ‘[a]ll our knowledge of human 
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nature is experimental.’221 The second instance is Mill’s citation of a quotation from 
Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: ‘Philosophical decisions are 
nothing but the reflections of common life methodized and corrected’. Mill proceeds 
from here to critique ‘[o]ne of the characteristics of the Practical man’ in distinctly 
Humean terms: ‘[they] mistake forms for substances, formalities for essentials; 
concomitants for principals’.222 
Considering the importance of the influence of Hume on Mill evokes the 
aforementioned similarities between their positions on the role of history to philosophy. 
Yet it also brings to mind the recurring question that arises from attempts to understand 
the two major competing intellectual contexts to Mill’s ideas: whether the nature of his 
methodological position represents a break with his Scottish inheritance, or whether it is 
a more complicated mix between Scottish moral philosophy and Bentham’s doctrine of 
Utilitarianism. This question arises because Hume believed that men can have no 
knowledge of the world but what they derive from ‘Experience’, with ‘Experience’ 
consisting of ‘Sensation’ and ‘Reflection’, and Bentham was sympathetic to this notion 
that knowledge was derived from sensations. However, scholarly interpretations of the 
Scottish Enlightenment influence upon Mill, in particular that he initially and 
predominantly belongs to the Common Sense school of Thomas Reid, suggest a 
potential conflict here in Mill’s ideas.223 Reid, who succeeded Adam Smith as Professor 
of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, wrote a contemporary critique of Hume, 
giving him credit for taking Locke’s premises to their logical conclusion, but pointed 
out that the final outcome was patently absurd. Against Hume’s belief that an 
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impression (an idea) had no existence apart from the perceptual situation in which it 
figures, Reid constructed the Common Sense view that took for granted the existence of 
persons to whom perceptual acts can be attributed. Reaching a conclusion on the 
importance of Hume to Mill thus represents the limitations to the methodological 
approach to this section: it cannot be ascertained on the virtue of two small extracts 
relating to his work, and the analysis of implicit influences do not yield enough 
evidence to decide either way. 
These limitations notwithstanding, this section has shown that a wide range of 
intellectual influences contributed to Mill’s ideas on method within his common place 
books, many of which have hitherto been understated in importance to his thought. It 
has been demonstrated, for example, that Montesquieu and Wolff, to give just two 
contemporary figures, were used by Mill to justify his preference for the deductive 
approach to knowledge. The logical arguments of classical authors such as Plato are 
also important, as is the thought of Condillac, whose machiniste also seems inherently 
like Mill’s philosopher-legislator figure, suggesting a far greater philosophes influence 
on Mill’s thought than has previously been stated. What this section’s findings portray, 
therefore, is a sense that even if it is difficult to delineate where Mill intersects the two 
mental landscapes provided by his Scottish intellectual inheritance and the influence of 
Bentham, his intellectual history should not be bound to simply negotiate a strict 
compromise between these two positions when projecting an argument on his 
philosophic method. It is only by virtue of using the common place books that the 
importance of a thinker such as Condillac can be confirmed and solidified, and this 
alone suggests their value to the study of Mill’s ideas. 
More conducive to the overarching aim of this chapter, however, is the fact that Mill’s 
manuscript writings on method, which champion the virtues of deducing legislation 
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from philosophical principles, build towards an irresistible justification for the 
employment of a priori arguments as seen in published political writings such as 
Government. To Mill, the deductive method was a rationalist approach to legislation, 
calculated from a science of human nature, and which he believed was eminently 
knowable by those equipped to think philosophically. At the same time, this approach 
heavily criticised the alternative, inductive approach to politics of the Whigs, which by 
extension suggests Mill felt attempts at piecemeal reform of the existing political 
system were fundamentally mistaken, at best resulting in no discernible benefit, at 
worse advancing revolution by not giving way to reform quickly enough. Mill’s 
writings on method suggest his political ideas to be radical by definition, because his 
opposition to more moderate reform measures appeared as strong as his belief in the 
validity of laws deduced from a scientific, rather than a historical or practical basis. The 
purpose of the ensuing section of this chapter, therefore, is to examine these political 
ideas specifically, as they were advanced by Mill in published form in Government, and 
unpublished form in his common place books material on topics such as ‘Parliamentary 
Reform’. 
VI. 
The contextual study of Mill conducted in the earlier sections of this chapter has led to 
the supposition that his political thought, as depicted in texts such as Government, can 
not necessarily be taken as a full and accurate reflection of his ideas. The direct 
inference to this is that such ideas were actually more radical in scope than what he was 
prepared to advance publicly. The nature of the period Mill was writing in – the 
‘Reform Crisis’ of the early nineteenth century – is one explanation for such a reticence, 
because of the reactionary nature of governmental and religious authorities. There is, in 
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addition, a significant intellectual argument concerning Mill’s perceived dissimulation, 
based upon his preference for a deductive approach to determining the laws of 
‘sciences’ such as political economy or legislation. The very nature of this theoretical 
underpinning explicitly rejected the experimental or inductive reform measures 
emanating from establishment political actors such as the Whigs. In its place, it suggests 
a more far-reaching interpretation of politics that was by its definition radical. Although 
Government ostensibly relied on such an a priori method, the argument thus far has 
been that Mill still had to shield the more radical aspects of his political thought from 
public view. To this end, the primary aim of this final section is to ask whether the 
content of Mill’s unpublished common place books can substantiate such an argument. 
This section employs the comparative method to determine the radical extent of Mill’s 
political ideas, by highlighting the differences between Mill’s published text, the essay 
on Government, and extracts from his unpublished common place books. Mill’s 
manuscript chapters entitled ‘Reform’ (but also referred to as ‘Parl. Ref.’) present the 
most interesting material to consider for this activity. The second of these chapters is 
particularly important, as it was made up between 1817 and 1820, that is to say 
synchronous to the time Government was composed. But whilst the overarching 
hypothesis about determining Mill’s radicalism may be relatively straightforward, its 
execution in methodological terms is anything but. The manuscript material, as has been 
noted elsewhere, does not simply exist as a more radical version of Government. In 
addition, there is a need to avoid accusations of relativism in the selections made from 
Mill’s common place books. In trying to identify Mill’s understated literary influences, 
for example, the danger is that if one only chooses passages in the manuscripts to 
interpret based on what one oneself finds interesting, one might unknowingly skew the 
conclusions drawn. This warning is particularly applicable to the third chapter of 
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manuscript material on ‘Reform’, where the style of commonplacing is such that it at 
times resembles a daily record of Mill’s reading, and the prevalence of choice becomes 
an acute scholarly hazard. 
At face-value, Government is an abstract essay, initially focused on defining the ends 
and means of its subject. This should not be especially surprising, given its ostensible 
purpose as an article for the SupEB. But by using the common place books to provide 
intellectual context to the essay, one can show just how deeply Mill’s political thought 
was rooted within the discourse of the ‘Reform Crisis’ of the early nineteenth century. 
This notion rests primarily upon the fact that the manuscript material has express 
relevance to certain passages of Government, and more developed instances of Mill’s 
published arguments can often be found within the unpublished writing, such as his 
thoughts on the suffrage, or on the role and function of the House of Lords and the 
monarchy. The common place books, however, offer more than just points of 
comparison. They demonstrate Mill’s commitment to reform through his impassioned 
defence of it against its conservative critics. They also show his opinion on the French 
Revolution, an event to which much importance has already been ascribed in this 
chapter, as well as evidence of particular literary influences to his thought, especially 
French writers such as Condillac, Condorcet, and Madame de Staël, and also, 
significantly, the English conservative philosopher (and Whig MP) Edmund Burke. In 
short, the common place books provide a richness to Mill’s intellectual history not 
conveyed by the published Government, and one product of such richness is that 
conclusions about the extent of Mill’s radicalism, one of the chapter’s main objectives, 
can be readily drawn. 
At the beginning of Mill’s essay, the end of government is deemed relatively 
straightforward, and delivered in assured Benthamic terms: to increase the utmost 
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pleasures, and diminish the utmost pains, which men derive from each other. It was a 
difficulty regarding definition, however, to delineate the actual means of achieving such 
a state, and this constituted Mill’s primary task for the essay. Government opens with 
the claim that previous attempts to describe the purpose of government have always 
suffered from a lack of clarity, to which Locke’s premise that government was ‘the 
public good’ and Bentham’s argument that government was ‘the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number’ are the two cited examples.224 Mill seeks to address the alleged 
opaqueness of these prior works in his essay, but whilst arguing that the fundamentals 
of human happiness can only be understood by an analysis of the whole science of 
human nature, he also states that the breadth of this kind of topic is such that it would be 
impossible to elaborate on within the confines of an essay as compact as Government. It 
thus makes sense, according to Mill, to ‘content ourselves with assuming certain 
results’. From this confidently brusque yet undefined position, Mill dictates several 
laws upon which he bases his definition of the ends and means of government: 
the actions of men are governed by their wills, and their wills by their desires: that their desires 
are directed to pleasure and relief from pain as ends, and to wealth and power as the principal 
means: that to the desire of these means there is no limit; and that the actions which flow from 
this unlimited desire are the constituents whereof bad Government is made.
225
 
The means, depicted here as ‘wealth and power’ of which man has no desire to limit, 
give the question of government a powerful economic dimension. Government is to do 
with the distribution of the ‘scanty materials of happiness’, and most of these ‘objects of 
desire’ and ‘means of subsistence’ are the product of labour, the ‘foundation for all’. 
Furthermore, and in completing the definition of the end of government, the greatest 
happiness of a society is attained by ‘insuring to every man the greatest possible 
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quantity of the produce of his labour’. Mill’s perception is that such a state can only be 
reached by an agreement of mutual benefit between men, that is to say an arrangement 
where ‘a great number of men combine, and delegate to a small number the power 
necessary for protecting them all.’226 
The seemingly innocuous assertion that there existed a mutual agreement between men 
as the foundation for government is actually one route in to understanding the radically 
democratic underpinning to Mill’s thought as shown in his manuscript material. A 
significant portion of such writing is used to justify the notion of increased popular 
involvement in government, as well as defending such a suggestion from contemporary 
detractors of reform in this guise. One common reason ‘against giving the people rights’ 
according to Mill, has been that ‘men will always do mischief, when not compelled by 
force.’ He argues that this is simply not true, ‘because it is not in their interest.’ 
‘Government’, after all, ‘is the interest of all men’: 
Indeed those who talk of the propensity of the people to non-obedience forget that without 
obedience there is no government; they can only use force against one part, by the obedience of 
the other. It is because one part of the people are obedient, that governments have the means of 
employing force against another part.
227
 
Mill also seeks to ‘pulverize’ the notion that ‘the English constitution is the best in 
existence’, because its distribution of power tilts less towards the people than in other 
constitutions.
228
 The defence of the argument for people participating more fully in 
government is developed along two lines. First, the notion that the people lack the 
required probity for government is dismissed because ‘the people, as a whole, can have 
no sinister interest.’ Second, and in response to the idea that they also lack the required 
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intelligence, Mill argues that the people have, historically, been capable of taking a 
small share in a government alleged as ‘the best in the world’. Since they are now more 
intelligent, they are surely capable of participating more.
229
 
In Government, the determination of the means of government is a complex endeavour 
because it revolves around the need to sufficiently restrain the ‘small number’ delegated 
with power in order to secure the whole community against abuse. Very basically, it is a 
question of how to protect the many from the sinister interests of the powerful few, and 
there are clear allusions here to Bentham’s political thought which we find in published 
form in his Plan of Parliamentary Reform. Historically, Mill argues that of the three 
‘species’ or forms of government that have existed – democracy, aristocracy and 
monarchy – all fail to provide such security. In terms of a democracy, the system of 
government collapses under the weight of having to resort to deliberations from the 
entire community. The strongest benefit of the democracy, however, is that it represents 
the interests of the entire community, and whilst such interest can be mistaken – thereby 
leading to error – it can never go willingly against itself. Mill’s evaluation of democracy 
is one that must be kept in foremost thoughts when later considering his own practical 
application of politics to obtain good government. The two other forms of government 
suffer from the machinations of sinister interest. An aristocratically dominated 
government will exploit the community, taking from them as much as they please of the 
objects of desire. A further comment on the aristocracy is Mill’s belief that a hereditary 
one is likely to lack intellectual aptitude, since such powers are the ‘offspring of labour’ 
and they are deprived of a strong motive to labour owing to their wealth and position. 
The analysis of the monarchical form of government is broadly the same, Mill 
reinforcing his point that ‘whenever the powers of Government are placed in any hands 
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other than those of the community… those persons will make use of them to defeat the 
very end for which Government exists.’230  The similarity between these two latter 
systems should be noted at this juncture; in Mill’s manuscripts, little distinction is 
actually made between the monarchy and the aristocracy, and Mill often uses the latter 
term as a byword for those who hold political power and an interest in opposition to that 
of the community (a ‘sinister’ interest). 
Mill also rejects in Government the Hobbesian notion that it is better to avoid the 
anarchy of no government, which would expose every man ‘to depredation from every 
[other] man’, and instead be exploited by either a monarchy or an aristocracy. Whilst 
Mill admits it is very difficult to go against Hobbes’ idea that ‘absolute Monarchy is the 
best’, he resorts to his conception of human nature to justify why this reasoning actually 
constitutes an error.
231
 Firstly, although it is perceived that a monarch or aristocracy will 
satiate themselves with the objects of desire and leave the rest to the community, this is 
in not true in practice. The plunder will continue, leaving the rest of the community with 
only the ‘bare means of subsistence’. Secondly, there is no upper limit to a human’s 
capacity for selfishness, to ‘possess himself of the objects of desire at the cost of 
another’. This concept extends in an ‘infallible sequence’, argues Mill, to an unbounded 
demand for power over the acts of other men, both in terms of the number of persons 
this power extends to, and the degree over the actions of each. There are of course two 
well-known classes of means ‘by which the conformity between the will of one man 
and the acts of other men may be accomplished’: pain and pleasure. Pleasure can be 
evoked by sharing the profits of misrule. But pain is a much more efficient obedience 
mechanism, and terror the grandest invocation of it. The end achieved by a monarchy or 
aristocracy is thus one of desperate cruelty for the majority of the community, unless an 
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adequate ‘checking’ body can be established to temper the selfish desires of those in 
power.
232
 
Mill’s true attitude towards the role of the monarchy and the aristocracy in the 
institutions of government can be perceived in his assertion within the common place 
books that the ‘natural and powerful tendency of the rich few to govern absolutely the 
poor many’, which he finds well illustrated in Mackintosh’s Vindiciae Gallicae. It is a 
puzzling feature of politics that ‘the doctrine [is] always [of] taking measures to protect 
the rich against the poor’ which, Mill continues, ‘is about as wise as taking measures to 
protect the wolves against the sheep… it is to make that stronger which is naturally too 
strong.’ For Mill, ‘the old approved maxim has always prevailed’: ‘they deny that what 
is good for the prince is bad for the subjects’, and this is true for ‘a single despot, or a 
compound one’, that is to say a monarchy or an aristocracy.233 
In Government, however, Mill states that whilst the representative system functions as a 
formulator of legislation, it cannot execute laws, and here the monarchy is perceived to 
be useful, since a king-like figure is the most perfect example of an executor. Bentham, 
too, was willing to concede the execution of laws to a monarch (even if he described 
that particular institution as ‘dross [with] glitter on it’), in return for a ‘democratic 
ascendency’, i.e. popular control of the House of Commons.234 Moreover, if such an 
institution did not exist, Mill argued, it would have to be invented. This differentiation 
between the monarchy and the aristocracy allows Mill to then specifically consider the 
utility of the House of Lords as an institution, which Mill says should hold no fear of 
dissolution, providing it too has some merit. In the common place books, however, 
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opposition to both institutions is much more forthcoming. The monarchy and the 
aristocracy are the people’s ‘natural and irreconcileable [sic] enemies’.235 Mill states 
that if the objective is good government, the powers of government are to be executed 
for the good of the community in general, and not for the advantage of any small 
number. If this end is unachievable without destroying institutions such as the House of 
Lords, then such institutions stand directly opposed to the welfare and happiness of 
human beings and to the best interests of human nature. ‘If they are not essential,’ 
wonders Mill, ‘where would be the harm in parting with them?’236 
When Mill orientates Government towards a more contemporary analysis of British 
politics, the fundamentals of a prescription for effective measures pertaining to 
parliamentary reform can be glimpsed. Attention is first cast upon the orthodox idea that 
the British constitution is a perfect form of government, existing as a balance between 
the three types of government hitherto delineated and thus eminently stable and secure. 
Mill believed there was simply no proof for this claim of perfection, and sought to 
demonstrate it by simple logic: two contrasting groups need only join forces with one 
another to supersede the influence of the third. This was essentially what Bentham had 
termed the ‘conjunct yoke of two partial and adverse interests’ to which the universal 
interest was sacrificed.
237
 Whilst Mill more straightforwardly labelled, in Government, 
the perception of balance as a conjuring trick,
238
 his opinion of the existing political 
system of Britain was much more damning within his manuscripts. The idea of 
perfection is dismissed by the notion that ‘our government [is] not the fruit of human 
wisdom’, it exists by a mere ‘chance stroke’, and ‘to suppose it good from this 
                                                 
235
 Mill, CPB II, 14
v
. 
236
 Mill, CPB I, 38
r
. 
237
 Bentham, “Plan of Parliamentary Reform, in the Form of a Catechism, with Reasons for Each Article: 
With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform,” 440. 
238
 Mill, “Government,” 16. 
103 
 
circumstance merely, is just to beg the question.’239 What was needed for security of 
government was thus the insertion of a checking power which would protect the 
interests of the community against the sinister interests of those in whose hands power 
lay by fortune of circumstance. Those in possession of this power existed, according to 
Mill, as ‘three millstones about the neck of the people, which crush them to the ground’, 
possessing ‘undue power, wealth torn from the people by taxes, or undue privileges, and 
undeserved respect’. 240  A bulkhead against this power is provided, Mill argues in 
Government, in the ‘grand discovery of modern times’, the system of representation.241 
Representation is depicted here as a purely rational or logical choice, its advancement 
does not appear to be driven by any particular ideology. It requires two things: a degree 
of power sufficient for the business of checking, so it can oppose the sinister interests of 
opposing groups even in combination; and it must have an identity of interest with the 
community, or else it falls into the same trap as the body is it designed to confront, and 
will make mischievous use of its power. It is, essentially, what Mill envisaged to be a 
reformed House of Commons. 
Since the checking body must have power that exceeds the combined power of all other 
groups, the only rational check that can itself limit its influence is to circumscribe the 
period of time which its members can serve on it before re-election is due. Whilst 
lessening the duration is thus the instrument which ensures representatives continue to 
identify their interests with the wider community, this does not mean a member stands 
only for one term – indeed, Mill thought the opposite beneficial – but that the check on 
his use of power is so effectively limited by the threat of expulsion that he will always 
act in the interest of his community. This is an implicit argument against the Septennial 
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Act, which set the maximum life of parliaments to seven years, and Mill’s position was 
made more pronounced in a later article entitled ‘Periodical Literature’ for the 
Westminster Review, in which Mill called the Septennial Act the ‘greatest mockery of 
popular rights.’242 In the common place books, Mill is even more explicit in his claim 
that elections should be annual, arguing that there is no distraction in having an election 
during the interval between one parliamentary session and another. He finds 
concordance with this stance in a citation from Burke’s Speech on a Bill for Shortening 
the Duration of Parliaments: ‘The object in view is to have parliaments as frequent as 
they can be, without distracting them in the prosecution of public business.’243 
Mill’s attitude in Government towards extending the suffrage attracted stringent 
criticism from both his fellow Philosophical Radicals (who argued it did not go far 
enough) and from more conservative quarters (who argued it was already dangerously 
radical). The suffrage, in Government, was the elected body which chooses (the 
‘choosing body’) the members of the checking body, and in a straight-forward appeal to 
logic Mill suggested that such a choosing body should be the community at large. But 
whilst universal suffrage is implicit in this initial utterance, Mill did, however, advance 
examples of how it could be made smaller. Ostensibly these appear to be posited for 
reasons of efficiency, but their inclusion is perplexing because they seem somewhat 
arbitrary limitations. To this end, Mill’s active exclusion of women, children and men 
under 40 because, he argues, their interests were alleged to be the same as those to 
which he did give the vote, casts a heavy shadow on his legacy.
244
 
Mill’s manuscripts in this regard can be cast as something of a redemption, because he 
appears far more emphatic in support of universal suffrage, and far less convinced of the 
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ability to temper it for reasons of efficiency. Mill’s citation of Burke within the 
manuscripts appears to be as a means of justifying the stance he adopted in Government. 
It was Burke’s view that all individuals ‘have an indefeasible right to all the power 
which they are capable of exercising without injury to themselves.’ That which they are 
not capable of exercising can of course be done by others, but the right is retained to 
choose these persons. ‘No species of men’, it continues, ‘ought to be excluded except 
for specific reason shewed.’ Such reasons, which perhaps are ones Mill felt convincing 
enough to include in Government regarding women, children and men under 40, have a 
requirement (an ‘onus probandi’) to prove ‘that the admission of such people to the 
power of chusing would be injurious to the people themselves.’ 245  But Mill’s 
consideration of this onus probandi actually appears to result in a much more liberal 
interpretation of who should possess the suffrage. For it is from Burke’s argument that 
we ‘ought to go as near to universality as we can’ that Mill arrives at the conclusion that 
it is so difficult to define this ‘glaring line of distinction’ that the ‘onus of proof lies 
glaringly upon those who would restrict.’ Without a convincing argument that evil will 
result from universal suffrage, Mill says, he is inclined to support its adoption as per the 
‘previous and decisive reasons’, that is to say in reference to the fact that all individuals 
have an indefeasible right to choose their representatives.
246
 
By extension, it is a relatively short step from Mill’s thought on the suffrage to his ideas 
on representation, and this in turn can link to his notions about the configuration of the 
checking body. Mill analyses several modes of representation, including that relating to 
representation of property, which itself is developed more fully in tandem with his 
thoughts on interest in its public, private and sinister guises. In Mill’s critique of Lord 
Liverpool’s reform attempts in Government, his opposition to the representation of any 
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interest except that of the community is laid out. Liverpool felt that the interests of 
different fraternities – landowners, lawyers, merchants, army officers, etc. – should be 
given direct representation, which would constitute a representation of the interests of 
the community at large. But Mill argues that since all fraternities will have sinister 
interests, this is a sham theory. There is no proof that these sinister interests would 
cancel each other out, nor that fraternities would follow the common rather than their 
own interest – since to do so would be to go against their own human nature. In Mill’s 
view, a ‘motley representation’ as posited by Liverpool is as bad as the ‘motley 
aristocracy’ that already existed.247 In the common place books, Mill’s opposition to 
such a system – what he specifically terms ‘variegated representation’ – can be seen 
reinforced by his reading of Condorcet’s Life of Turgot. A representative of the clergy, 
nobility or another class, and the representative of the population as a whole, are clearly 
not the same thing. With the man in the former regard seeing himself as a delegate of 
the particular order he represented, and ‘obliged in honour to support all its pretentions’. 
The object, therefore, ‘should be to unite the citizens among themselves; whereas we 
divide them, when we mark, with a stronger line, the bounds of their separation.’248 
Mill’s views on representation based on class interest were only superficially distinct 
from those on variegated representation. Class interests were selfish in the sense that 
they were fundamentally in opposition to the community, and composing a government 
of class representatives meant composing it of ‘three or four sets of men… having each 
an interest hostile to the community.’ The underlying argument to this stance was again 
one essentially democratic: ‘The individual interest is of course the foundation of every 
thing.’ All interests that are not held in common with one another are opposite, and 
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private, class and public interest all conflict with each other.
249
 These statements appear 
to be a direct refutation of the type of virtual representation Mill himself appeared to be 
advocating in the concluding passages of Government, where his extolling of the virtues 
of the ‘middle rank’ as the class ‘which is universally described, as both the most wise, 
and the most virtuous part of every community’ suggested the franchise needed only be 
extended to them.
250
 
What attracts perhaps more attention than any other topic within Mill’s manuscripts 
pertaining to reform, however, is not justification for specific ideas such as universal 
suffrage or the secret ballot, but a defence of the very notion of reform from its 
numerous political detractors. Such a defence has been highlighted elsewhere in this 
chapter, in particular Mill’s opposition to the “cry” against philosophy from various 
state and religious authorities, which appears to be predicated on a fear of insurrection 
inspired by the events and excesses of the French Revolution, and the linked belief that 
government based on philosophy was a route to the destruction of private property. Mill 
actually saw such cries as the clearest indications of the rude health of such powers.
251
 
But here also exists the most extensive defence of parliamentary reform which has 
specific implications for this chapter’s more conceptual questions, regarding Mill’s 
political objectives and the extent of his radicalism. Mill can be found, for example, 
rejecting the notion that the motivation of the reformer is to ‘be in opposition to all 
established laws and government’, to which he adds the rhetorical question ‘to wish to 
improve the laws and government, means to wish to destroy all law and 
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government?’252 Mill prepares ripostes to a wide selection of arguments against reform, 
such as the notion that reform is difficult to obtain (an illusion based on ‘vague 
fears’),253 that England is a prosperous country and therefore does not need reform (a 
clear logical fallacy),
254
 that reformers can never agree (‘many must be the shades of 
difference on every interesting point’),255 or that the people are disposed to disobey, 
disrespect and despise their superiors (when in fact the ‘very reverse is the case’).256 
Whilst these responses are based on seemingly sound principles, Mill can also be seen 
descending into withering sarcasm when listing further examples of objections to 
reform, such as in a passage which was later reproduced by J.S. Mill in a debating 
speech on parliamentary reform.
257
 
There are, in addition, particular arguments against reform which attract more sustained 
criticism. On the topic of the French Revolution, for example, Mill explores both 
explanations for its violent legacy and reasons why it is unlikely to be repeated in 
England. The inherent conservatism of the English, which Mill finds in Hume’s History 
of England (that the English ‘are very difficult to rouse to resistance against established 
government’) is one such reason. But Mill also argues that conservatism can itself 
explain the fate of Louis XVI, and show that the “antijacobins” [sic] who believed that 
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it was a ‘giving way’ to reform which spawned the French Revolution are gravely 
mistaken. This position can later be clarified by a quotation from Madame de Staël, who 
compares the differences between French and English nobles, the latter of which 
‘demanded rights for the Commons conjointly with rights for themselves’, whilst the 
former ‘opposed these rights when claimed by the Tiers Etat’, were subsequently too 
weak to refute such demands, and then fled the country making a constitutional 
monarchy impossible.
258
 
Talk of revolutionary fervour, as well as explanations for it, are a useful bridge towards 
a final contextualisation of Mill’s political thought attempted in this chapter: his 
identification with the term ‘radical’, and his assessment of the wider population’s 
inclination to radicalism, which is based heavily on refuting the perception that the 
people, given power, would wilfully destroy property. Regarding his own nature, Mill 
states that he does not know what the term ‘radical’ means, and if it is ‘a bad thing, I am 
not for it.’ He conveys his perplexity at being labelled a radical, given that his 
motivations are only the pursuing of laws calculated to secure the interests of the many 
against ‘the encroachments and usurpations of the few’: 
If it means the procuring of laws which may take the powers of government out of the hands of 
those who with the power cannot but have the will to use them in opposition to the ends of their 
institution, and when they are taken out of such hands to place them in the hands of those who 
shall neither have the powers nor the will to use in opposition to those ends, I can imagine 
nothing more congenial to my soul than radicality.
259
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Regarding the wider population, Mill sees in them merely a love of good government. 
His inference, therefore, is that disaffection which might be labelled by observers as 
radical only arises when a government deliberately abuses its power: 
Those who have all the means of influence and authority—all the power of instruction, to be 
exercised with every advantage, must have made a shocking use of their advantages to allow the 
people instead of loving to detest them.
260
 
It is the very object of radical reform, claims Mill in the common place books, to lessen 
taxes, improve the law, and to make property more valuable. ‘The People’, argue Mill, 
possess three general desires: that the power exercised over them is ‘necessary for the 
ends of government’ and not more; that ‘the portion taken from them… under the guise 
of defraying the expenses of government’ is ‘as little as possible’; and that they have 
securities ‘for those requisites of their own happiness’.261 There is thus no inclination 
within the population to ‘annihilate property’, and this is evident to Mill based on the 
machinations of interest. In the experience of the Americans, who, Mill reminds us, 
have a ‘practically universal’ suffrage, there is the utmost of respect for property 
rights.
262
 Furthermore, Mill can find no logic in the belief that the people ‘should they 
wish to take those good things from the few… if they do not wish them to be secure to 
themselves.’ Quite simply, man wishes all other men to respect the rights of his 
property, and this he can obtain ‘upon one condition only–that of respecting theirs.’263 
This sentiment, Mill believed, could be read in Turgot’s Formation et Distribution des 
Richesses.
264
 Finally, Mill sees a contradiction in those ‘who affirm… that the people, if 
they had the power would destroy the rights of property’ but ‘do yet affirm that to the 
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people the rights of property are of the greatest advantage.’ If the government is not for 
the good of the greatest number, its extinction would be desirable. But since one of the 
great ends of government is preservation of property, a ‘respect for the laws of property 
is implicit in the very circumstances of people’s living together in society.’265 
That the people’s interest revolves around a mutual respect for property illuminates the 
final argument Mill sets out in Government is his objection to the maxim that ‘people 
are not capable of acting agreeably to their interests’. His opposition stems from the fact 
that he believes the whole ‘chain of reasoning’ exhibited in the essay is dependent upon 
the principle that ‘the acts of men will be conformable to their interests’. This is a 
complete and ‘irrefragable’ chain which stands upon a strong psychological foundation. 
Mill argues that 
it is indisputable that the acts of men follow their will; that their will follows their desires; and 
that their desires are generated by the apprehensions of good or evil; in other words, by their 
interests.
266
 
Any claim to the contrary is usually the retort of the aristocracy and is, in Mill’s view, 
patently absurd. The aristocracy represents evil by design, the representative democracy 
evil only by mistake. In the latter, the mistake can be cured with knowledge, which 
centres education at the heart of Mill’s democratic political thought.267 There is no 
antidote to the former, however, and exploitation of society by the aristocracy can only 
be limited by checking their powers. 
The implication from the attempt to compare two of Mill’s political texts and 
demonstrate the true depths of his radicalism is that, beneath the veneer of the reform 
measures implicit in Government, and atop the philosophical principles established in 
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the chapter on ‘Speculation and Practice’, lies a wholesale plan for government that is 
revolutionary in its scope, and unrecognisable from the political institutions of Mill’s 
context. This is actually not Mill’s objective. Mill acknowledges within his manuscripts 
that all speculative plans, however excellent in theory, are shunned.
268
 This, when 
coupled with Mill’s attitude towards the French Revolution, draws him away from the 
perception that he is a political thinker who is revolutionary in outlook, and towards one 
with a concerted interest in the politics of reform. The question thus becomes how 
radical his reforms actually were, rather than whether his perceived radicalism outstrips 
any notion that his thought contributed to the concept of parliamentary reform. 
In determining the radical extent of Mill’s thought as expressed in the common place 
books, much of what he writes speaks for itself. An overarching impression from the 
manuscripts is one of sharp democratic principles, as well as the promotion of reform 
measures based on ahistorical, theoretical understandings. Such measures, especially 
with regard to the suffrage, clearly surpass those which can be perceived in 
Government. Just as emphatic are Mill’s impassioned statements defending the cause of 
reform from its enemies, which reinforce the idea posited at the start of this chapter that 
Mill himself was a defender of philosophy against the “cry” rung out against it by the 
church and state authorities. What is less apparent in the manuscripts, however, is that 
Mill’s ideas constitute a grand political plan of the type authored, for example, by 
eighteenth-century philosophes. Whilst Mill quotes passages which firmly suggest an 
appreciation for such an approach, such as that from Carlo Antonio Pilati about 
Machiavelli’s maxim to ‘cut down and uproot everything’,269 which seem to suggest the 
razing of existing political structures in order to begin again, Mill tempers this with an 
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acknowledgement that the great theoretical political works are perpetually ‘slighted as 
mere visions’ in practice.270 Such an acceptance can shed some light upon a resolution 
to the longstanding problem regarding the definition of Mill’s political objectives. 
Whilst Mill is certainly not abandoning the use of philosophy in legislative matters 
altogether – itself a rather unlikely proposition – it does help explain the relationship 
between Mill’s philosophy and the concept of parliamentary reform that this chapter has 
previously found difficult to clarify. A quotation Mill selects from The Idler offers 
much insight around this issue: ‘[f]orms of government are seldom the result of much 
deliberation. They are framed by chance in popular assemblies, or in conquered 
countries by despotic authority.’ The laws created are ‘often occasional, often 
capricious, made always by a few, and sometimes by a single voice.’271 It is quite clear 
that Mill’s objectives in this regard are the improvement of government via the 
introduction of sound laws formulated for the interests of the community, and deduced 
from a sound theoretical rather than experimental basis. As to how this marked him out 
as a radical, Mill, it seems, remained wholly unsure. 
VII. 
This chapter began in earnest as a narrative, which commenced at the start of the French 
Revolution and continued into the early decades of the nineteenth century, which 
attempted to illustrate the specific context to Mill’s political ideas. Elements of this 
narrative prompted the speculation that political works which appeared radical in 
nature, and in this group Mill’s essay Government can be regarded as a specific 
example, were actually subject to restraint by their authors – the practice of 
dissimulation – for fear of a reaction from a conservative government and population 
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which was itself weary of radical political ideas following the upheavals wrought by the 
French Revolution. As noted in the chapter’s opening paragraphs, that Government was 
not an accurate portrayal of Mill’s politics has been a long-held scholarly supposition, 
but with this hypothesis based on contextual reasons in hand, the purposes of the 
chapter – an attempt to uncover Mill’s more radical but unpublished thought in the 
common place books – became readily discernible. 
Depicting the extent of Mill’s radicalism was first attempted by investigating his 
particular philosophical approach to the delineation of political laws in Government. His 
use of deduction from a science of human nature attracted critical attention from a 
number of Philosophic Whigs associated with the Edinburgh Review, who saw Mill’s 
method as mistaken and the content of his ideas as too radical. In turn, this led to 
questions about Mill’s own intellectual heritage from the Scottish Enlightenment which 
he shared with a number of these Whigs. Mill’s theoretical approach preached an 
interest only in the general, and his deference to the a priori seemed to suggest he was 
interested only in a wholesale interpretation of politics, which seemed fundamentally 
incompatible with the reform discourse of the period. But in practice, it seemed he 
could not help but account for particulars. In Government specifically, this meant 
directing his political philosophy towards the specific cause of parliamentary reform. It 
resulted in his political objectives being portrayed in a rather perplexing state, at once 
both deeply theoretical in origin and yet seemingly applicable to the realities of the 
‘Reform Crisis’ of nineteenth-century Britain. It confused not just his Whig opponents, 
but fellow Philosophical Radicals such as his son J.S. Mill as well. 
A major difference between Government and the common place books resulting from 
this comparative study is that privately Mill seems entirely convinced by the cause for 
radical democratic reform of the British political system, and that his published political 
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writings were merely echoes of such ideas, their full extent kept away from public 
consumption. How, then, is it possible to reconcile perceptions of Mill’s radicalism with 
a political reality which was unreceptive to such ideas and forced their moderation? Mill 
is supportive of parliamentary reform, but it came down to a question of definition. His 
reforms are much more radical in scope than anything proffered by establishment actors 
such as the Whigs. But his radicalism was always only to a point, and despite attempts 
by his Whig critics to construe his philosophical approach otherwise, he did not wish to 
see revolutionary fervour or excess along the lines witnessed in the French Revolution. 
He appears both fundamentally convinced of the integrity of his deductive basis to this 
political thought, yet aware of the fact that the damage done to the reputation of 
philosophy by the French Revolution meant there was little chance of ever achieving 
what he thought was a theoretically sound legislative process. 
Whilst establishing Mill’s true political thought can be achieved through a study of his 
common place books, defining how such thought shaped his political objectives has 
been a consistently difficult task in this chapter. Whilst the common place books can 
establish that the political thought he advanced publicly fell short of his actual ideas, the 
pursuit of what he would have practically advocated, had the restrictions which 
necessitated the dissimulation he employed in Government not existed, still remains a 
matter of speculation. J.S. Mill observed, in his Autobiography, that his father: 
would sometimes say that if life were made what it might be, by good government and good 
education, it would then be worth having: but he never spoke with anything like enthusiasm even 
of that possibility.
272
 
Whilst it is perhaps too unjust a conclusion to argue that Mill lacked the stomach to 
advocate the full extent of his political ideas, since an appreciation of his context can 
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offer many reasons for such reticent behaviour, he certainly seemed to lack enthusiasm 
for the possibility that he would ever see ‘good government’. Whether ‘good education’ 
was similarly unattainable is a crucial question of the next chapter. 
117 
 
3. ‘Democratical sentiment and indigent orders’: James Mill 
and the essay Education 
I. 
As evidence of the vast progress which we have made in right thinking upon this subject, we 
cannot help remarking, that even Milton and Locke, though both men of great benevolence 
toward the larger family of mankind, and both men whose sentiments were democratical, yet 
seem, in their writings on education, to have had in view no education but that of the gentleman. 
It had not presented itself, even to their minds, that education was a blessing in which the 
indigent orders could be made to partake. 
James Mill, Education
273
 
Few areas of James Mill’s thought appear as multifaceted as that which encompasses 
his ideas on education. His interest in the subject ran from involvement in very practical 
activities, such as his role in attempting to establish cheap schools as a means of 
educating England’s poor – first under the auspices of the Lancasterian movement, 
which led to the pamphlet Schools for All in 1812, and later through Bentham’s related 
plan for the Chrestomathic Day School – to deeply philosophical ruminations, such as 
those found in his essay Education, which highlighted the psychological foundations to 
his educational ideas, and placed them at the heart of Utilitarian objectives to maximize 
man’s happiness. Whilst it is possible to draw a distinction in Mill’s thought pertaining 
to education between the fact that some of his ideas appear more consistent with the 
formation of the citizenry, whilst others are better associated with a term such as 
‘schooling’, that is to say concerned with more specific vocational, instructional, or 
technical matters, an intersection between these two different facets of Mill’s thought 
can be glimpsed in what is also one of the most controversial aspects of his biography: 
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the education of his own children. The astonishing depth to the tuition he instilled in his 
eldest son, John Stuart Mill, was indicative of his beliefs – drawn in particular from 
Helvétius – that education meant total environmental influence, and that the human 
mind had a potent capacity for intelligence if nurtured correctly.
274
 At the same time, he 
trialled the monitorial system – the ‘efficient’ method of teaching which defined the 
Lancasterian and Chrestomathic models – within his own household, which saw John 
responsible for instructing the younger Mill children.
275
 
It is the objective of the following introductory paragraphs, however, to justify why it is 
towards the more philosophical aspects of Mill’s thought, rather than his real-world 
endeavours, that this chapter is especially drawn. Initial responsibility for such a 
narrowing of attention can be ascribed to the methodological approach that this chapter 
inherits from the wider thesis. In the previous two chapters, comparisons were sought 
between Mill’s published and unpublished thought on two pressing contemporary topics 
of his early nineteenth-century context – the law of libel, and political ideas pertaining 
to parliamentary reform. This was facilitated in the main by the existence of particularly 
relevant and accessible source material within the common place books, which could be 
contrasted with the published essays Mill contributed to the Supplement to the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (hereafter SupEB). This chapter also proposes to use one of 
Mill’s SupEB essays – the slightly earlier Education (1819) – but two related factors 
about such a selection affect the ability to carry out a study as exact in parameters as 
previous attempts. At the same time, these factors account for the concentration on 
Mill’s more abstract educational ideas, at the expense of a study of those that were more 
eminently practical, such as those argued for in Schools for All. 
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The first of these factors concerns the aforementioned nature of the published essay, 
which is less a treatise advocating specific reforms (it speaks, for example, only briefly 
and in a very particular way, about Bentham’s plans for the Chrestomathic School) and 
more a philosophical treatment of the general subject couched in distinctly Utilitarian 
terms and dominated by Mill’s interest in associationist psychology. The end of 
education, states Mill in this essay, was relatively straightforward: happiness. The 
means (or what Mill called ‘the business of education’), however, were more 
complicated: it involved the cultivation of the mental successions, sequences, or trains 
of thought that were most conducive to happiness, an encouragement of their repetition, 
and an exploration of how best to train the mind for such tasks.
276
 The essay does not 
forge these objectives into any kind of curriculum, or prepare them much for practical 
expediency, beyond some fleeting remarks in a section devoted to what Mill terms 
‘technical education’. Whilst Mill’s definition of ‘technical education’ will be seen to be 
of distinct relevance to this study, it is sufficient at this point to observe that it broadly 
reflects the ideas found in Bentham’s 1817 Chrestomathia, which, by contrast, does set 
out an intricate and extensive curriculum.
277
 The sense of practical detachment in 
Education is augmented by its language and style which, whilst entirely befitting of its 
status as an encyclopaedic article, makes its content difficult to correlate with the more 
pressing educational concerns of Mill’s time. In spite of this assessment, however, some 
passages, such as the sections relating to the effects of poverty of diet on education, 
have been interpreted as a nascent form of early nineteenth-century social 
commentary.
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The second factor which makes the source material problematic in this chapter is that 
the content concerning education in the common place books is also of a particular 
specificity. It shares with the essay on Education the attribute of possessing little 
practical material beyond a few scattered examples; such as Mill’s concerns about the 
aforementioned poverty on the diet (which may be attributed to a work by Crichton),
279
 
or the argument for the benefits of gymnastic exercises in a curriculum (seemingly an 
Ancient Greek concept).
280
 Notably, there is nothing in the manuscripts outlining Mill’s 
arguments in support of the monitorial system, either in its Lancasterian or 
Chrestomathic guises. Meanwhile, in terms of identifying what could be termed the 
working material for the SupEB essay, a process which was fairly straightforward in the 
previous chapters concerning Liberty of the Press or Government, significant difficulties 
are encountered. It is necessary here to rely on Robert Fenn’s labours as the editor of 
Mill’s common place books as a guide to the most appropriate manuscript material, 
because the novel proposition is encountered of published and unpublished work 
sharing a common title but having relatively little to do with each other in terms of 
content. Fenn’s argument is that the largest section of manuscript material in the 
common place books found under the head ‘Education’, in the third volume, is actually 
more to do with the ‘aristocratical’ corruption of education, and is by extension an 
attack on the contemporary British political system.
281
 For reasons which will become 
clear, it is material found later in the same volume under Fenn’s editorial title of 
‘Fallacies’, and, to a lesser extent, in a few pages collected under the title ‘Education’ in 
the fifth, that pose the most relevance to the purposes of contextualisation here. 
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The factors outlined in the previous two paragraphs explain to some extent why this 
chapter will not be expressly interested in any of Mill’s more practical educational 
ideas. In articulating what will become this chapter’s central argument, however, a 
practical role is found for Mill’s more philosophical conception of education: as a 
distinct component of his political thought. Aspects of Mill’s theoretical ideas about 
education possessed a ‘democratical sentiment’, which can be strongly linked to the 
radical nature of Mill’s political philosophy outlined in the previous chapter. This term 
is itself found in the extract from Education that forms this section’s epigraph. In 
Education, Mill is critical of the likes of John Locke and John Milton for possessing 
such sentiments in their wider philosophy, being as they were ‘men of great 
benevolence toward the larger family of mankind’, but failing to extend them to their 
conceptions of education. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to highlight material 
in Mill’s public and private writings that can first demonstrate the extent to which 
Mill’s own ideas on education differ from the likes of Locke and Milton because they 
were applicable to a wider population than gentlemen (i.e., they are applicable to what 
Mill calls the ‘indigent orders’), and, second, can show the distinct relevance such ideas 
had to his wider political thought, the study of which represents the main objective of 
the wider thesis. In tracing the intellectual history of these ideas some of Mill’s own 
specific democratic influences are in turn uncovered. 
That Mill’s ideas on education can shed light on his political thought is not a novel 
proposition. Indeed, the strong correlation between ‘good education’ and ‘good 
government’ in his philosophy was made very apparent by Mill as a ‘key of knowledge’ 
in his 1813 article Education of the Poor, as well as by John Stuart Mill.
282
 W.H. 
Burston, meanwhile, in his editorial introduction to the essay Education, portrayed 
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Mill’s desire in the text to direct the population to pursue maximum personal pleasure, 
via a cultivation of the power of self-denial or temperance, as an attempt to inculcate a 
‘self-realisation theory of ethics’ which was key to understanding Mill’s political ideas 
expressed in Government. Mill’s remarks on the ‘exalted and refined human nature’ of 
the middling ranks were explained by this theory. They were cast as the leading lights 
of society because of their pursuit of long-term and more satisfying pleasures at the 
expense of short-term ‘passing pleasures’.283 A further instance drawn from Burston’s 
work involves his articulation of the role of Utilitarianism as two-fold – both a 
statement of an ideal and a ‘practical criterion for immediate reform’. This meant that 
the psychological hedonism inherent to Mill’s educational philosophy – that all men 
were selfish – had a very practical application to Mill’s ideas on representative 
government. By ensuring all selfish interests were represented, none could be 
disregarded, and the foundations for good government could be laid.
284
 Whilst this 
chapter’s investigation takes its cues from Burston’s latter example, since it too is 
interested in detailing the democratic dimension of Mill’s educational thought, its 
approach differs on two more general points. The first is in methodology, in that it 
makes extensive use of the common place books as a major source of contextual 
material for the essay Education. The second is in the scope of its investigation into 
Mill’s philosophy, which goes beyond his psychological hedonism and towards his 
ideas on the rationality of the human mind, and the progressive nature of human 
knowledge. In these latter two topics, significant links will be drawn between this 
chapter and its successor, which details Mill’s attitude to established religion. 
A final introductory note should be reserved to address a recurrent theme investigated in 
this thesis, but which also speaks uniquely to this chapter’s approach: perceptions of 
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Mill’s radicalism. In previous chapters, the fact that exploration of the common place 
books revealed content that differed greatly from that presented in Mill’s published 
writings was enough to prompt the belief that Mill frequently shielded the more radical 
aspects of his thought from public view. Regarding Mill’s ideas on education, 
discussion of his implicit or explicit radicalism is a more nuanced question, and it does 
not command the same attention given to the issue in previous chapters. This chapter’s 
primary argument infers that if Mill’s conception of education reinforces or 
substantiates the democratic nature of his political philosophy, then his ideas were by 
association politically radical for the context of their time. A separate method for 
defining Mill’s radicalism, and a step removed from his politics, lies in the fact that any 
application of the more practical ideas he possessed, such as his promotion of 
monitorial schools, as well as his own experiments with the same method within his 
own household, mark him out as radical in the sense that he was forward-thinking, or 
that his approaches to education were novel. This latter point is somewhat undermined, 
however, by the fact that the monitorial system itself was neither unique to Mill nor to 
the wider Lancasterian movement he had a role in establishing; the Church of England 
promoted a similar scheme based on the near-identical ideas of Dr. Andrew Bell. A 
clear mark of a more serious or involved radicalism can be seen, however, with Mill’s 
promotion of secular schools within this context, and this formed the main basis of his 
opposition to the Bell system. This point is taken up more forcefully in the next chapter, 
where Mill’s radical ideas pertaining to established religion are discussed more 
comprehensively, with his pamphlet Schools for All, which was firmly against religious 
intervention in the monitorial system, a key text. Elements of Mill’s opposition to 
provision of education by religious establishments, however, does offer distinct 
illumination to some of his ideas concerning the English Universities, described in part 
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III below. Finally, in acknowledgement of Mill’s relationship to his son John, it is not 
much of a stretch to describe the former’s rigorous and intensive schooling of the latter 
alluded to in the thesis’ introduction as radical in both its theory and application, even if 
‘zealous’ may be a more befitting adjective. 
II. 
That the presence of a so-called ‘democratical sentiment’ present in Mill’s educational 
thought can be portrayed as a vital component of his wider political ideas means it is 
prudent to begin with some brief reflections on the previous chapter, which made 
inroads in to this latter subject. There, two related concepts – one theoretical, one 
psychological –underlined Mill’s political thought in a way that is of distinct relevance 
to his conception of education. First, Mill believed sound political laws could only be 
attained a priori, by deducing legislation from a science of human nature, a theoretical 
framework forged from a widely-sifted array of empirical facts. Second, Mill’s 
psychological argument, which followed that of Bentham’s, contended that since man 
was driven by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, he was inclined, by his 
nature, to selfishly follow his own interest. Drawn out to a community-wide level, the 
amalgamation of personal interests was in the interest of the population at large, and 
good government could be attained by conducting politics for the benefit of this 
community interest. Mill’s philosophical and psychological doctrines, when taken 
together, can be interpreted as an argument for a system of representation based on 
democratic principles, with the individual interests of the population at large 
represented by elected individuals who were subject to various institutional checks on 
their power. With Mill’s belief that the body responsible for electing the representatives 
– the electorate – should be so vast as to contain nearly the entire population, these ideas 
125 
 
can be deemed very radical for their time and context. Only with all interests 
represented could government function in the interest of the community, and anything 
aimed at less than this standard would result in political dominance by a small group 
with a counter or sinister interest. This was the short road to domination of government 
by an aristocratical body and, therefore, corruption. 
An initial link between Mill’s political philosophy and his ideas on education is made 
via his conviction that the coalesced interest of the community could be misled, but 
could never be mistaken. A representative democracy, argued Mill in Government, 
could only be evil by mistake, never by design.
285
 It could only be misled specifically 
by the machinations of a subgroup – such as an aristocracy – who may deceive it into 
acting against its own interest. Education was portrayed as the antidote to such a 
situation. An educated population would be able to recognize their own interest and 
defend it against a counter or sinister interest, and was thus crucial to the pursuit of 
good government. Through a contextualisation of the arguments and ideas present in the 
SupEB essay Education, the importance ascribed to education by Mill to his political 
thought can be greatly expanded. Of particular interest is whether the democratic 
aspects of Mill’s political ideas, found in his writings such as Government and in the 
common place books under ‘Reform’ in the definition of ‘community interest’ and 
language of ‘representation’, can be seen both reflected and perhaps reinforced by a 
more detailed investigation into the philosophical arguments he advances in Education. 
Because this chapter’s primary concern is to do with the political application of Mill’s 
ideas on education, the final passages of the essay Education, where a paragraph is 
devoted to the concept of ‘political education’, appear distinctly relevant. This Mill 
termed the ‘keystone of the arch’ for his wider definition: political education was the 
                                                 
285
 Mill, “Government,” 8. 
126 
 
base upon which three other types of education were built upon.
286
 The term was 
described as the inherent responsibility the political machine of the country had for the 
type of behaviour its population adopted, because the ‘grand objects of desire’ favoured 
by men were to be found reflected in the actions of such a machine. Thus according to 
Mill, when the political machine promoted virtuous behaviour (‘high services to 
mankind’), one would see diffused amongst the population an ardour for the 
‘acquisition of all those admirable qualities’ which enabled a man to conduct himself 
virtuously, such as intelligence, temperance and benevolence. On the contrary, if the 
actions of the political machine were not virtuous, it in turn promoted in the population 
a ‘subservience to the will’ and ‘command over the affections’ of the ruling class. This 
resulted in men being interested only in the means of pleasing those above them, and a 
pursuit of wealth and power. Since the rewards of wealth and power were naturally 
limited, and thus could only be distributed by the ruling class sparingly and unequally, 
such behaviour inevitably led to corrupt collective political conduct, characterised by 
Mill as ‘intrigue, flattery, back-biting [and] treachery.’287 
Mill’s concept of political education was, in essence, a restatement of the reality that 
government was controlled by the landowning aristocracy, and teemed with corruption. 
Its reference to men seeking to obtain affection from, or act obediently towards, those 
hierarchically above them resonates in part with ideas expressed in his manuscripts 
pertaining to fallacies of authority, to be addressed in part III below. Taken on its own, 
however, political education in the terms described here reveals little about the link 
between Mill’s ideas on education and those on politics. Beyond the notion that the 
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contemporary political arrangement in Britain was corrupt and encouraged corruptive 
behaviour in the population, very little is revealed about any democratic dimension 
existing between the two subjects. An investigation concerned with this latter notion is 
better guided towards an appreciation of the essay’s historical account, spanning its first 
four sections, which depicts how certain developments in psychology and philosophy 
have given rise to Mill’s general definition of the theory and practice of education. Mill 
begins this history with Hobbes, crediting him as the first philosopher to clearly mark, 
in the first discourse of his Tripos, the succession of ideas and the succession of 
sensations. He subsequently introduces, via reference to Locke and then Hume, the 
concept of the association of ideas, before presenting the thought of Condillac and 
Hartley, whose thought starts with the notion that all simple ideas were copies of 
impressions, and all complex ideas were simple ideas united by the principle of 
association. According to Mill’s synthesis up to this point, the character of the human 
mind consists in the sequence of its ideas, and from this the object of education is 
ascertained, which he describes as the ‘constant production of certain sequences rather 
than others’.288 
For Mill, sequences of thought are influenced by two ‘grand instruments’ – ‘custom’, 
and ‘pain and pleasure’ – which allow the repetition of beneficial sequences over non-
beneficial ones, that is to say sequences conducive to happiness. Custom is an idea 
drawn directly from Hobbes, whilst pain and pleasure is Mill’s redefinition, in 
Utilitarian terms, of Hobbes’ concept of appetite. To obtain happiness in a greater 
degree, however, required further refinement, involving six of what Mill calls ‘qualities 
of the mind’: these were knowledge of what natural means are available to attain 
happiness; an ability to sagaciously choose the most conducive means; the self-restraint 
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or temperance necessary to guard against illusions of passions; fortitude to resist pain; 
abstention from doing harm to others (i.e. justice); and generosity to do positive good 
for others. What happiness is however, Mill acknowledges as a disputed question. He 
defines two approaches, but leaves the resolution open-ended. The first is an 
Associationist argument that the elements of happiness can be traced back to the simple 
sensations which are transformed into ideas and then into combinations. The second is 
an argument analogous to parts of the philosophy of the likes of Reid and Kant: that 
there are truths independent of human existence, that is to say objects of pure intellect. 
Happiness in this latter arrangement may be perceived either by a peculiar sense, a 
faculty which discerns pure truth, ‘Common Sense’, or sympathy.289 
Having demonstrated how education is the pursuit of happiness, that it is a question of 
mental successions and their repetition, and that there are certain expedients of the mind 
such as knowledge and temperance which can encourage this, Mill’s next topic – and 
that of most relevance to this section’s objective – is an exploration of the best methods 
advocated by philosophers of bringing this conception of education to bear on the 
population. Much is devoted here to Helvétius, with Mill’s reverence clear, describing 
him as a man who ‘ha[s] done so much towards perfecting the theory of education’, and 
whose books are ‘pregnant with information of the highest importance.’290 Helvétius’ 
theory of education was that it should entail everything ‘which acts upon the being as it 
comes from the hand of nature in such a manner as to modify the mind’. This is 
obviously reflected in certain aspects of Mill’s own actions, in particular his direction of 
the ‘hothouse’ education of his son John, as well as some of his remarks found in both 
Education and within his manuscripts, concerning the conducive effects of proper diet, 
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exercise and other environmental factors on education. More importantly, however, is 
Mill’s support here for an argument of Helvétius’ which can be read as inherently 
democratic: all differences between classes of men depend wholly on education. This is 
a position which rejects the idea that an individual is incapable of following their own 
interest due to an inadequacy based on social or economic grouping. Differences 
between individuals or groups, therefore, can only ever be due to inadequacies in 
education.  
Mill’s belief that differences between classes existed only due to the extent of their 
education leads to the establishment of a second, related position: that the capacity for 
intelligence amongst men is fundamentally similar. This is made explicit in the section 
of his essay he devotes to ‘technical education’, the main objective of which is to instil 
intelligence in the population (intelligence being the product of two ‘qualities of the 
mind’, knowledge of the means of happiness, and sagacity, that is to say the ability to 
discern between the different means). Mill’s position on technical education is made 
with particular reference to Bentham’s plans for the Chrestomathic School. The focus of 
Bentham’s 1817 work Chrestomathia was to fulfil the requirement for a school for the 
children of the middling ranks. The school was to possess a curriculum as broad as it 
was deep, leaving ‘the elements of hardly any branch of knowledge unprovided for’, 
with particular attention paid to the pursuit of ‘useful knowledge’ which could assist in 
the attainment of happiness – an objective synonymous to Mill’s definition of technical 
education.
291
 Notwithstanding the clear similarities in the foundations of Bentham’s and 
Mill’s definition of education which underlines the extent of their collaboration on the 
subject, what is of particular note here is Mill’s employment of an argument in 
Chrestomathia concerning the amount of education a child should receive, made in 
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particular reference to those destined to perform necessary or what Mill calls ‘ordinary’ 
labour. 
‘It is desirable’, writes Mill in Education, ‘that the animal frame should not be devoted 
to [labour] before a certain age, before it has approached the point of maturity.’ This age 
was around fifteen or sixteen, and the quandary was what to do with the intervening 
years between the end of a child’s education and this time. Drawing on Bentham’s 
ideas, Mill states that if those years could be ‘skilfully employed in the acquisition of 
knowledge’, then pupils would be rewarded with a life of ‘mental action… wisdom, and 
reflection’ in spite of their ‘most ordinary labour’. What is interesting about this 
position, however, is its presumption that the degree of intelligence attainable by the 
‘most numerous class’ was actually very high. Just as ‘we strive for an equal degree of 
justice… in the poor and rich,’ argues Mill, ‘so ought we to strive for an equal degree of 
intelligence.’292 This position was in distinct contrast to figures such as Milton and 
Locke, who Mill suggests possessed ‘sentiments [that] were democratical’ but took 
education no further than the view that it was for the ‘gentleman’. 293  Whilst 
acknowledging that there were undoubtedly those capable of more intelligence than the 
majority, and that special technical education should be provided for them in terms of 
the Universities or other colleges (of which more later), what is of concern here is 
Mill’s argument that all individuals should be given more education to make use of their 
mental capacity, regardless of the nature of their work. Whilst ostensibly this is to 
increase a person’s ability to pursue happiness, there are clear democratic elements to 
such an argument. The first, reflective of the role Mill gives education in Government, 
is an inference that increasing the education of a population would make them more 
suitable for political participation, not least because they would be able to ascertain and 
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defend their own interest. The second is to note that Mill’s argument can be read as a 
general rejection of the ‘monarchical’ or ‘aristocratical’ conceptions of government, 
which advocated oligarchical rule based on a poorly-defined argument that suitability 
for such a role could be found only in a limited portion of the population, viz. the 
monarchy or the aristocracy. Mill’s position is also indicative of his opinion of the 
potential of the human mind, and it is his elaboration on this subject in his common 
place books, along with a closely-linked argument for the progressive nature of human 
knowledge, which will be a major focus of the following section. 
This section has contended that the importance of Mill’s essay Education to his political 
philosophy can be grasped by focusing on so-called democratical sentiments expressed 
within it. The first, that any difference which exists between classes or bodies of men 
was the effect of education, showed it was ‘wholly [that] which constitutes the 
remarkable difference between the Turk and the Englishman, and even the still more 
remarkable difference between the most cultivated European and the wildest savage.’294 
The second, the belief in the equal potential of each individual to increase their 
intelligence, was formulated into a strong argument – also found in Bentham’s 
Chrestomathia – for advocating equality in education throughout the population, for the 
same reason that there was equality in justice. As well as reinforcing the notion that 
each individual was eminently capable of perceiving and acting upon their own interest 
if they had a suitable education, the essay encouraged the cultivation of the mental 
faculties that would enable such perception and action, justifying such a process as 
conducive to the pursuit of happiness. Thus whilst at the end of Mill’s essay he 
identifies political education as the ‘cornerstone’ of his wider definition of education – 
not least in part because the highlighting and remedying of the political corruption 
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existent in the Britain of Mill’s time was a clear objective of the Philosophic Radicals – 
it seems that an inversion of this phrase, positing education as the cornerstone of 
politics, is a rather successful way of summing up the importance of Education to an 
understanding of the democratic dimension of Mill’s political philosophy. 
III. 
In shifting focus from Mill’s published work in the form of the essay Education to the 
unpublished material of his common place books, a preliminary investigation of the 
source material consulted must be conducted before proceeding to an analysis of its 
content. The manuscript extracts utilised herein are taken predominantly from a chapter 
under the editorial title of ‘Fallacies’ in the third volume of the common place books. 
According to Robert Fenn, this particular chapter is a particularly rich source of 
quotations and references for the essay Education.
295
 In other words, ‘Fallacies’ 
represents some of the working material used by Mill whilst composing his drafts. The 
previous section has shown that the essay Education itself reveals, by virtue of citations 
of various authors, the range of material that appeared to influence Mill’s thought, 
especially regarding the psychological origins of his conception of education which was 
derived from the work of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. On this topic, the common place 
books make it possible to show that the net of influences on Mill’s ideas can be cast 
beyond just those explicitly referenced in his published essay. Whilst demonstrating the 
variety of these influences is one aim of this section and takes place throughout it, it is 
not the primary objective. That, instead, is formulated from the conclusions of the 
preceding section, which identified democratical sentiments to Mill’s thought in the 
essay Education. The main aim is to further illuminate the democratic dimension 
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inherent to Mill’s educational philosophy, and explain how in turn this links to Mill’s 
radical political thought, by drawing on the contents of extracts from his common place 
books.  
One way of introducing the relevance of the manuscript material to the essay Education 
is to show how connections can be made between Mill’s attitudes toward authority in 
the former, and hierarchy in the latter. In the essay, the concept of hierarchy is touched 
upon in the aforementioned section concerning political education. There, Mill claimed 
that the behaviour of the political machine can be found reflected in that of the 
population, with non-virtuous behaviour leading to men becoming interested only in the 
means of pleasing those above them. Mill’s criticism in the manuscripts concerning 
deference to authority follows this argument, and amounts to a specific objection: it is 
absurd to uncritically follow someone, for reasons pertaining to ‘grand objects of desire’ 
such as wealth and power or otherwise at the expense of using one’s own reason. 
Authority is in fact ‘a treacherous guide to a searcher after truth’, quotes Mill from a 
work by Conyers Middleton,
296
 yet it is unfortunately a guide followed by most men 
who, according to Lord Clarendon, ‘consider more the person that speaks, than the 
things he says.’297 This, believes Mill, can lead them along the road to compulsory 
obedience, which in turn will also bring about corruption. A citation from Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia illuminates how this notion might particularly effect the sick, who ‘readily 
[they] call in those who are to prescribe what they must do’. It is, however, also 
perceptible in other instances, for example regarding political functions such as 
representation, where ‘[p]eople are only too glad to obey the man who they believe 
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takes wider thought for their interests than they themselves do’,298 and, as the next 
chapter will show, in the domain of religious belief when it consists of a creed or 
doctrine articulated to the faithful by priests. 
Demonstrating the illogicality of the deference to authority fallacy is critical to Mill for 
his attempt to show the potential of the human mind to achieve mental excellence, a 
notion which speaks to his ideas in the essay Education concerning the giving of more 
education to individuals destined for ‘ordinary’ labour, because they had the mental 
capacity to absorb it. His argument is that everything done by man that is of merit, has 
been achieved in spite of authority. Progress is only obtained, he asserts, ‘by one age 
stepping before another’.299 This is made with particular regard for progress in science 
and art, Mill believing with regard to the former that ‘every man who has advanced the 
boundaries of science, has advanced it, by despising authority.’ Mill is referring here to 
men such as John Locke and Francis Bacon, as opposed to ‘emasculated creatures’ such 
as Edward Copleston (a Provost of Oriel College), who ‘teach and preach that there 
should be no walking but in binding strings.’300 But beyond the particular pursuit of 
showing scientific progress as hampered by this fallacy lies a greater, more general 
danger. Deference to authority, Mill believes, leads to men enslaving their own minds: 
To attempt to make any mind believe any thing, except upon evidence, and as far as that mind 
sees the force of that evidence, what is it? It is to attempt to make men believe, only because 
other people believe, or profess to believe.
301
 
Mill’s argument develops from a specific concern that scientific or artistic progress is 
hampered by deference to authority, to a broader one suggesting that the population as a 
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whole can actually become complicit in the degradation of their own intelligence by 
such an activity. Mill argues that ‘to believe, because others believe, is a very unsure 
ground’. He is unsympathetic to any motive which there might be to rely on others’ 
beliefs, to be content ‘with the alms-basket, and live upon begged opinions’, when ‘the 
mind may work, and earn its own subsistence’.302 To not dare to think for oneself, 
according to Mill, is to profess not a love for truth, but a sinister motive for something 
else. From Mill’s belief in the potential of the human mind therefore springs a cry for 
man to actually make use of such potential to achieve progress, and shake off the 
‘binding strings’ of authority. This is clearly a noble appeal, but its emphatic nature 
leaves Mill open to the accusation of over-reaching, given that the logical endpoint of 
his argument appears to be a blanket eschewal of all previously accrued opinions, 
regardless of their individual merit, and a reliance on each individual to form their own 
positions based on rigorous interpretation of the evidence. 
The sketching out of Mill’s argument opposing blind or irrational deference to authority 
is useful when considered alongside two extracts from his manuscript chapter 
‘Education’ in the fifth volume of the common place books, because of the clarity it 
gives to what Mill perceives as the role for education in man’s development. These 
show in particular that the definition of education introduced in his published SupEB 
essay is derived from the Scottish philosopher Thomas Brown. ‘The whole theory and 
practice of education’, reads Mill’s extract from Brown’s Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Human Mind, is founded ‘on the skilful management of the laws which regulate our 
trains of thought’. The art of education is itself ‘the animating spirit of every other art,’ 
and it ‘has raised us from the dust, where we slept or trembled in sluggish, yet ferocious 
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ignorance, the victims of each other, and of every element around us.’ 303  The 
intelligence of man increases, therefore, by his use of reason, or, in Brown’s terms, the 
regulation of man’s trains of thought. In order to avoid a kind of mental slumber, man is 
implored to cast off ignorance and think for himself. Such statements strongly support 
the argument Mill appeared to be embracing in Education for the progressive nature of 
human knowledge. 
That Mill detests authority is an idea reinforced by his attitude to particular 
establishments such as the Church and the Universities (the latter seen as part of the 
former), who are both regarded as bastions of misguidance. Mill’s citation of Tillotson, 
for example, depicts a ‘corrupt and degenerate church’ as in possession of rulers ‘deeply 
engaged in the errors and corruption of it.’ Their successors, ‘bred in the belief and 
practice of them, are concerned to uphold and maintain them.’ This gives a ‘kind of 
sacred stamp’ to error, and ‘an authority not to be opposed and resisted.’304 This link 
between error and corruption is vital for the political considerations of Mill’s thought, to 
be examined in this section’s conclusion below. The all-pervading hostility towards the 
Established Church apparent in Mill’s ideas is contextualised in greater detail in the 
subsequent chapter. With regard to the English Universities, meanwhile, Mill’s critique 
is more stinging even than the treatment he gives on the same subject in the published 
essay Education, where he calls them ‘enemies to all innovation.’305 The doctrine of 
Oxford University, for example, is: 
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Do not think. On all important points, do not think. Only believe – let credulity guide. Adopt 
what others tell you. Right or wrong, take it at any rate for right; and curse by your Gods those 
who shall call it wrong.
306
 
Indeed, the ‘cry of the Oxonians’, that ‘philosophy is dry [and] calculating’ leads to 
‘one of the impostrous [sic] acts which men possessed of abusive powers employ to 
hinder the search of truth’. This is an attack by Mill on what he considers the more 
effete subjects studied at the Universities, which send the human mind in to ‘fields of 
fancy… to gather buttercups, instead of looking for useful propositions.’ 307  In an 
arresting passage from the manuscript chapter entitled ‘Education’ in volume III, Mill 
declares Universities as places where ‘people go to have their eyes put out.’308 It is 
worth considering, at this juncture, whether the strong opinions expressed by Mill here 
are indicative of a desire to reform higher education, which by 1826 was manifest in his 
involvement in the foundation of University College (now University College London). 
The overarching objective of an ‘ecclesiastical establishment’, meanwhile, is to use 
their ‘fixed creed and fixed forms’ to ‘keep the human mind where it is’.309 
Mill’s arguments in his manuscripts portray institutions such as the Church and the 
Universities as unwarranted and limiting checks on both the potential of the human 
mind to accrue knowledge and the general progress of such knowledge, both of which 
can only increase by man’s use of his reason. A specific vexation seems to be that man, 
having used his mental faculties to elevate himself out of ignorance and fear, 
subsequently suspends them by deferring to errors established by figures in authority 
that have since gone unchallenged. Mill’s citation of Condillac is instructive here for the 
origins of such errors, which arise ‘because we reason about principles whose ideas we 
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have not clearly distinguished.’ An inadequate employment of the faculties of reason in 
this way leads to ‘falsity of mind’.310 These errors become established, and can persist 
for ‘10,000 years standing,’ even though they are ‘not preferable to the truth of 
yesterday.’ 311  In counterpoint to this bleak outlook, however, is a sense that such 
falsehoods can eventually be overcome, as depicted in the grandiose speech Mill cites 
by William Shippen, the Jacobite MP and critic of Walpole. This proclaims that:  
truth… every day adds to its establishment and… falsehoods, however specious, however 
supporters by power, or established by confederacies, are unable to stand before the stroke of 
time. Against the inconveniences and vexations of long life, may be set the pleasure of 
discovering truth, perhaps the only pleasure that age affords.
312
 
A fitting encapsulation of Mill’s overarching sentiment regarding the human mind’s 
capacity to obtain truth and advance knowledge, as well as the requirement or duty to 
make such a pursuit in spite of statements from (or obstructions by) authority is found 
in a quotation in volume V of his common place books, from John Barrow’s account of 
the life of the Earl of Macartney: ‘The human mind is of a soaring nature, and having 
once gained the lowest steps of the ascent, struggles incessantly against every difficulty 
to reach the highest.’313 These passages are highly evocative of Mill’s private attitude 
towards the liberty of the press in chapter 1, where, he argued, the law of libel should be 
rescinded since truth, in order to rise above falsehoods, needed to be unfettered from 
restriction of any kind. 
For Mill, then, opposition to authority was a key to improvement in human affairs. Such 
innovation was eminently achievable by a mind that could think without limitation. This 
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underlined Mill’s confidence in man’s ability to use his own reason, and also set the 
goal of education as facilitating the use of such ability. Meanwhile, the imploring to 
mental action by Mill suggests a belief that man appeared to have an inherent duty or 
obligation to think for himself, a practice which had originally elevated humanity out of 
its savage origins and, if utilised again, would enable further progress. This practice was 
encouraged to advance knowledge, but at its foundation lies an undeniable democratical 
sentiment. Faulty reasoning led to error, and maintenance of error by authority led to 
corruption. Thinking for oneself – viz. rejecting authority – was thus both a way to 
attain truth and eliminate error, and an obvious precursor to thinking about one’s own 
interest as opposed to being misled by another’s sinister interest. 
Introducing a democratic reading of Mill’s ideas on the role of reason and innovation of 
the kind advanced above acts as a bridge towards considerations of Mill’s approach to 
questions concerning the practical expediency of such innovations in government – that 
is to say political reform. Towards an initial question in this regard, ‘is innovation good 
or bad?’, Mill’s answer is succinct, but puzzlingly noncommittal: ‘Both – and 
neither.’ 314  This is, however, down to a matter of precision of language. There is 
actually nothing in innovation itself, Mill argues, which is good or bad, it is in its end 
where judgement can be made on its utility.
315
 With specific reference to political 
innovation, then, Mill states that it ‘is not whether the state to be reformed is more 
good, or whether it is less good; but whether the proposed attempt to reform offers a 
greater chance for good or for evil.’316 The question of improvement in legislation is, in 
Mill’s words, simply whether the proposed attempt promises greater good or evil. If it 
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offers a greater chance of good, it should be approved. Correspondingly, a greater 
chance of evil means the measure should be refused. 
Attached to Mill’s arguments for innovation based on creating good can be set his 
opposition to those preaching ‘no innovation’ on any account. Mill believes a response 
to this is ‘well handled’ by Madame de Staël, who questions: 
What human being, gifted with good sense, can pretend that a change in manners and opinion 
ought not to be productive of a corresponding change in our institutions? Must government then 
always be three hundred years in arrears?
317
 
In essence, this appears to be an argument for innovation on the grounds that if a 
government is the reflection of a historical interpretation of a culture, rather than its 
contemporary actuality, it is less likely to produce good if innovation is discouraged. 
Indeed, a later portion of the same quotation from Madame de Staël is illuminating for 
the precedent it gives to ‘national feeling’ – public opinion – over history, the latter of 
which is seen as much less important to the justification for institutions: 
Can men coolly discuss whether the form of the governments of the present time ought to be in 
correspondence with the wants of the existing generation, or of those which are no more? 
Whether it is in the dark and disputed antiquity of history that a statesman ought to look for his 
rule of conduct; or whether that statesman should know where power resides, whither opinion 
tends, and where he can take his stand to act on the national feeling? For without the nation, 
nothing is to be done.
318
 
This passage seems to closely reflect Mill’s own belief in the role of history to the 
formulation of his science of human nature, as depicted in the section in the previous 
chapter detailing Mill’s philosophical approach to knowledge. It is also reminiscent of a 
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line in Mill’s 1826 essay Ecclesiastical Establishments, a text of notable interest in the 
following chapter, where Mill lauds public opinion as ‘daily approaching to the 
condition of a match’ for the ‘once gigantic foe’ of ‘persecution’.319 Here, meanwhile, 
Mill develops Madame de Staël’s point by drawing upon an extract from Rousseau’s 
Julie, or the New Héloïse to show that if men are happier now than they were three 
hundred years ago, then by the same logic those men were themselves happier than our 
savage ancestors in the woods.
320
 Any argument for resisting improvement now, 
therefore, could easily be transposed to an argument to have resisted improvement in 
the past. This, of course, is nonsensical, since it would ‘deprive us of all the happiness 
by which our present state is happier than theirs.’ The allusions between this point and 
the argument against the ‘fixed creeds and fixed forms’ of ecclesiastical establishments 
which attempt to restrict or suspend progress of the human mind are clear. Resistance to 
change, in particular that engendered by authorities of church and state, and based on 
the idea that current arrangements are acceptable, or that it is preferable to resist 
upheaval and enjoy ‘tranquillity’, simply runs counter to the principles of utility. ‘If we 
successfully resist improvement now,’ argues Mill, ‘the effect would be to deprive 
posterity of a still greater portion of happiness.’321 This is an entirely separate argument, 
however, to one advocating innovation for its own sake. In the words of Madame de 
Staël, any innovation which would ‘tend to degrade’ the existing system should, of 
course, not be taken up.322 
Whilst Mill places confidence in Madame de Staël’s riposte to those who object to 
innovation and reform, which shows the effect such opposition has on utility, he also 
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delivers his own specific rebuttals to two arguments which reinforce his views on the 
capability of the rational human mind to innovate, and its potential adoption for use in a 
democratic political system. The first argument Mill seeks to counter is the notion that 
the general population lack suitability (or in Mill’s terms ‘fitness’) to participate in 
government. Mill demonstrates that since the people already possess a degree of power 
in the existing constitution, and indeed have done for some time, such influence could 
be safely extended. This is, in fact, a position Mill also takes up in his more explicitly 
political manuscript material.
323
 A further response links directly to his views on 
education, and argues that if the intelligence of the population is found wanting, to the 
extent that it makes their participation in government impossible, the obvious solution is 
to increase such intelligence, thereby eliminating such a problem. Mill also rejects the 
accusation of the people being unfit for participation by asking what it is in the rich that 
make them so much more intelligent. What is the difference, he asks in one example, 
between ‘the peasant [and]… the fox-hunter, or [the peasant and] the Bond street 
lounger?’324 Mill sees the inclusion of more people in the share as providing a distinct 
political advantage, since it improves the ‘means of judging of the conduct of their 
representatives’, and such conduct, by extension, might also be improved.325 
A second concern, found often repeated by Mill throughout his common place books, 
regards the effects of the French Revolution on the progress of reform, or more 
specifically the disinclination of governments to allow any reform for fear of a 
repetition of the events of the Terror. This was a political observation often repeated by 
Mill in his common place books. He dismissed it as ridiculous fallacy: ‘All would-be 
retrenchers of abuse are revolutionizers; all revolutions are French revolution; therefore 
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all reformers are pests.’326 But the inclination of public men to abuse their positions 
was, for Mill, inherently obvious in the corrupt political system of his day. Regardless 
of the fact that ‘[p]ublic men cannot find breath to vent the indignation which labours 
within them upon such a violation on to their moral frame’ and that to distrust public 
men is akin to ‘murder’, ‘sodomy’, or, crucially, ‘Jacobinism’, philosophy – and here 
Mill cites from the physiocrat Mercier de La Rivière’s L’ordre naturel et essentiel des 
societies politiques – argues that such corruption is inevitable: 
The desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain are the common motives which belong to our 
constitution, and which are the principles of all our movements. To wish that man acts in a sense 
contrary to the force of these motives, is to pretend to change the unalterable order of nature: it is 
to propose to render effects independent of their causes, it is to undertake to make a river rise to 
its source.
327
 
Mill employs this argument to show that whilst corruption of public men is a direct 
consequence of their selfish nature, it is also, in fact, a psychological trait common to 
all. By dismissing the political figures seeking moral recompense for being portrayed as 
abusers, Mill is arguing for a realisation in the wider population of these ‘common 
motives’, which at their most basic are the desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain, 
or in other words the means to attain happiness. Awareness of these means was, of 
course, one of Mill’s stated objectives for the overall goal of education, but the effects 
of educating the population in the attainment of happiness had clear political 
repercussions. With a population educated to make use of their own reason, and thus 
identify their own interest, they could more readily choose the representatives of that 
interest in government, and oppose those who they perceive as working under the 
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machinations of a corrupt or sinister interest. In effect, this is a return to the premise 
fundamental to Mill’s ideas expressed in Government and highlighted by Burston’s 
editorial introduction of Education which states education as key to the practical 
criterion of reform advanced by the Philosophic Radicals: with all selfish interests 
represented, none could be disregarded, and the foundations for good government could 
be achieved. 
The study of Mill’s manuscript material conducted in this section reveals two related 
notions about the importance of his conception of education to the democratic nature of 
his political thought, the restating of which can serve as closing remarks. The first 
concerns Mill’s belief that if man could be educated to use his reason, it would prevent 
him deferring to mistaken or mischievous authority, and thus impact upon the 
maintenance of errors that were typically held up by political ‘establishments’ such as 
the aristocracy, or religious ones such as the Church of England or the English 
Universities. Education in this sense had an inherently democratic dimension, since it 
allowed man to rise above a blind adherence to misguided authority, to order his 
thoughts rationally, and subsequently act in his own interest. Authority was an 
important fallacy to explode for Mill because it also hindered the progression of human 
knowledge, which was attained only by man’s use of his reason. This leads to a second 
concluding notion, which concerns the role of education in innovation in human affairs. 
By rejecting authority and innovating, as opposed to deferring to it and allowing both 
the human mind and therefore progress in knowledge to stagnate, Mill’s educational 
philosophy can be seen as supportive of changes to the political system which would 
make it more reflective of contemporary public opinion. This was obviously in direct 
contrast to the maintained political institutions of his day, which were historical relics 
beset by corruption. Opposition to such innovation, characterised by Mill as typically 
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either the disinclined nature of an obdurate and rattled aristocracy to give way to more 
democratic forms of government for fear of Jacobinism, or as the stubbornness of the 
related institutions of the Church and the Universities to keep the mind’s progress fixed 
and human knowledge littered with errors, was inevitable. The remedy to this situation, 
framed in psychological terms which showed that those in power and authority were 
corrupted by a natural disposition to seek out pleasure and avoid pain, also revolved 
around the concepts of education and democracy. Educating the population would 
enable it to realise these dispositions in both those in authority and themselves, and 
subsequently recognise, protect and advance their own interest. 
IV. 
This chapter began by defending its proposed method of investigation, and argued that, 
despite the fact that many facets of Mill’s ideas on education possessed a concrete link 
to the realities of the early nineteenth century, such as the poor provision of schooling 
for children in England, the nature of his published essay Education for the SupEB, as 
well as the contents of his manuscripts, dictated that most attention should be cast on 
Mill’s more theoretical interpretation of the subject. Whilst the very abstract nature of 
Mill’s thought is eminently demonstrable in both published and private guises, 
however, the main argument of the chapter was that a distinctly practical element could 
be glimpsed amongst Mill’s language of psychology, sequences, the rational human 
mind, and mental trains. This practical element was not so much as to do with Mill’s 
ideas concerning education, but rather the particular democratical sentiments found in 
his writing which spoke volumes about the nature of his wider political philosophy. 
What followed from this premise was less a thorough demarcation of the meaning and 
provenance of Mill’s educational philosophy – a task which has been handled admirably 
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by the work of W. H. Burston
328
 – but more an attempt to illuminate the existence of 
these sentiments, firstly in Education, and second in the manuscript material deemed to 
be that essay’s working material. 
In Mill’s essay, he initially defined the term education as the means man utilises to 
obtain happiness. A more rigorous explanation of the concept, however, was that it was 
a psychological process which highlighted the rationality of the human mind, and 
guided this ability towards independent and critical reasoning, which allowed man, 
amongst other things, to recognise and defend his own interest. The intellectual history 
of Mill’s position concerning education showed that he owed much to the philosophy of 
Helvétius, who argued that it was only levels of education which differentiated both 
between members of a society and between different societies. Mill’s thought was also 
closely aligned closely to Bentham’s, whose own arguments had suggested the capacity 
for mental intelligence amongst the population was similar, and that a sense of equality 
should apply to the provision of education, much as it did to justice. Taking these two 
standpoints together led to a reading of Mill’s educational philosophy as at its 
foundation democratic, because it advocated a representation of each individual’s 
interest in the machinery of government as a way of remedying the corruption wrought 
by the sinister interests of an aristocracy. 
The democratical sentiments apparent in Education were greatly expanded upon by an 
investigation into Mill’s manuscript material, in particular that devoted to countering 
several different fallacies, such as that concerning arguments from authority. Mill’s 
thoughts pertaining to authority in particular – that it was as Dugald Stewart had argued 
essentially a ‘blind guide’ in the ‘search for truth’ – meant that he saw the only route to 
obtaining truth as via the use of man’s reason. This faculty – which Thomas Brown 
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argued had delivered man from the doldrums of a simplistic origin and savage existence 
– was then hindered in its operation by sinister interests such as those of the political 
machine appropriated by the aristocracy, or by the Church of England and the English 
Universities, who were bastions of errors derived from false reasoning, motivated by 
their nature to pursue and maintain power and privilege. Corruption or error, 
meanwhile, had led to the impediment of the progress of human knowledge; it 
prevented man from exercising free thought; and it made for resistance to innovation in 
human affairs such as politics. The remedy to such behaviour was to educate the 
population to rely on their own reason, thereby inculcating an ability to identify their 
own interest, and strengthen it against the sinister machinations of authority figures. 
That Mill saw the entire population as typically capable of such enlightenment was 
clearly an inherently democratical sentiment. In addition, it was the employment of this 
reason which led to innovations such as the introduction of democratic forms of 
representation in politics. Such reforms – rejected by the authorities as akin to 
Jacobinism – were merely the reflections of the public opinion of a modern society, and 
could highlight the fact that government institutions, typically, conducted themselves 
‘three hundred years in arrears.’ 
Despite this chapter being ostensibly tasked with a discussion of Mill’s educational 
philosophy, it is at length an extension of the discussion of his political thought 
attempted in the previous chapter, and in particular the origins of the democratic 
dimension to this philosophy. As a final remark, it is worth acknowledging how this 
chapter links to its successor, which, paradoxically, contains more context of Mill’s 
practical educational reforms – specifically the 1812 pamphlet Schools for All – than is 
given here. Mill’s conception of education played a particularly important part in his 
pursuit of ‘good government’, because it prepared the population for its role in a 
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government representative of the community interest. Ultimately, this comes across in 
Mill’s faith in the rationality of the human mind and the ability of man to use such 
reason. The problems caused by the Church of England’s opposition to Mill’s expressly 
defined role for education were in particular its encouragement or maintenance of 
opinions formulated from errors, and its stifling of progress in human affairs. This was 
made apparent in the so-called ‘Lancasterian Controversy’ of the early 1810s, a topic 
where the subjects of established religion and education met head on. It is towards an 
analysis of Mill’s thought on established religion, and in particular the Church of 
England, which both he and Bentham nicknamed the ‘juggernaut’, to which focus now 
turns. 
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4. ‘A Monopoly of Spiritual Domination’: Secularism and the 
role of ecclesiastical establishments in James Mill’s religious 
thought 
I. 
In the course of his life, James Mill was, at varying points, the recipient of a scholarship 
intended to prepare him for a career in the Kirk, a divinity student at Edinburgh 
University, a travelling or ‘itinerant’ preacher, a candidate to be the minister for the 
parish of Craig near Montrose, a ‘moderate’ Presbyterian,329 a secularist, an agnostic, 
and the architect of a plan for a rather esoteric form of state religion based on Utilitarian 
principles. Such a diverse array of religious attributions and appointments means it is no 
overstatement to describe Mill’s religious thought as one of the more complicated facets 
of his intellectual history. This description, in turn, poses questions about how such a 
history should be explored. A precursory glance at Mill’s biography hints at his 
departure from Scotland for England in 1802 as an event of great significance in the 
specific evolution of his religious beliefs. Before this point, Mill’s upbringing and 
education near Aberdeen and at Edinburgh destined him for a religious career. 
Afterwards, when Mill was in London, he became an agnostic, his religious scepticism 
(defined as ‘negation, pure and simple’) possibly accelerated once he became 
acquainted with another noted sceptic, Jeremy Bentham.
330
 But whilst this chapter uses 
Mill’s major change of location to frame his ideas about religion in their Scottish and 
English contexts respectively, a teleological interpretation of Mill’s faith is problematic, 
since its nature cannot be neatly compartmentalized into two discrete sections of belief 
and scepticism. 
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The attempt to divide and then contrast Mill’s religious views in this way creates a 
number of suppositions about his earlier Scottish period which do not stand up to 
contextual scrutiny. Mill’s pursuit of a career as a preacher, for example, did not 
necessarily mean he held particularly strong religious convictions. By extension, there 
does not seem to be some abrupt religious volte-face which led him to reject his 
preaching career and come to London; other less spiritual reasons can account for such 
a decision. The first objective of this chapter, encompassing part II below, investigates 
the nature of Mill’s upbringing and education in Scotland in order to bring these issues 
of context to light. 
Meanwhile, accounting for Mill’s later sceptical position poses rather different 
challenges, primarily because of the degree of circumspection which surrounds it. The 
concept of dissimulation has already been encountered in the previous chapters of this 
thesis, where it was argued that the hostile atmosphere towards radical thought in early 
nineteenth-century England prevented Mill from publicly stating the extent of his 
thought for fear of reproach, although the true magnitude of his ideas could be revealed 
by a close reading of his common place books. At first look, the tenets of Mill’s 
agnosticism appear to also be open to such a treatment. Mill’s biographer, Alexander 
Bain, described them as ‘very strong meat even to the most liberal of the young men 
that became his disciples’, even highlighting the distress such views caused the radical 
George Grote when he first heard Mill ‘declare that we could know nothing whatever of 
the origin of the world.’331 But examples of Mill being explicit about the intellectual 
origins of his agnosticism, or even his arguments in support of it, are difficult to find 
amongst his private manuscripts, and a different approach must be sought. 
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Our knowledge of the alleged influences of Mill’s agnosticism are in fact limited to two 
secondary sources, Bain’s aforementioned monograph and John Stuart Mill’s 
Autobiography. The former speculates upon the importance of General Francisco de 
Miranda, the Venezuelan revolutionary and admirer of Bentham’s philosophy, but can 
provide nothing substantial in terms of evidence for such a claim of influence upon 
Mill’s agnosticism. 332  The latter posits that it was Mill’s meditations upon Joseph 
Butler’s Analogy of Religion which led to a defined ‘turning point’ in his mind, but the 
contemporary hostile political situation stopped any public exposition of such ideas.
333
 
This situation had already seen the likes of Richard Carlile imprisoned for publishing 
Thomas Paine’s theological works, and even Bentham had been urged against 
publishing Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined by Sir Samuel 
Romilly.
334
 There is no reference, however, to Butler’s Analogy in the common place 
books, which seems puzzling given the influence on Mill’s religious beliefs his son 
ascribes to that work. Whilst this is not to dispute the opinion of J.S. Mill, it signifies a 
methodological problem with the use of the common place books for the purposes of 
contextualising Mill’s later religious views. This problem is compounded by the fact 
that the tenets of Mill’s agnosticism are rarely discussed in the manuscripts, and on the 
rare occasion Mill does address them, it is only either to reassert the position he relayed 
to Grote, i.e. that it is a logical absurdity to affirm or reject the existence of God (Mill 
writing in one instance that it is ‘just as mysterious’ to him ‘that something should be 
made out of nothing, as that something should begin to exist without a cause’),335 or it is 
to reinforce said position with a quotation from another author (such as Joseph 
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Priestley: ‘Of the beginning of motion or action we must sit down with acknowledging 
that we have in reality no conception at all’).336 
In order to interpret Mill’s later religious ideas, therefore, an approach not expressly 
centred on his scepticism needs to be adopted. Parts III and IV of this chapter instead 
focus on Mill’s attitude to established religion, or in terms he himself used as the title of 
an 1826 essay, ‘ecclesiastical establishments’. In other words, Mill’s intellectual history 
is attempted not through a study of his beliefs (or non-beliefs), but through his 
secularism. Secularism, for Mill, meant the liberating of religion from its capture as an 
engine of the state; it also involved strong arguments in favour of religious toleration. A 
wealth of textual sources pertaining to these ideas exist in both public and private forms. 
As in the previous three chapters of the thesis, extensive use is made of the common 
place books. The religious material in these manuscripts identified as most conducive to 
our purposes spans about a decade, from the mid-to-late 1810s until the late 1820s, and 
is found in the third volume of Mill’s common place books. The nature of its 
composition suggests it was added to over a considerable length of time. The published 
instances of Mill’s writing which provides the most significant context to this time are 
Mill’s attack on the interference of the Church of England on the provision of education 
for the poor in Schools for All (1812), and his scathing indictment of clericalism for the 
Westminster Review in an article entitled Ecclesiastical Establishments (1826). The 
Church and Its Reform, Mill’s essay for the London Review published in 1834, appears 
to fall outside the period corresponding to the material in the common place books. This 
particular essay, which advocated the removal of Christian theology from the notion of 
a religious service and its replacement with a Utilitarian programme of worship based 
on the promotion of good social conduct, is much less of a practical critique of existing 
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ecclesiastical establishments than the earlier articles. Its occasionally fantastical content 
also readily brings to mind the verdict of Leslie Stephen on the general religious plans 
of the Utilitarians, which he argued were illustrative of ‘the incapacity of an isolated 
clique to understand the real tone of public opinion’.337 
Mention of Mill’s published material on religion necessitates the addressing of a further 
methodological issue: how the chapter compares and contrasts in approach from its 
predecessors. Whilst the use of the common place books in this chapter naturally evokes 
a resemblance to its siblings, it does not elevate one of Mill’s published essays to a 
position where it can be compared in detail with the sentiments Mill expressed privately 
within his manuscripts. A few reasons can account for this discrepancy. Schools for All 
is unlike Mill’s published essays on Government or Liberty of the Press because its 
working material cannot be found within the common place books. The latter portions 
of that work, however, do rely extensively on William Paley’s Principles of Moral and 
Political Philosophy, a book from which long extracts can be found throughout Mill’s 
manuscript volumes, especially in the chapters concerning Mill’s ideas on the liberty of 
the press analysed in chapter 1. Ecclesiastical Establishments, on the other hand, does 
have some resemblance to the manuscript material on religion used most prominently 
by this chapter. The primary difference between the published and unpublished material 
is that whilst the article relies on historical examples (such as that of Hume’s History of 
England and Campbell’s Lectures on Ecclesiastical History) to build its case for the 
hypocrisy and illiberal nature exhibited by the Church of England and its clergy, the 
manuscripts constitute a much more philosophical interpretation of Mill’s ideas 
concerning the rejection of established religion, and in many cases this mimics the 
general arguments exhibited in favour of reason over authority cited in the previous 
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chapter’s analysis of the essay Education. As such, published (part III) and unpublished 
(part IV) material is considered in serial rather than parallel. Finally, whilst the above-
mentioned The Church and Its Reform has initially been dismissed as too late in its 
composition to feature in the common place books, it should be noted that some points 
from manuscripts written in 1813–15, on clerical salaries, do appear in that article, 
although said manuscripts generally appear to be a recension of Bentham’s arguments 
in Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined.
338
 
The investigation in parts III and IV of this chapter concerning Mill’s secular attitudes 
is of particular importance to the wider thesis for the connection that it makes between 
his religious thought and his political ideas. This is shown most obviously by Mill’s 
involvement with the establishment of schools for the poor, an activity which links to 
the notions of happiness and democratic sentiment he established as conducive to good 
government in his essay Education, as seen in the previous chapter. But the exploration 
of Mill’s attitude towards the Church of England specifically – what he and Bentham 
often referred to as the ‘Juggernaut’, an allusion to the Hindu chariot which crushed 
members of the faithful under its wheels, depicted in Southey’s epic poem The Curse of 
Kehama – unveils the very specific opposition he exhibited to the political union 
between church and state. Bentham argued, in his Analysis of the Influence of Natural 
Religion, on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind published under the pseudonym 
Philip Beauchamp and with the assistance of George Grote, that both these bodies held 
an interest ‘incurably at variance with that of the community’, because they had a 
natural tendency to combine together and co-operate.
339
 Mill is very close to Bentham 
on this issue, a fact not especially surprising given a summary of the Beauchamp work 
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is found in the common place books.
340
 He perceived a government’s reliance on a 
church establishment as indicative of its failure to uphold the principle of utility. Not 
only did this lead to bad government, it was a profanation of religion which lead to its 
own corruption. The alliance of church and state, for Mill, was ‘the alliance of religious 
abuse and corruption with political abuse and corruption.’ 341  Such a position 
demonstrates that Mill’s attitude to established religion rested not just on conceptions of 
toleration, logic, education and reason, but also on his strong and persistent political 
objective to rid government of sinister interest. 
II. 
The brief biographical account of Mill’s education and upbringing in Scotland given in 
this section serves to describe the events, achievements and interactions which led to a 
seemingly significant religious occasion in his life: his licencing as a preacher in the 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland (the Kirk) in 1798. An evaluation of the intellectual 
context of these early years, however, advances what appears at face-value to be a 
rather counter-intuitive claim: that Mill’s pursuance of a career in the Kirk did not 
necessarily reflect strong personal religious beliefs. These contextual questions relate 
both directly to the nature of Mill’s studies in particular, and also to the wider influence 
of the Scottish Enlightenment on religion in Scotland more generally. They help to 
reinforce the rejection of the suppositions about Mill’s beliefs made in this chapter’s 
introduction: that it is incorrect, for example, to speak of Mill as having some kind of a 
crisis of religious faith during the period in Scotland where his career prospects were in 
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flux and that, by extension, Mill’s decision to abandon his fledging preaching career and 
remove to London in 1802 was not centred around him losing his faith. 
Not enough primary material exists either to fully reconstruct the events of Mill’s early 
years, or to conceptualize his early religious thought. Only one scrap in the common 
place books volumes definitely comes from the 1790s, which is a note on a lecture on 
moral philosophy given by Dugald Stewart found in volume IV. There are significant 
gaps, for example, in the knowledge of the time between him leaving Montrose 
Grammar School and attending Edinburgh University, or why his viva voce 
examinations for becoming a licensed preacher took place in 1797, but the licence itself 
was granted nearly 20 months later. In order to relay the established specifics of Mill’s 
life, a reliance on Bain’s 1882 biography of Mill is a somewhat unfortunate necessity. 
The contents of that particular account, which is predominantly based on testimony 
(which is of course unverifiable), and partly based on Mill’s correspondence (the 
majority of which has been lost), can however be enriched by reference to Lazenby’s 
much later study, which provides further insight into the nature of Mill’s education. In 
one regard this is achieved by examining what would have been the fairly ‘typical’ 
education and intellectual context for a man of Mill’s background and location (i.e. in 
proximity to Aberdeen) in late eighteenth-century Scotland; in another, by evaluating 
Mill’s reconstructed university library lending record whilst he was studying divinity at 
Edinburgh. 
Initial focus on the early events of Mill’s life reveals the centrality of his mother Isabel 
to his education, who ‘nurtured and petted’ her son, and ‘exempted [him] from all 
distracting occupation’ so that his concentration was devoted to scholarship.342 It is 
slightly unclear whether Isabel had noticed her son’s scholarly prowess early and 
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resolved to railroad the young James into a childhood focused solely on its 
development, or whether she had designs on him becoming a scholar from the outset 
and simply acted accordingly. Regardless, she established for her son a programme of 
study, made arrangements for him to work and eat away from the rest of the family, and 
relieved him of all domestic chores (Mill also never assisted in his father’s shoemaking 
business, nor took part in any agricultural labour in what was a very rural parish).
343
 
Lazenby posits that Mill’s early intellectual talent, whether enabled or expedited by the 
interventions of his mother, would have been noticed in the parish school at Logie Pert 
in Forfarshire where he grew up. He also speculates that the first person in an official 
capacity to recognise his ability may have been the minister for said parish, Daniel 
Bryce, also known as a distinguished teacher.
344
 Mill went on to attend Montrose 
Grammar School, where boys with gifts similar to his would normally be expected to go 
up to Aberdeen (such as to Marischal College, of which Bain was himself an alumnus) 
at the age of 14 or 15.
345
 
Mill’s education diverges from the norm at this point, and instead of attending 
Aberdeen, he went up to Edinburgh in 1790 at the more ‘advanced’ age of 17½. Two 
reasons appear to account for this divergence, but since both revolve around the 
aristocratic Belsches family, it is not much of a stretch to assume that one begat the 
other. Sir John Belsches had succeeded to the Wishart baronetcy on his mother’s side in 
1777, and had purchased, with the money inherited from his uncle Sir William Stuart, 
the estate of Fettercairn in Kincardineshire, which became the Belsches family’s 
summer residence. It lay approximately six miles north of the Mill family home in 
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North Water Bridge, just over the border in Forfarshire.
346
 Mill’s involvement with the 
Belsches family arose when he was recommended to Sir John’s wife, Lady Jane, who 
was involved in a fund for educating ‘one or two’ young men from the area for the 
Church, as a potential scholar by the minister of Fettercairn. The Belsches family also 
required a tutor and companion for their daughter, Willamina (born 1776), and Mill 
took up this role from about 1787, probably until she was eighteen. Arrangements were 
made for Mill to tutor Willamina at the same time as he underwent the university 
training necessary for his expected career in the Kirk. Since the Belsches family’s 
winter residence was at Edinburgh, it was resolved that his studies would be taken up 
there rather than at Aberdeen. But given that Mill began his tutoring duties in 1787 yet 
is only found on the admission rolls at Edinburgh in 1790, one must assume he spent 
this time either tutoring Willamina or in study, possibly whilst still attending Montrose 
Grammar School (as argued by Terence Ball) or perhaps back home in Logie Pert 
(which was significantly closer to the Belsches residence at Fettercairn House than 
Montrose).
347
 The success of such preparatory work may be indicated by the fact that, 
upon Mill’s arrival at Edinburgh, he was deemed proficient enough in the Classics to 
skip over the junior Latin and Greek classes, progressing directly to the senior 
classes.
348
 
Mill attended Edinburgh for three years as an undergraduate, from 1790, although 
according to Bain, nobody (by which he means the men who would go on to be the 
Edinburgh Reviewers or Whig lawyers) recalled him during those years. The university 
records detailing Mill’s attendance are patchy, although he certainly took classes in 
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Classics, Logic and Natural Philosophy. Bain assumes that, since Mill was taking an 
Arts degree, he most probably took Mathematics and Moral Philosophy, the latter 
confirmed by the presence of the aforementioned scrap of notes from one of these 
lectures. Lazenby attributes Mill’s absence from attendance rolls for Dugald Stewart’s 
lectures as possibly symptomatic of the Jacobin-fearing political climate in Scotland of 
the 1790s.
349
 Mill completed his undergraduate studies in three years, and subsequently 
commenced his divinity training, also at Edinburgh, in 1794, which lasted nearly ‘four 
winters’, or until January 1797. After questioning trials in February 1797 Mill was 
licenced as a preacher in October of the following year. There is evidence that, once 
licensed, he preached at the church in his home parish, and the existence of a ‘saddle 
bag’ in the attic at his residence in Queen’s Square, London, which contained his 
written sermons, suggests his initial work was as an ‘itinerant’ preacher. The saddle bag 
was the traditional equipment of a ‘probationer’ – a preacher who rode on horseback 
from parish to parish as temporary cover for absent ministers. These sermons would 
naturally provide much insight into Mill’s early religious thought, but the only glimpses 
obtainable of their content is found in Bain’s biography, which describes their moderate 
nature. Mill was a ‘severely reasoned’ preacher, as is to be expected but he was 
‘wanting in the unction of the popular evangelical.’350 
Mill appears to have continued this roaming type of preaching work until 1802, but it 
may have been supplanted or at least supplemented by further tutoring, perhaps for the 
Burnet family of Elrick, near Aberdeen, or the family of the Marquis of Tweeddale in 
East Lothian. Indeed, it is an incident regarding the termination of Mill’s tutoring 
appointment which Bain relays as one of two possible events that ignited, or at least 
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accelerated, Mill’s desire to remove to London. This tale – of dubious provenance – 
depicts Mill either being insulted by or causing offence to his employer during a dinner, 
which led to him resigning from his position.
351
 The second incident Bain suggests – 
altogether much more plausible – concerns Mill’s apparent later failure to be appointed 
to a more permanent Kirk position, as minister for Craig, a parish just south of 
Montrose. Whilst this appointment was made in 1803, the year after he left for London, 
the competition for it may have been held in advance and Mill, knowing he had missed 
out, resolved to pursue other avenues.
352
 The importance of this decision will be 
revisited at this section’s conclusion. 
Two issues about the intellectual context to the actualities of Mill’s early education 
described above revolve around considerations of geography. The first is that the 
proximity of Mill’s upbringing in Forfarshire to Aberdeen, approximately forty miles 
north, has led both Bain and Lazenby to consider the intellectual influence on Mill of 
the ‘metaphysicians of the neighbourhood’ such as Thomas Reid, James Beattie, and 
George Campbell. These men, members of the Aberdeen Literary Society, were 
considered to be progenitors of the ‘Scottish’ critical views which became a dominant 
feature of the Edinburgh Review, the Whig journal founded in 1802 by Francis Jeffrey, 
Sydney Smith and Henry Brougham which would come to publish Macaulay’s famous 
attack on Mill’s essay Government. However, since Mill would before that time become 
a reviewer for the Edinburgh himself, it is possible that his affinity for this particular 
type of criticism was a product of geographical influences.
353
 It has also been previously 
argued in this thesis that the ‘objectivist moral theory’ found in the Common Sense 
philosophy of the Reidian school can be found in Mill’s later published work, which 
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suggests that if the intellectual influence of Aberdeen on Mill took hold in his early 
years it certainly also had longevity.
354
 Mill certainly came to rely in particular on 
Campbell’s Lectures on Ecclesiastical History in his 1826 essay on religion 
Ecclesiastical Establishments.
355
 The second, related geographical point is that although 
Mill was in attendance at Edinburgh University, his borrowing record seemed more 
characteristic of a course of study at Aberdeen. This was largely based on the presence 
of the aforementioned Reid et al. in the list of books he borrowed from the Theological 
Library, a reconstruction from the records of which is found in Bain’s work and is 
described below.
356
 A further link to Aberdeen may be ascertained in Mill’s borrowing 
of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth’s A Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality, given that group’s Arminian influence on Aberdeen’s Episcopalian 
tradition.
357
 
More striking than the notion that Mill followed an Aberdeen-influenced curriculum 
rather than one more of Edinburgh in his divinity studies, however, is Bain’s contention 
that such a curriculum was not even that theological. The list of Mill’s library books is 
‘very unlike the lists of the other Divinity students’, as the majority of it is given over to 
the study of works of philosophy rather than theology.
358
 Indeed, the book most 
frequently borrowed by Mill in the course of his divinity studies was Plato’s Works, 
whilst the second was Adam Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral Philosophy. In addition, 
Mill reads several of the Aberdeen-based writers, such as Archibald Alison (Essays on 
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the Nature and Principles of Taste), the aforementioned Campbell (The Philosophy of 
Rhetoric) and Reid (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man); other Scottish authors 
such as Hume (Essays), Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments) and Lord Kames 
(Sketches of the History of Man), and also works by Bolingbroke, Locke and Rousseau. 
Theological items were not entirely absent from Mill’s studies, but they seem firmly in 
the minority. Notably in this regard, Mill consulted the sermons of French authors such 
as Fenelon and Massillon, thereby implying he was by this time already a ‘fair French 
scholar’.359 He also consulted the sermons of the Irish Presbyterian church leader John 
Abernethy and those of the Anglican preacher George Gregory,
360
 both of whom, 
coincidentally, were also Edinburgh alumni. 
Whilst many of the books Mill read seem more philosophical than theological, at the 
time these subjects were not rigidly separated. Reid’s Intellectual Powers, for example, 
was designed to refute the sceptical doctrines of Hume, whose challenge to religion in 
his Dialogues and Natural History of Religion had undermined the nature of all 
belief.
361
 A significant number of the books borrowed were also written by purportedly 
religious men. Reid, Ferguson and Campbell were all licensed as preachers by the Kirk. 
Gregory and Alison both took orders in the Anglican Church. Even Locke had given 
serious thought to ordination whilst at Christ College early in his scholarly career.
362
 
Such observations give rise to a more salient point regarding the nature and strength of 
Mill’s early religious convictions, for it seems not that Mill saw the Christian ministry 
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as a calling, but instead as an opportunity for a man of his origins (which were 
definitely humble) and talent (which was undoubtedly substantial) to forge a scholarly 
career for himself. To try to comprehend his divinity studies as a religious question, 
therefore, is to take Mill’s actions out of context. Strong religious convictions appeared 
not to be such a prerequisite for a Kirk career so much as intellectual ability was. This is 
not to suggest that Mill was ambivalent about his religious faith whilst at Edinburgh. 
But if he had resolved to be a scholar, as his mother had intended for him whilst he was 
still a young boy in the parish of Logie Pert, then in the books he consulted in the 
Theological Library at Edinburgh he found evidence that a Church career offered a clear 
pathway to men of intellectual talent who were possessed of similar resolve. 
Bain perceives Mill’s aforementioned failure to become minister for Craig parish, a 
hamlet near Montrose, as a major turning point in his life, but this should not be viewed 
only in the sense that it seemed to precipitate his move to London, in alleged 
concordance with the abrupt termination of his prospects for tutoring the children of the 
aristocracy. Had Mill obtained this post, Bain argues, he would have had time to 
continue his ‘favourite studies’, publish his work, and, in all likelihood, would one day 
have attained a chair at one of the universities.
363
 In this regard, it is possible to 
envisage Mill’s outlook in Scotland in the late 1790s as proportionally commensurate to 
that of Reid or Campbell before him, since both of these men were licenced by the Kirk 
but had made major contributions to philosophy. Focusing on why Mill became a 
preacher, given that his course of studies seemed to reflect a person much more 
interested in philosophy, is therefore a question which fails to understand Mill’s 
situation: a person with designs on being a scholar would quite obviously consider this 
career, given that such employment could provide time for such scholarship. Lazenby 
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appears to be alluding to this point, somewhat opaquely, when he claims that the 
Scottish experience Mill underwent was a ‘mixing of education and religion, each a 
means of the other, [where] one finds that the same persons are frequently involved in 
both spheres of influence.’364 
Despite being unable to shed much light on the nature of Mill’s early religious thought, 
the suggestion in this section that Mill’s intellectual context was one significantly 
influenced by the thought of Aberdeen-based thinkers such as Reid and Campbell is one 
worth keeping in mind when considering Mill’s later religious scepticism. More 
specifically, since Reid was Hume’s ‘most gifted antagonist’,365 and had attacked the 
sceptical foundations of the latter’s philosophy, it seems very unlikely that the roots of 
Mill’s agnosticism lay in an early reading of Hume’s works on religion. Bain theorizes 
that, were Mill to have read such works whilst at Edinburgh, it was highly possible that 
he would have been ‘carried away by the style of reasoning there employed, and have 
taken in the seeds of his ultimate scepticism’. What works against such a hypothesis is 
the fact that Mill was the product of an intellectual movement which was itself proof 
against Hume.
366
 His agnosticism, therefore, had to have been developed later, it was 
not a direct product of his Scottish education. 
What this biographical account does illustrate, however, is the extent of Mill’s scholarly 
prowess and ambition. The assumption that Mill would be devoutly religious because 
he was pursuing a course of divinity at Edinburgh is faulty, ignoring as it does some 
rather vital questions of context. In turn, the realisations wrought by such 
contextualisation also moderate any bewilderment about Mill’s later agnosticism, 
                                                 
364
 Lazenby, “James Mill: The Formation of a Scottish Émigré Writer,” 5. 
365
 Paul Wood, ‘Reid, Thomas (1710–1796)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2006 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23342, accessed 
28 Nov 2012] 
366
 Bain, James Mill, 90. 
165 
 
because it no longer jars awkwardly with preconceptions about the strength of his 
earlier religious belief. Since Mill was ready to abandon any ‘calling’ (now a rather 
imprecise term to describe his career choice) to the Christian ministry as early as 1802 
and take his chances in London, it becomes difficult to suggest that his more emphatic 
turn away from religion in the second half of that decade was particularly tortuous. 
Religion and education went hand-in-hand in the late eighteenth-century Scottish 
context Mill was raised and educated in, with the former providing distinct 
opportunities in the latter. It is of particular and relevant interest, however, that such a 
pairing, when manifested as a partnership between the Church of England and schools 
for the poor in the early nineteenth century, would come to animate Mill greatly in 
another section of his religious thought: his secularism. It is to an exploration of this 
period, and the intellectual history of these ideas which bestride both political and 
religious domains, that the chapter now turns. 
III. 
The account of Mill’s experience of early formal schooling in Scotland given in the 
preceding section, which took place first at the local parish school in Logie Pert and 
subsequently at the Montrose Grammar School, is a fairly typical example of the 
Scottish approach to education at the time. Since the Education Act of 1696, all Scottish 
parishes had been required to provide for the lodging and salary of a schoolmaster. 
These parochial schools fell under the supervision of the church presbyteries, and whilst 
attendance was not free, the children of the poor were educated at the expense of the 
parish, and others paid a small fee.
367
 Mill’s familiarity with the Scottish system meant 
he could argue quite convincingly that, in 1812, the English version was of no 
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comparison, since it had ‘no general provision… for the education of the poor.’368 If it 
appears somewhat unusual, however, to give over a portion of this chapter (which is 
ostensibly on religion) to matters of education or schooling, when the previous chapter 
(supposedly on education) provided very little practical detail about such subjects, this 
peculiarity can be assuaged by stating that it is the particular involvement of religious 
institutions in the attempts to correct the disparity in educational provision between 
Scotland and England which is of significant importance to this section. This 
phenomenon greatly contributes to the contextual understanding of Mill’s hostile 
attitude towards ecclesiastical establishments and, more specifically, towards the 
Church of England. The intertwinement of religion and education was used in the 
previous section to clarify why Mill’s abandonment of his preaching career could occur 
seemingly without much consternation. In its incarnation here, it is used as a route into 
explaining the nature of Mill’s ardent secularism developed in both his public and 
private writings. 
Mill’s assessment of the provision of education for the poor in England was entirely 
accurate; the collection of English schools in existence at the start of the nineteenth 
century was woefully inadequate for the purposes of mass education. The great public 
schools, which prepared the aristocracy for high office, were out of reach for all but the 
elite. Grammar schools of various iterations existed, some of the oldest of which had 
been founded in the Tudor era, but they typically served only their immediate locality, 
and a conservative curriculum was taught in all but those schools located in the larger 
cities, which contained a large number of families of merchants and tradesmen. The 
provision of so-called charity schools, which Mill felt provided only the ‘rudiments of 
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learning’,369 was primarily the domain of the Society for the Propagation of Christian 
Knowledge, in existence since 1699. The first Sunday school, meanwhile, had been 
founded in 1780 in Gloucester by Robert Raikes and the concept had been readily 
imitated elsewhere. Despite their popularity, the restrictions of time (one day per week) 
and teaching material (the main objective obviously being to inculcate a religious creed) 
limited the overall educational contribution of these schools. In summarising this 
landscape, Mill felt that the formation of the minds of the poor in England was the result 
of ‘mere chance’.370 
Alongside a meagre capacity for educating the poor in England were attendant 
economic and moral arguments which attacked the very notion that such education was 
actually beneficial. The growth of the industrial revolution, reliant as it was on child 
labour, had precipitated a decline in the standard of popular education, and the number 
of illiterates was greatest in the counties of Middlesex and Lancashire, unsurprisingly 
also the country’s major industrial areas.371 An incident in Gloucestershire, meanwhile, 
saw the criticising of the Sunday schools by a combination of local gentry, farmers and 
the Tory press, who labelled them as subversive to the social order, given that they 
enabled the lower classes to think for themselves, a sure route to political and religious 
sedition.
372
 Mill would come to attack a reformulation of this very common argument, 
based on the idea that knowledge (as opposed to ignorance) was inimical to the Church 
of England (a sentiment encapsulated in his mockery of the cry that ‘The Church is in 
danger!’) in the 1812 polemical essay for The Philanthropist entitled Schools for All.373 
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Whilst the state would eventually intervene in the delivery of basic instruction for the 
masses, officially with the introduction of the 1833 Factory Act, which required two 
hours of education to be given to child workers aged between 9 and 13, several 
institutions stepped into the breach before it. Despite the aforementioned reservations 
about promoting sedition amongst the lower classes, many of these interested bodies 
were actually religious, from both established and dissenting creeds, who were 
motivated by the philanthropic nature of the activity. The National Society for 
Promoting Education of the Poor, established in 1811 under the auspices of the Church 
of England, was one such example. It sought to teach children not the three Rs, but four: 
reading, writing, arithmetic and religion, which would take the form of study of the 
Bible, catechism and prayer-book services. 
Another organisation concerned with educating the poor was the Royal Lancasterian 
Institution, founded two years before the National Society in 1809. Its objective was to 
advance the radical education ideas of Joseph Lancaster, a Quaker who had established 
the free Borough Road School in London. Lancaster was an educational pioneer, 
reforming methods for both disciplining and teaching pupils. The problem of ever-
increasing numbers at his school, however, had drawn him towards the ideas of Dr 
Andrew Bell, whose Madras System introduced the monitorial concept of education, 
which was essentially the use of the older pupils to instruct the younger ones. 
Lancaster’s success at using monitors in his school led to his desire to establish an 
entire national system of monitorial schools, in each of which a thousand children could 
receive instruction, by way of standard repetitive exercises, from a hundred monitors, 
who were themselves drawn from the pupil body. It is through Lancaster that Mill is 
explicitly introduced to this narrative. Since 1811 Mill had written for The 
Philanthropist, the journal of another Quaker, William Allen, who had persuaded him 
169 
 
to participate in advancing Lancaster’s scheme, initially by serving on the Institution’s 
financial committee. By 1813, the organisation had been renamed the British and 
Foreign School Society (Lancaster was dropped not just from the organisation’s title but 
from its day-to-day operations as well) and, under the guidance of Mill, Francis Place, 
Henry Brougham and Edward Wakefield, a plan of a complete system of primary and 
secondary education for London was devised. The idea of applying the Society’s 
economical methods to secondary schools became the foundation for Bentham’s work 
Chrestomathia.
374
 
Despite Mill’s assertion that the Lancasterian plan was cheap and easy, its 
implementation was beset by both financial and other administrative problems. Analysis 
is focused here, however, on a distinctively religious issue, more specifically how 
religion was to be taught within the schools. Since Lancaster could not teach merely the 
children of dissenters, the need for his schools to appeal to the greatest proportion of the 
population meant there were two potential avenues for religious education. The first, as 
recounted by Mill in Schools for All, was to ‘teach no Christianity at all in reading and 
writing, like with mathematics [or] painting.’ The second was to teach ‘only the parts of 
Christianity which all Christians were agreed about.’375 The Bible would therefore be 
studied to encourage literacy and general Christian principles would be taught, but these 
principles would be expressly non-sectarian. Even though Mill felt that this second idea 
was ‘seemingly unobjectionable’, its application had resulted in Lancaster being 
accused of ‘scheming to extirpate Christianity’. 376  Lancaster was no stranger to 
criticism, and his approach to religious education had been attacked as early as 1805, 
when the philanthropist and education reformer Sarah Trimmer called him the ‘Goliath 
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of Schismatics’, describing his methods as inimical to the Established Church, whilst in 
a public lecture, Samuel Coleridge had compared the Lancasterian schools to prisons or 
convict stations.
377
 By 1811 this opposition had solidified into a concerted, competing 
Church-led movement for the education of the poor, in the shape of the aforementioned 
National Society. It too proposed teaching via the monitorial system, and claimed Bell 
as one of their own, but given that the specifics of the Church of England creed were 
added to the curriculum. For Mill, this competing system was at once expensive 
(‘instead of one school in a populous city, you [would] need as many schools as there 
are denominations of Christians’),378 divisive (the children of dissenting parents would 
be excluded) and a hindrance to the work already being carried out by the 
Lancasterians. Schools for All was penned as a fierce riposte to one of the opposing 
scheme’s champions, the high church bishop Herbert Marsh. 
A commentary on Schools for All is key to introducing how pervasive the concept of 
secularism was to Mill’s political and religious ideas as early as 1812, but the article is 
also a classic example of his abilities as a sharp polemicist and, initially, it is towards 
his repeated and ruthless exploitation of the logical inconsistencies of the position of the 
Church of England contra the Lancasterian schools that attention is drawn. Amongst 
these more specific rebuttals to the Church’s protestations against the Lancasterian plan, 
however, can certainly be seen the emergence of more general secular ideas, which are 
fleshed out considerably in Mill’s later anti-clerical essay Ecclesiastical Establishments 
for the Westminster Review. Mill begins Schools for All by describing the problem with 
the Church’s objection to the idea of the non-inculcation of a creed alongside the 
teaching of the Bible: without the education offered by the Lancasterian schools, 
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children would simply not be educated at all. Creeds had to be treated with absolute 
equality; the teaching of both literacy and a creed was incompatible with the overriding 
economical objective of the plan – its cheapness. In this light, the question, therefore, 
was actually whether the Church preferred the ‘non-inculcation of a creed accompanied 
with total ignorance’, or the ‘non-inculcation of a creed accompanied with the talent of 
reading and the knowledge of the Bible’. More pointedly, Mill’s question was whether 
the Church of England thought ‘knowledge or ignorance [to] be most favourable to the 
belief of Christianity?’379 
Such a choice was made even plainer by Mill showing the ridiculousness behind 
Marsh’s contention that to teach children literacy without teaching them the creed 
would actually make them renounce the Church of England. This argument is recast by 
Mill to demonstrate that, at its foundation, the point is essentially that to ‘not to give a 
bias to the Church of England creed, is to give a bias to other creeds.’ 380  The 
implication here is that the Church of England cannot compete on an even ground with 
other creeds, and ‘if pains are not taken to give it the earliest advantages over other 
creeds, men will in general disdain and reject it.’381 Taking this sentiment to its logical 
conclusion, Mill finds that the Church of England clergy would 
rather see… the children of the poor belonging to their church brought up in the streets and in 
the fields, where no creed it taught, but ignorance is retained and vice engendered; than see them 
in the schools of Lancaster, where no creed indeed is taught, but where reading and writing are 
taught, and where those habits are acquired, of industry, attention, orderliness, &c. on which 
good conduct in life depends.
382
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Whilst Mill’s hostility towards the Church of England in Schools for All is palpable, 
with an attendant exasperation frequently brought to the fore (‘Church opposition… is 
so counter-intuitive as to beggar belief’),383 his diatribe never verges on the irreligious. 
Indeed, many ostensibly moderating sentiments are expressed, such as the claim that the 
Lancasterians do not recommended ‘teaching without religion’, or that they count 
amongst their number some of the most zealous and effectual supporters of the Church 
of England.
384
 This was probably a sop to head off accusations of non-belief on the part 
of the Lancasterians, given that they were composed of dissenters, liberals, and free-
thinkers. Mill’s primary concern, however, was with demonstrating the flawed position 
of the Church and its defenders, and the fact that such a position was inimical to the 
Church’s existence. When Mill mocks the cry of ‘the Church is in danger’, for example, 
he does so to show the absurdity of the reality behind such a statement: that ignorance is 
not dangerous to the Church, and knowledge is. This projection of Mill as a protector of 
the Church can be seen in particular in his argument that the failure to embrace the 
Lancaster plan will lead to the Church’s own downfall. He posited that a withdrawal of 
public support for the Lancasterian schools which the Church so craved, and the 
bestowing of responsibility for education provision on the National Society, would lead 
to the establishment of schools where the children of dissenters are excluded. This 
would force dissenters to set up their own schools teaching their own creeds, and their 
work would most likely ‘surpass the establishment in zeal, industry, [and] attention’. 
Since the clergy often failed to carry out even the basic teaching of the catechism to 
parish children on Sundays, it was obvious to Mill that a ‘a large proportion of the 
population, [upon] seeing Dissenter children better educated, [would] send their 
children to these [dissenting] schools’. Mill failed to see a situation more detrimental to 
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the Church than this, but his position was also a reconfirmation of his own secular 
objective: to exclude all creeds, both established and dissenting, from being taught to 
the children of the poor.
385
 
Despite Mill’s demonstrations of support for the survival of the Church of England, his 
objection to its status as the established religion was already unshakeable and emphatic 
in Schools for All. His summary of the position he sought to demolish is useful as a 
commentary for demonstrating the dimensions of his argument: 
It is asserted… that the Church of England is necessary for the support of the British 
Constitution; that the British Constitution, though the best, and for that reason the most steadfast, 
of all forms of government, could not stand without the support of the Church of England; that, 
therefore, in order to support the constitution, Church of England creed, though attended with 
worthlessness, ought to be preferred to Dissenters’ creed, though accompanied with merit.386 
Thus at the heart of Mill’s secularism was both an appeal for religious equality, and a 
rejection of the capture of religion and its deployment as an engine of the state. Whilst 
Christianity was undoubtedly the religion of the nation, Mill felt no particularly section 
of it could claim the title of national religion ‘when they are only part of the nation’.387 
This was an explicit rejection of Marsh’s attempt to redefine Christianity as Church-of-
Englandism. But Mill felt this stance should not necessarily be constituted as an attack 
on the Church itself. Since religion was founded on scripture and reason, any creed 
inferior in its conformity to these fundamentals would eventually be abandoned by its 
supporters. The Church, therefore, should have nothing to fear from disestablishment, to 
profess otherwise was to express a distinct lack of confidence in its foundations. 
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Meanwhile, for religion to support government, for it to be ‘modelled and fashioned for 
the purposes of statesmen’, was a perversion which led to its corruption. An 
ecclesiastical establishment was to be founded solely on its utility to religion; its 
conversion to any other purpose, political included, served only to debase it and to 
introduce numerous abuses. Similarly, a government which was dependent on religion 
was inherently bad because ‘as far as government is grounded on the principle of utility, 
it supports itself’.388 Mill uses the historical example of James I’s famous utterance, ‘no 
bishop, no king’, to reinforce this point. By rewording the statement as ‘no bishop, no 
despot’, Mill highlighted the fact that political abuse – despotism – often found support 
in the form of religion. Established religion was therefore simply ‘the alliance of 
religious abuse and corruption with political abuse and corruption.’389 This opposition 
to the alliance of politics and religion continued apace in Mill’s later essay 
Ecclesiastical Establishments. Whilst this article retains the polemical nature of Schools 
for All, it also reads as a more general exposition of Mill’s secular thought because it 
does not have the strong root in contemporary events which the earlier essay possessed 
in the form of the Lancasterian controversy. In the years between their publication, both 
the Lancasterian and Chrestomathic schemes had failed to establish schools. But Mill is 
still particularly forthright about the contemporary nature of his target in Ecclesiastical 
Establishments – the Church of England, and especially its ‘corporate clergy’ – paying 
by comparison only slight attention to previous or historical instances of established 
religion (the most prominent being the Catholic Church, who created ‘the greatest 
monster which the world ever beheld’, the Holy Inquisition).390 Both articles also share 
the taking up of two lines of argument in their critiques of established religion. In 
Ecclesiastical Establishments, the first attacks the Church’s hostility to toleration, the 
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second the restrictions the Church enacted upon the press – a topic of significant 
personal importance to Mill – which impacted upon religious and by extension political 
freedoms. 
On the subject of toleration, Mill was astonished by the hypocrisy of the Church of 
England concerning their right to separate from the Catholic Church on the ‘inference of 
error’, whilst denying others a similar right, on the same inference, to separate from 
them. This amounted to persecution. But whilst Catholic priests, for example, engaged 
in persecution of dissenters because they believed themselves to be infallible and it was 
damnable to dissent, the clergy of the Church of England persecuted them to preserve 
uniformity, which they could not bear to see violated. Mill could perceive at least the 
rudiments of a sense of duty in the activity of the Catholic priest (the desire to save 
individuals), but in the proceedings of the English priests he found ‘nothing in human 
conduct more atrocious’.391 This persecution also had a long history, particularly under 
the auspices of various Archbishops of Canterbury, such as John Whitgift or William 
Laud. It had a particular political manifestation in the Test and Corporation acts which 
limited the holding of office to those who did not take Anglican communion. Even if 
the ‘spirit of the age’ had meant an annual act of indemnity was passed to temper these 
laws, the ‘highest dignitaries’ of the Church were still adamant to enforce the sinfulness 
of schism, or what Mill sarcastically called the ‘sinfulness of following one’s own 
convictions in matters of religion, whenever they are not accordant with those which 
churchmen profess.’ 392  This was, according to William Blackstone, an ‘offence of 
reviling the ordinances of the church’, a crime which was ‘much grosser [in] nature than 
the other of mere non-conformity.’393 Mill however called such a description ‘one of the 
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most shameful passages in any book of authority in the English language’, attacking as 
it does the right of private judgement as a crime of ‘peculiar grossness’ and the ‘utmost 
indecency, arrogance, and ingratitude.’394 
To his condemnation of the array of the Church’s political influence via legislative acts 
Mill also added its power to impinge upon the liberty of the press, which the clergy 
used to circumscribe all reasonable debate. As the first chapter of this thesis has shown, 
Mill felt the liberty of the press was only a ‘vain sound’, unless it could be applied to 
two subjects of importance: government and religion. The Church of England, having 
already influenced the retaining of printing under license ‘until four years after the 
Revolution’, maintained such restrictions afterwards, and Mill accused the clergy of 
being the ‘most strenuous and furious opponents’ of the giving of any additional portion 
of beneficial freedom to the press.
395
 Because Christianity (in the form of the Church of 
England’s creed) had been taken as ‘part and parcel of the law of England’, it inhabited 
a privileged position whereby any criticism of it could not be tolerated, and was subject 
to prosecution as seditious or blasphemous libel. Mill saw the verdict of Rex v Woolston 
as confirmation of this, with the claim that the ‘root’ of Christianity had to be protected, 
meaning prosecutions for such libels constituted a destruction of religious freedom 
which involved all other freedom as well.
396
 
Schools for All and Ecclesiastical Establishments reveal the extent of Mill’s thought 
pertaining to established religion that he was willing to advance publicly, and 
demonstrate the potency of his arguments for dismantling the Church of England’s 
established status on grounds of toleration, freedom, rationality and, critically, the 
attainment of good government. The former work possessed a reserved if undeniable 
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secularist streak as it played out its main argument in support of a secular vision for 
schools for the poor, its arguments for cheapness and efficiency compounded by 
affirmations that the state could not rely on a religious establishment for support 
without instigating corruption in both institutions. In the latter work, Mill’s arguments 
against established religion were much more pronounced, in particular his 
condemnation of the corporate clergy, whose interests could not help but coalesce with 
those of the ruling political class, resulting in corruption at the expense of the 
population. 
In establishing the intellectual context to these secular ideas, however, relatively little 
can be confidently asserted at face-value about the influence to the published pieces 
discussed in this section. In Schools for All, Mill’s contention that a state’s reliance on 
established religion controverted the principle of utility initially appears to be derived 
from Bentham. It is, however, to William Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy which Mill makes the most explicit reference in the article concerning this 
notion. Paley was lauded by Mill as not just ‘the greatest ornament of the last age of the 
church’, but ‘the most eloquent defence of religion not used as a political engine’.397 
Since Bentham would come to employ similar language in his description of the 
‘governing aristocracy’ and the ‘sacerdotal class’ as ‘each wielding the precise engine 
which the other wants’ in his 1822 work Analysis of Natural Religion, on the Temporal 
Happiness of Mankind, it is not unreasonable to claim that Mill’s use of Paley served to 
make his argument more acceptable to defenders of the Church, a technique he also 
employed in the advancement of other arguments explored in this thesis.
398
 In 
Ecclesiastical Establishments, meanwhile, the conception of human nature given in the 
essay’s initial display of anti-clericalism does appear Benthamic in origin. Mill asserts 
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here that the clergy had a long history of usurpation and of ‘establishing a sort of right 
to call themselves and their interests, by the most sacred of names’. This was the natural 
product of the concatenation of interests, because when ‘a number of men, one by one, 
all virtuous and honourable’ where brought together they act in a body that appears to 
‘have renounced every principle of virtue’.399 Mill posits that since man is allured by 
power and pleasure and abhorred by weakness, privation and pain, a corporation of 
priests will by their very nature ‘labour for the extinction of [their] rivals.’ 400  The 
priestly incorporation of the Church of England was but one instance in a long history 
of the pursuit of such persecution; ever since the ‘first sovereign who protected the 
Christians was scarcely seated on his throne’ (Mill is referring here to Constantine and 
the Arian controversy), a conflict has raged competing creeds for ‘possession of his 
ear.’ 401  Whether Bentham’s purported influence on Mill’s religious ideas about 
secularism can be maintained in an analysis of Mill’s arguments against established 
religion found in the common place books forms one of the principal objectives of the 
next section, to which this chapter now turns. 
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IV. 
In the opening paragraphs of Ecclesiastical Establishments, Mill thought it proper to 
commence his article by stating unequivocally his opinion, that 
an ecclesiastical establishment is essentially antichristian; that religion can never be safe or 
sound, unless where it is left free to every man’s choice, wholly uninfluenced by the operation 
either of punishment or reward on the part of the magistrate.
402
 
The tenets of this statement function as a useful introduction to the study of his 
manuscript material on religion. They reflect in particular two major concepts that are 
illuminated in a chapter entitled ‘Religion’ in volume III of Mill’s common place books: 
the importance of reason (and a correspondent hazard of authority) to the habit of man’s 
religious inquiry, and the corruptive influence of rewards and punishments on the 
holding of certain religious beliefs, typically propagated by the clergy. It is the purpose 
of this section to investigate the intellectual context to these two concepts, in addition to 
an important third: the superiority of what Mill describes as the ‘moral’ or ‘popular’ 
sanction in comparison to the ‘religious’ sanction. 
The supremacy of reason is the first plank of Mill’s hostility to established religion, and 
is a position he expresses via a critique of man’s ‘habit’ of inquiry when faced with 
religious questions. The essence of this critique is derived from the principle that 
answers to such questions must be a very personal experience, originating from within a 
person’s conscience; beliefs could never be forced upon someone by external factors. 
But it also clearly has origins in Mill’s ideas about education, which were emphatic 
about the requirement for individuals to throw off the influence of authority when 
searching for truth. Whilst many illustrative quotations can be found which reflect this 
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kind of sentiment within this chapter of the common place books, two items are offered 
here because they also bookend the particular material that is of concern. The first or 
earlier one comes from Church of England clergyman Conyers Middleton’s Defence of 
the Letter to Dr. Waterland, stating that ‘whatever my reason declares to be true, I 
cannot help believing.’ 403  The second or later one is from Samuel Clarke, the 
philosopher and associate of Isaac Newton, in his Answer to the First Letter from a 
Gentleman of the University of Cambridge, which equated the use of reason with the 
use of sight. Since reason is a passive sense like sight, one need only to open it up in 
order to ‘see[s] the object necessarily. … Neither God nor man can avoid seeing that to 
be true, which they see is true; or judging that to be fit and reasonable, which they see is 
fit and reasonable.’404 
Mill’s initial suggestion is that whilst only a rational approach to religious belief is 
valid, man’s attention to his faculty of reason can be susceptible to lapses and, thus, it is 
likely he will commit errors. Responsibility for this can in part be attributed to the 
nature of human passions. ‘[T]he very best intentions are not sufficient to guard a man 
against fatal mistakes’, Mill quotes approvingly from Cardinal de Retz, who is 
described as ‘a profound judge of human nature’.405 But it is reasoning pertaining to 
religion – a subject which ‘inflames every passion of the human mind’ – which is the 
most likely to cause such incidents of faulty thought, since it is a subject exposed to ‘all 
kinds of imaginations.’ 406  Such imaginations might be restrained if man left alone 
‘whatever the scripture has left indeterminate’, an argument advanced by Jeremy Taylor 
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in the preface to his Liberty of Prophesying, which also states that ‘peremptory creeds’ 
should ‘never attempt to define what the scripture has left undefined’.407 But it is also 
the work of Taylor that Mill resorts to when trying to describe in greater detail the 
problems man encounters with his nature in his pursuit of religious truth. The first of 
these is that man seemed incapable of discernment, of choosing correctly between 
wholesome and corrupted opinions he finds influencing him. Man’s natural iniquity 
means he ‘suck[s] in opinions as wild asses do the wind’. Confidence in an opinion that 
is built on zeal and mistake rather than humility and rationality led to a second source of 
criticism: man possessed an impatience of contradiction, an arrogance where he was 
unwilling to correct an erroneous opinion. Not only would this compound the effects of 
any earlier established faulty reasoning, but it also suggests insincerity, since man may 
end up resolving not to believe, even if he sees reason to believe.
408
 Thirdly, a growth in 
man’s zeal for religious opinions resulted in a correspondent decline in his other 
religious qualities and activities, such as his piety or temperance.
409
 Yet whilst Taylor’s 
criticisms are extensive, Mill is quick to suggest that external factors bear at least as 
much responsibility for the position man finds himself in concerning matters of 
religious belief. Man is attracted, for instance, to the security perceived from the fact 
that knowledge of his beliefs comes from ‘very admirable men’, which is sufficient 
ground ‘for a zealous adherence to the belief.’410 This constitutes Mill’s first, albeit 
partially disguised, shot against an object of much of his loathing in his published work: 
the clergy.  
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From the condemnation of man’s own incorrect application of his faculty of reason to 
religious matters, Mill’s attention is next drawn to the objection that the mind can at 
once be governed by religious prejudices derived from such faulty logic, whilst this 
faculty of reason (the mind’s ‘power of pursuing and discerning other truth’) can go on 
in other domains without being undermined or weakened.
411
 In short, Mill is pondering 
here why the culture of religious belief inhibits reason, yet reason can seemingly 
continue unabated in other domains. This objection further underlines Mill’s belief in a 
lack of sincerity in the minds of men, or what he interprets as the position of 
Montesquieu in his Lettres persanes, that ‘men may profess a religion, and with a sort 
of good faith without believing it.’412 Logically, for Mill, reason dictates that one cannot 
simply separate out religious views from others, exploring evidence for the latter whilst 
being simultaneously in the habit of receiving opinions for the former. Whilst Mill 
agrees that there is a noble, agreeable tradition amongst men of ‘vigilant, indefatigable 
inquiry,’ which is ‘the habit of taking nothing upon trust, the habit of looking only to 
evidence, as the sole ground of its belief’, attachment to religion in a person corrupts 
such a habit, because religion ‘requires that the mind should be governed by authority, 
that it should believe, not because it sees reason to believe, after a fair and impartial 
examination of evidence, but because it has been told that it is right to believe.’413 At 
face value this appears a rather interesting stance for Mill to adopt because it contrasts 
greatly with, say, David Hume’s scepticism over the applicability of the powers of 
reason to matters of religious belief.
414
 In fact, it appears that Mill is not rejecting the 
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notion of religious belief based on faith, rather, he is rejecting the validity of any belief 
taken up because it comes from an authority that has gone unchallenged. By not looking 
at the evidence, by looking with ‘a disposition not to explore and detect, but… to 
acquiesce’, man develops a habit of ‘mental partiality’ or ‘mental unfairness’. The 
strength of Mill’s objection to this negative, destructive habit is conveyed by the 
explosiveness of his indictment of those who practice it. To uncritically assent to 
authority makes men not only ‘bad reasoners [sic]’, but ‘bad husbands, bad fathers, bad 
judges, bad legislators, bad every thing.’415 At its foundation, Mill sees the departure of 
reason from matters of religion as the very source of injustice. 
Mill likened the process of decoupling the mind’s habit of ‘indefatigable inquiry’ from 
matters of religion whilst retaining it in other domains as akin to having a weakened 
limb, which will always impair the strength of the whole body: ‘if you cultivate in 
religion, a habit, the very reverse of that wherein strength of mind consists, you cannot 
but impair the force of that habit.’ His conception of the use of reason as a ‘habit’ is 
developed into an argument that such a faculty needed to be exercised often and 
uniformly. Practice of a contrary habit, viz. uncritical observance and belief in opinions 
accepted blindly of indifferently from a religious authority, interfered with and 
eventually destroyed the original habit: ‘Do you think it possible’, asks Mill, ‘for a man 
to have a confirmed habit of leaning upon others for his opinions in religion, and not to 
have, on account of that habit, a tendency to lean upon them for other opinions: To 
effeminate his mind in one thing, without affecting its manliness in all?’ This point is 
extremely similar to Mill’s assessment of ‘emasculated creatures’ such as Edward 
Coplestone and the associated ‘binding strings’ analogy highlighted in the previous 
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chapter.
416
 It is also very close to Bentham’s opinion that any reliance on ‘extra-
experimental belief’ – belief unconformable to experience – was a sign of intellectual 
weakness, given that such belief was altogether useless, since it could not contribute in 
any degree to the removal of unhappiness, the main objective of humanity.
417
 Mill 
attaches to this idea a series of further rhetorical questions, from ‘[i]s [this] a thing 
which can be put off, or put on at pleasure?’ to ‘[i]s this the nature of attention?’ and 
finally, ‘[d]o we not endeavour to create in our children habits of attention, by 
preventing them from contracting inattentive habits, in any department?’ In considering 
the importance Mill held man’s use of reason to the attainment of progress, the strength 
of his concerns regarding the ability of religious authority to fatally undermine this 
faculty can begin to be understood. A further passage is striking for the sense of 
foreboding it signals on this very topic: 
If a mind is capable of practising habitually the neglect of evidence, the reliance on others, the 
fear to trust himself, the hearing of only one side, the shutting of his ears to the other; can I form 
any other conclusion, than that this man has no confirmed habits of looking to evidence, of 
trusting to that only for his opinions, of accurately, and unintermittingly weighing that, on all 
other subjects?
418
 
As much as Mill’s argument thus far has consisted of a critique of man’s incorrect use 
of his reason, a second target has quite clearly been the concept of religious authority 
itself or, more accurately, established religion. This is seen in Mill’s assertion that 
whilst uncritical assent to religious authority was dangerous, it was compounded by the 
fact that such an authority also precluded man from ever changing his opinion if he ever 
were to ‘list’. Such inflexibility only created hypocrites which, in the words of Taylor, 
was equivalent to building a monument to the Devil ‘[i]nstead of erecting a trophy to 
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God and true religion.’ 419  But Mill also extended his allegations of hypocrisy to 
manifestations of religious authorities themselves, by harnessing an argument advanced 
by the theologian William Chillingworth in his The Religion of Protestants, that 
Catholics ‘refer people to reason, when they are endeavouring to gain a man from 
another religion’. Mill saw such ‘abuse [of] the use of reason’ to be reflected in the 
exact temper of the Church of England, a point he also made in Ecclesiastical 
Establishments.
420
 But Mill thought that whilst the sacred writers used ridicule against 
the religion of their opponents, such ‘professors of piety’ were remarkably afraid of 
ridicule themselves.
421
 
Taken in a broad view, Mill’s attitude to established religion seemed to reflect both 
ideas derived from Enlightenment figures such as Montesquieu, and those associated 
with some Evangelical or Dissenting traditions, who shared his views on private 
judgement and freedom of individual conscience. When Mill claims that ‘[n]othing 
must be done for the good of mankind for fear of fetching down the church of England’, 
which he describes as ‘that fabric which its upholders represent as so rotten and rickety 
that every breath is sufficient to blow it down’, he is arguing against established religion 
in two ways. First, that its existence within a state which also practices religious 
toleration is a clear contradiction, because indifference was the main driver of 
participation in the established religion. Simply put, if one excites men religiously, the 
consequence is that ‘every man’s particular mind, gives him then particular views.’422 
As religious sects grow in number, only a few would actually hold views which 
coincided with the established religion, and Mill states many concordant opinions to 
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this point, such as again from Montesquieu, who observed in the Lettres persanes that 
the lively faith in the religion of Muslims greatly exceeds that shown by Christians, and 
also from Jonathan Swift, who ‘never saw, heard, nor read, that the clergy were beloved 
in any nation where Christianity was the religion of the country.’423 
Second, Mill is advancing a statement which at its core is anti-clerical. ‘The true 
religion never ought to have a priest’, argued Mill, because the existence of a paid 
clergymen is in direct opposition to any hope of sincerity. This too was obvious. ‘To 
have faith in God is to believe on the word of God’, but if the priest tells you that 
something is the word of God and you take his word for it, ‘your belief is solely 
bottomed on his word.’ Mill portrayed belief ‘in the interpretation of the Church, i.e. the 
priests’ as a major tenet of the Church of England’s creed. It is not a belief in God, 
merely a belief ‘in the interpreter.’424 There is a resonance here with a sentiment of 
Rousseau’s that Mill notes from Letters Written from the Mountain: ‘If I am convinced 
to-day that I ought to submit to the decisions of others, I should to-morrow become a 
Catholick, and every honest and consistent man would do the same.’425 Mill viewed the 
general concept of an established religious authority with disdain because belief in such 
an authority required suspension of man’s use of reason. The conclusion of Mill’s 
argument is an indictment of established religions such as the Church of England as 
false. ‘False religions stand in need of [a] priesthood, and cannot do without one.’426 
This is a highly controversial statement, and it would have been very difficult for Mill 
to espouse it publicly. 
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Whilst Mill’s concern for the lack of sincerity in man’s belief in religion can be seen as 
derived in one sense from his aforementioned reading of Montesquieu’s Lettres 
persanes, it also appears to have origins in Bentham’s work, or more specifically his 
Traités de législation civile et pénale (1802), which was translated and edited by 
Étienne Dumont. ‘The state of most men’s minds with regards to religion’, paraphrases 
Mill from this work in his manuscripts, ‘is that they rather do not disbelieve, than they 
believe.’ This state of mind is referred to as a ‘half-belief’, and is regarded as the 
foundation upon which men’s great interests depend. Bentham’s argument is that when 
these interests are threatened, men are rendered ‘fearful for their faith, alarmed at 
objections, hostile to objectors, persecuting, etc.’ 427  In addition to reinforcing the 
understanding of Mill’s critique of man’s failure to exercise his faculty of reason, the 
reference to Bentham is also a useful way to introduce a change of focus for this study, 
away from matters concerning the habit of inquiry and towards Mill’s specific use of 
the terms ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ in the manuscripts. These terms naturally evoke a 
further link to Bentham’s thought, given their inclusion in the title of his Théorie des 
peines et des récompenses (published 1811, also under the editorship of Dumont and 
republished in part in 1830, in English, as The Rationale of Reward) and also their 
prominence in Analysis of Natural Religion (the work Bentham published with Grote 
under the pseudonym Phillip Beauchamp). In the former work, the obtainment of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number was Bentham’s objective for the political 
legislator, he regarded punishment and reward as the two ‘instruments’ or means to 
such an end.
428
 In the latter, Bentham argued that rewards and punishments constituted 
‘a lateral and extraneous force’ which disturbed the influence of proof on man’s holding 
of opinions. Reward enticed someone to believe upon inadequate proof and disbelieve 
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upon adequate disproof.
429
 Mill, however, does not acknowledge the origin of this 
material that is judged to have come from Bentham. This cannot be considered that 
peculiar, given the depth and breadth of the material collated in the common place 
books and the faulty referencing that pervades it, but highlighting these particular 
instances does show the apparent level of intellectual debt Mill owes to Bentham 
regarding how the conception of rewards and punishments in matters of religion 
contributes to the understanding of his anti-clerical and anti-establishment stance. 
A further principle in this regard which Mill adopts from his manuscripts is that any 
opinions to the belief of which ‘any thing that can be called reward’, or ‘to the disbelief 
of which any thing that can be called punishment’ are always, at first sight, to be 
presumed to be false.
430
 In Bentham’s view, if it was necessary to encourage relief by an 
artificial bounty, it would be useless to offer it to any doctrine which ‘would of itself 
command the assent of mankind.’431 In addition to this presumption, Mill is also highly 
critical of those that persecute disagreeing opinions, an activity which, in the thought of 
both Taylor and Chillingworth, is both unnatural and unreasonable. For Taylor, spiritual 
matters could not be restrained nor punished by corporal inflictions. This was akin to 
‘cur[ing] the colic by brushing a man’s clothes,’ or filling his belly ‘with a 
syllogism.’432 For Chillingworth, worldly terror might make a man profess a religion 
which he does not believe in, but this could never compel his conscience to actually 
consent.
433
 Punishment was thus a largely useless endeavour. Rewards and punishments 
taken together – what Mill and Bentham termed ‘inducements’ – were most likely in a 
religious context to be calculated more in favour of error than of truth. A love of truth 
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‘could never be the motive for the attaching of [them]’, because if the ‘true truth’ did 
not lead to the formation of such inducements, they were most likely employed in 
advancing falsehoods, that which was ‘incapable of being supported by reason.’434 
Mill’s explanation for this stance is that the giving of inducements to hold certain 
opinions is akin to extortion: ‘[i]f you put another man in fear, in order to extort money 
from him, you are hanged. If you put him in fear, in order to extort from him the use of 
his reason, do you represent yourself as entitled to reward?’ Similarly, if one was to 
give pecuniary reward to a man giving evidence to any particular side in the courts, the 
act is punished as subornation of evidence. ‘If reason would lead him to those opinions’, 
Mill asks, ‘[then] your penalties are useless; if reason would not lead him to those 
opinions, your penalties lead him to embrace falsehood.’435 These are all arguments that 
appear to be drawn from Bentham.
436
 The second argument, concerning the entitlement 
to reward for the holding of certain opinions, also has a very clear resonance with the 
position outlined above which implicitly questioned the scrupulousness of priests who 
were members of an established church and whose salary may be regarded as an 
inducement for holding a certain opinion on religious matters, and promoting the taking 
up of the same opinion by their congregation. 
A belief that there is any merit in believing was, for Mill, ‘wholly immoral’. This did 
not however mean Mill was critical of the holding of certain opinions as ends; his 
censure was reserved for the means employed to arrive at such ends. He conceives merit 
as being only that which is earned by man exercising his reason by diligently collecting 
evidence with ‘all the attention and fairness of the mind, in ascertaining its value or 
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weight in the scale of proof.’ ‘In this alone’, argues Mill, ‘all virtue in believing [is] 
included.’ 437  His opposition, instead, is towards the holding out of rewards and 
punishments to ‘turn away from evidence’, or to ‘believe on account of the rewards 
without any regard to evidence.’438 It is, in effect, a combination of his concerns for the 
health of man’s habit of inquiry, which must always depend on his reason, and the 
subterfuge produced by the offering of inducements to suspend such a habit and draw 
down beliefs from an authority. Mill sees such a combination as leading not to opinions 
or ends that rewards are attached to, but to those which pains are instead.  
The act of distributing rewards and punishments for the holding of certain opinions in 
religious matters, the effect of which typically produced either hypocrites or persecuted 
consciences, was for Mill an undeniably barbarous one. It was an act which, having 
taken root in a similarly barbarous age, was then protected and extended into the 
comparatively enlightened one of his own time, where the government still supported 
the holding of ‘certain opinions’ of many centuries standing by the act of rewarding or 
punishing the people for ‘professing this or that opinion.’439 Mill goes on to argue, in a 
similar vein to the arguments of Madame de Staël in the previous chapter concerning 
government being conducted in ‘arrears’, that since nineteenth-century Britain was a 
country with the capacity to devise new good opinions, there was no reason these could 
not now be implemented, supported by the proffering of rewards and the threat of 
punishments. In Mill’s consideration of why the longevity of bad opinions was so, he 
finds concordance with the rather despondent analysis of human nature derived from 
John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke’s argument, that 
‘[s]ome men, out of fear that an impartial enquiry would not favour those opinions 
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which best suit their prejudices, lives, and designs, content themselves, without 
examination, to take upon trust what they find convenient and in fashion’,440 is of 
course very similar in sentiment to the aforementioned notion of Bentham’s, found in 
his Traités de législation, that men, rather than believe, simply ‘do not disbelieve’ in 
order to protect what is in their own interest, and that of Montesquieu’s, who argued 
that men professed a religion with ‘a sort of good faith’ but without fully believing it.441 
Mention of Locke’s concept of fashion, described here as a method to judge the merit or 
favourability of holding certain opinions, as well as the idea that man’s belief in 
religious authority served in the main as a device to protect their own interests, forms a 
convenient way of bridging from a discussion of Mill’s thought on the corrosive effect 
of rewards and punishments, towards an exploration of an altogether different argument, 
which concerns his understanding of the term ‘moral sanction’. Mill uses the term 
‘fashion’ as part of the foundation of this type of sanction, which he believed possessed 
a far greater weight of authority than a religious equivalent. The language of Mill’s 
position here is very similar to that employed by Bentham in his Analysis of the 
Influence of Natural Religion, who argued that the efficacy of posthumous inducements 
(a more-or-less equivalent term for religion sanction) is in reality ‘referable to their 
alliance with public opinion.’442 
That Mill perceived the effects of religious sanction as rarely a source of animation for 
man’s behaviour has obvious consequences for the analysis of his argument concerning 
inducements heretofore outlined. There, it was argued that such a practice was immoral. 
Here, Mill’s argument seems to suggest that anything which could be regarded as part 
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of a religious sanction actually had no substantial effect on man’s action. Instead, it was 
the underlining moral sanction which dictated how man interacted with his political and 
social context. It is important to separate the understanding of the moral sanction from 
the notion that it necessarily promoted, by some objective measure, actions that one 
might consider moral, virtuous or intrinsically good. In this regard, a more accurate 
term may be ‘popular’ sanction, or conformity to public opinion, which in 
Ecclesiastical Establishments Mill believed capable of overturning clerical influence, a 
‘once gigantic foe’.443 An example employed by Mill which clarifies this distinction is 
in fact one of his most pointed: his portrayal of young women who ‘murder their 
bastard children’.444 This strain of infanticide was a practice not driven by any religious 
sanction, but by a moral one which was concerned with social values such as reputation. 
Mill is thus only interested here in whether the motivation for such an activity (or, 
indeed, motivation to not conduct such an activity) had originated from a religious 
authority. In his opinion, infanticide did not. Mill attributes his belief in the decline of 
the importance of religious sanction to the thought of Montesquieu and Adam Smith, 
who he calls precursors of the doctrine that the multiplication of religious sects 
increased the force of the moral sanction. This appears to be because of the undermining 
such multiplication gave to the original religious authority.
445
 It is developed into a 
position held by Mill which eschews religious laws completely, labelling them as 
inadequate for the governing of men, in one simple sense demonstrated by the fact that 
penal laws are directed chiefly against the ‘unprincipled’ or the ‘irreligious’, upon 
whom a religious sanction would clearly have no effect.
446
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Mill subsequently expands upon the ideas of Smith, with particular attention drawn to 
the coverage in the Wealth of Nations regarding the subject of fashion. Mill’s 
conception of fashion here is that it is one of several social virtues which constitute the 
‘powerful efficacies’ of the moral sanction. Other such virtues include dignity, respect, 
and ‘the whole advantage of what is called birth’. Moral sanction is so powerful that it 
also appears to supersede much legal sanction, since there are, in the words of Henry 
Fielding, ‘laws which, though not written, are perhaps better understood, and, though 
established by no coercive power, much better obeyed within the circle where they are 
received, than any of those laws which are recorded in books, or enforced by public 
authority.’447  Mill also quotes with agreement a similar position found in Edmund 
Burke’s Letters on a Regicide Peace, which defines the moral sanction as society’s 
most treasured manners. ‘Manners are of more importance than laws’, argues Burke, 
because whilst the ‘law touches us but here and there, and now and then’, manners ‘vex 
or soothe, corrupt or pacify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, 
steady, uniform, insensible operation.’448 
A comparison can be drawn between Mill’s consideration of the moral or popular 
sanction and its dominance over the religious version to the previous discussion which 
concerned the use of a threat of religious punishment – which, at its most obvious, is 
condemnation to an afterlife of suffering – as an inducement to encourage attendance to 
certain religious beliefs. Following Plato, Mill felt this latter application was very weak, 
and that ‘the talk of horrid things in the future life ought not to be permitted’, because 
they only made men fearful of death, and cowardly.
449
 Conversely, Mill considered the 
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moral sanction to be categorically much stronger. ‘The reason that religion does not 
command stealing’, he posits in one instance of this argument, ‘is because thieves have 
not the making of it – but [rather] men who know it is their interest there should be no 
thieves.’450 Thus it is religion that is made good by the moral sanction, not the other 
way round. Mill sees the effects of the moral sanction, moreover, as underpinning two 
key aspects of society which the religious sanction cannot hope to emulate. The first is 
that the moral sanction ensures ‘people are not all perpetual liars’. The second is that the 
power of adulation and flattery by others is at the heart of the moral sanction, and such 
power is so immense that it is the ‘very aim of riches’ and ‘for which all men toil’.451 
Two final extracts from Mill’s manuscripts serve to underline unequivocally his 
rejection of the religious sanction, and show his belief in the superiority of the popular 
or moral one. The first concerns Mill’s consideration of religious martyrs. ‘That men 
should go to death… in support of religious impostures, is nothing wonderful’, argues 
Mill, because ‘[p]raise is the motive… which sends the solider to the mouth of a cannon 
[and] the duellist to that of a pistol.’452 Martyrdom, for Mill, was not proof of a deep or 
sincere religious belief but a love of praise. Many a man of religious contradictions had 
willingly suffered martyrdom for what they professed to believe. There was no set of 
opinions, however absurd but ‘made the badge of a party’, and sanctioned by the 
applause of said party (read: encouraged by a form of moral sanction), which Mill felt 
someone could be found willing enough to martyr themselves for. In this light, Mill felt 
such martyrs could be compared to criminals brought to the gallows.
453
 The second 
consists of Mill’s rejection of antinomianism, found in his references to Helvétius’ 
Treatise on Man concerning the clear ‘destructive morality’ of the ‘speculative dogmas’ 
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of certain faiths. Helvétius posits that the Stoic doctrine of fatalism, the doctrine of 
predestination in Calvinism, or the Catholic doctrine of atonement had not caused the 
followers of those creeds to act immorally or suffer destruction of their tribes. Had 
religious sanction been more important than the popular sanction, however, the logical 
and amoral endpoints of these doctrines would have been enacted wholesale. Helvétius 
in fact felt in reality the opposite was true, citing the Stoics, for example, as being the 
most moral amongst their contemporaries.
454
 
It was argued at the beginning of this section that three particular concepts are advanced 
by Mill on the subject of religion in his common place books, all of which contribute to 
an understanding of his attitude to established religion and the intellectual context to 
such ideas. The first consisted of Mill’s well-rehearsed attack on the perversion or 
suppression of man’s use of his own reason. In the religious context of these particular 
manuscripts, the attack was applied to those in thrall to a religious authority, and who 
adopted a ‘half-belief’, invariably based on their own interest, which legitimised such 
an authority. This outlook of ‘not disbelieving’ was criticized by Mill because it 
required the suspension of one’s own faculty of reason, which could seemingly seek out 
truth in any subject except that concerning religion. But religious authority did not itself 
escape from censure by Mill, and this came particularly to the fore in his second line of 
argument, which accused the clergy of causing the population at large to hold false 
positions or use faulty reasoning in religious matters, particularly via their use of 
rewards and punishments. The sacerdotal class were also unreliable because they 
themselves received inducements for maintaining certain beliefs derived from an 
established church. Mill, in tandem with Bentham, believed the use of rewards and 
punishments for the holding of certain opinions meant that such opinions were almost 
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certainly false. No one had the right to force a man from any religion, or to restrain him 
from declaring any opinions in regard to religion. This, Mill believed, had been proved 
by Locke’s Third Letter on Toleration.455 The only true reward garnered from following 
truth was the merit earned by being rigorous in the habit of inquiry. The ‘religious 
system’, in Mill’s view, had ‘destroy[ed] all proportion, between the rewards allotted to 
the actions of men, and their usefulness to the public.’456 Mill’s third argument belittled 
the effects of the religious sanction on society as a whole, by showing that the popular 
or moral equivalent was felt much more keenly, more so perhaps than even the laws of 
the land, and that ‘posthumous inducements’ – to borrow a phrase from Bentham’s 
Analysis of Natural Religion – actually had little effect on unscrupulous behaviour. A 
connection can be discerned here to Mill’s first and second lines of reasoning, because 
when men were invited to use their reason in matters of religion, which meant it was 
likely most would come to reject the conventional religious views of the established 
church, the number of religious sects multiplied and the power of the moral sanction 
increased in proportion, reinforcing the notion that a religious sanction was limited in its 
scope, power and application. 
V. 
An intellectual history of Mill’s religious thought sheds significant light on both his 
early, seemingly more devout upbringing in Scotland and his later, secular existence in 
London. With regards to the former, the most important details gleaned from a study of 
his Scottish education is the argument that Mill’s religious belief – that is to say, the 
Presbyterian faith he was brought up in – was actually of minimal importance to his 
early career choice as a preacher in the Kirk. Instead, Mill viewed the prospect of 
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preaching as a potential route to a life of scholarship, one that was befitting of three 
separate factors: his intellectual prowess, the efforts of important figures in his 
biography (such as his mother Isabel and his patrons in the Belsches family) and, 
perhaps most importantly, the taste for philosophy he had developed in the course of his 
studies at Edinburgh under the tutelage of figures such as Dugald Stewart. This appetite 
for philosophical works was made apparent by Bain’s attempt to reconstruct Mill’s 
library borrowings, which was used to determine what Mill read whilst at Edinburgh. 
Such a lending record has, in turn, been used by Lazenby to support his more general 
thesis that Mill’s philosophical ideas were formed largely before he met Bentham.457 
Two problems arise with Lazenby’s conclusion as a result of this chapter. The first is 
that knowledge of what Mill borrowed pales significantly in comparison to knowledge 
of the specific parts of works that he found engaging or particularly illuminating, and 
this latter form, of course, can only be found in his common place books. The second is 
that, when the contents of Mill’s manuscripts are taken into account, it is clearly 
Bentham, rather than any Scottish philosopher, that Mill draws the most influence from 
when developing his religious thought. 
The particular nature of Mill’s religious belief, meanwhile, continued to be problematic 
in the second half of this chapter concerned with his later life, hampered as it was by a 
distinct lack of primary material with which to work with. Speculation about the 
provenance of Mill’s religious scepticism, such as that it came from General Miranda or 
through a detailed reading of Butler’s Analogy of Religion, cannot be confirmed by 
reference to material in the common place books. For this reason, an approach to 
examining Mill’s religious ideas that was not centred on his belief (or lack thereof) had 
to be devised, one that professed to study the tenets and influences of his attitude to 
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established religion. The only link that could be ascertained between his Scottish and 
English contexts in this light was in the fact that Mill’s experiences of primary 
schooling whilst a young boy in Scotland meant he could offer insightful criticism to 
the diametrically opposed arrangements for such education offered in England. The 
involvement of Mill in a scheme to correct this – the Lancasterian system of the British 
and Foreign School Society – led to one of the first major public expositions of his 
secular thought in the form of the 1812 essay Schools for All. 
It is Mill’s secular or anti-clerical ideas pertaining to established religion and especially 
the Church of England which are the overarching theme to the study of his religious 
thought in its later London context. Whilst these were displayed in his published 
writings such as Ecclesiastical Establishments, they took on a highly controversial form 
in sections of his private manuscript writings. Mill’s arguments against established 
religion were based on a well-known admiration for the powers of human reason, a 
characteristic trait of his well established in the previous chapter concerning his ideas on 
education. In the form of an established church, and more specifically in the Church of 
England, he saw a distinct and clear threat to the exercise of this reason and, by 
extension, the notion of progress in human knowledge. But Mill’s secularism was also 
an inherently political notion. He perceived the reliance of the state on an established 
church as contravening the principle of utility upon which governments were to be 
judged. A church in this position also possessed unwarranted statutory powers, such as 
the ability to impinge upon the freedoms of the press by stifling debate which it deemed 
seditious or blasphemous libels, and on religious freedoms by dictating the creeds 
which were to be taught in schools provided for the education of the poor. 
Within the common place books, Mill developed three specific arguments for his 
rejection of established religion, all of which possess varying intellectual provenance. 
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The frequent citations of Protestant theologians or clergymen, such as Chillingworth 
and Taylor, are striking for the degree of concordance Mill claims they have with his 
own ideas about the habit of man’s inquiry, and how such habits were often faulty when 
applied to religious matters. These citations appear to be an instance of Mill collecting 
extracts from relatively uncontroversial (and in this case theological) works which he 
could use to demonstrate the moderate nature of his own argument, a technique he is 
seen to repeat across all four specific studies that make up this thesis. But Mill is also 
reliant on ideas associated with evangelical and dissenting traditions, mainly seen in his 
support of a general argument for toleration and in his specific assertion that religious 
belief had to originate from a very personal viewpoint, as opposed to being prescribed 
by an authority. The importance of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding and his Letters Concerning Toleration to these notions is also 
pronounced in the manuscripts. 
Locke is of further importance, along with Adam Smith, to Mill’s ideas on the concept 
of fashion and other related sentiments, and their applicability to the strength of what 
Mill termed the moral sanction. Mill’s ideas about the moral sanction and how it was 
superior in strength to the religious sanction also drew upon the arguments of Madame 
de Staël and Montesquieu, although the most pronounced influence in this regard is 
undoubtedly Bentham, where distinct, albeit often unacknowledged, allusions in the 
manuscript material to Bentham’s works demonstrate the degree of intellectual affinity 
that existed on this subject between him and Mill. Indeed, this degree of affinity 
between Mill and Bentham is even more emphatic in the arguments advanced by Mill 
concerning the giving of rewards and punishments for the holding of religious opinions. 
The tenets of Mill’s argument are derived wholesale from Bentham’s works such as his 
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Théorie des peines et des recompenses and his later work published under the 
pseudonym Philip Beauchamp, Analysis of Natural Religion. 
The biographical features of this chapter have only been concerned with Mill’s early life 
in Scotland. But it is worth introducing a further point at this late juncture that concerns 
Mill and Bentham, in order to insinuate an argument for a more pronounced religious 
influence of Bentham on Mill that went beyond that pertaining to the latter’s secular or 
anti-clerical ideas. Mill had accompanied Bentham to his retreat at Forde Abbey, 
Somerset, on four long and consecutive occasions between 1814 and 1818, and it was 
here that Bentham worked upon Chrestomathia, a topic of clear personal interest to Mill 
given his prior involvement with the Lancasterian scheme which had gone before it, and 
two of his three significant works on religious scepticism, Not Paul But Jesus 
(published only in 1823 under the pseudonym Gamaliel Smith) and Church-of-
Englandism and Its Catechism Examined (published 1818), with the third being the 
aforementioned Influence of Natural Religion. A speculative remark on Mill’s religious 
thought, therefore, is that if Bentham can be shown as of significant influence to Mill’s 
attitude pertaining to established religion as expounded in the common place books, it is 
impossible not to discount the assumption of a similar influence of Bentham on Mill’s 
own religious scepticism. This subject has been deemed out of reach by the 
methodological approach taken by this chapter, but in being able to show how strongly 
related their ideas were concerning established religion, it is not much of a stretch to 
speculate that the tenets of Mill’s agnosticism also possessed a strong influence from 
Bentham. 
For Mill, established religion damaged man’s ability to use his reason and propagated 
false opinions in its place through inducements. Its ability to affect the behaviour of the 
population through sanction was however declining inexorably, in opposition to the 
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growing strength of the moral sanction which was built upon the sturdier foundations of 
public opinion. Mill thought established religion was highly inimical to the pursuit of 
good government for these reasons, and the contextualisation of these ideas made 
possible by reference to this common place book material is inherently valuable for the 
contribution it makes to the thesis’ overarching objective: the study of Mill’s political 
thought. It is to a final conclusion encompassing the four distinct areas examined in this 
thesis for their relevance to such thought that this thesis now turns to. 
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Conclusion 
The initial argument about the intellectual history of James Mill advanced in the 
introduction to this thesis was that four specific areas of his thought could be 
contextualised in detail by examining the contents of his common place books. Since 
the common place books have hitherto been underused in a scholarly sense, their 
centrality to the pursuit of the objectives of this thesis, when combined with their 
privileged nature as sources, means a strong argument can be made for this study having 
an immediate and significant impact on existing scholarship on James Mill. Whilst 
these four areas were discrete enough to be subject to individual study (in the form of 
four chapters), when taken together they contribute significantly to a wider 
understanding of Mill’s political thought. Such an understanding has been the 
overarching aim of the thesis. 
The four specific areas of concern regarded as central tenets to Mill’s wider political 
thought were his ideas on the liberty of the press; on the ability to attain good 
government through parliamentary reform; on the education of the population at large, 
which aimed to encourage a reliance on reason rather than authority as a guide to truth; 
and finally on Mill’s secular thought, manifested in his attitude towards established 
religion. In addition to appraising these four constituent investigations, this conclusion 
aims to justify the specific methodological approach to Mill’s intellectual history taken 
by this thesis in three significant ways. The first is through the study’s contribution to a 
more sophisticated understanding of Mill’s intellectual influences; the second through 
its ability to recover and reveal the extent of Mill’s true ideas; and the third through the 
analysis the study has provided of Mill’s specific political context. 
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Mill’s unpublished manuscripts have opened up the scholarly debate on the precise 
nature of the influences on his ideas and arguments, and now a much broader array of 
potential thinkers, writers and political figures than has historically been implied may be 
seen to be of particular importance to him. Indeed, previous studies of Mill’s intellectual 
history have typically cast the juxtaposition of his two most well-known intellectual 
contexts as a primary feature. The first of these contexts regards the philosophers 
representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, 
who were undoubtedly of influence to Mill during his education and upbringing near 
Aberdeen and at Edinburgh, but also of significance to his later ideas. The second 
context is the particular influence of Jeremy Bentham, the philosopher and legal 
reformer with whom Mill worked closely from about 1808, and whose doctrine of 
Utilitarianism Mill adopted in his role as propagandist for the group which would 
become known as the Philosophic Radicals. 
The common place books provide ample evidence that the net of influences upon Mill 
must be cast much wider than just these two contexts. Mill is confirmed as a voracious 
reader, and his manuscripts are at times archetypical common place books: a daily 
record of his reading. But it is in Mill’s treatment of certain extracts from the works of 
specific authors that reveals significant and illuminating insights about the nature and 
provenance of his own arguments. Mill is an avid student, for example, of the speeches 
and writings of Edmund Burke. Whilst he alternates between approval and dismissal of 
Burke’s ideas within the same manuscript chapter, sometimes in the space of two pages, 
the intersection between Mill’s thought and the arguments of Burke is very important 
for uncovering the nature of the former’s political philosophy. This is particularly 
manifest in Mill’s treatment of Burke’s disparagement of radical reform, and this 
dispute was to be repeated in real-life when Mill took up the same argument against 
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Macaulay, himself an heir to Burke’s legacy of philosophical conservatism.458 Mill also 
makes constant references to Plato,
459
 and to the ideas of Montesquieu and Madame de 
Staël, which are notable for their frequent use as reinforcement to many of his own 
arguments. Significant concordance is also found, for example, between Mill’s 
conception of the philosopher-legislator figure, and the machiniste of Condillac’s 
political theory, thereby implying that the impact of continental philosophers on Mill 
was significant. 
That Mill’s intellectual influences are much wider than the Scottish and Benthamite 
contexts traditionally ascribed to him does not mean, however, that this thesis has 
precluded any investigation of whether their particular influence on Mill can also be 
seen in the contents of the common place books. Indeed, in the case of Bentham, 
analysis of Mill’s manuscripts only confirms the significance of the former to a range of 
the latter’s positions. This is apparent from general instances such as regarding Mill’s 
thought on the liberty of the press, which is seen as generally analogous to Bentham’s 
theory of rewards and punishments, to the very particular fact that, on the topic of 
established religion, Mill’s secular ideas are virtually inseparable from those Bentham 
advanced in his own controversial religious work Analysis of Natural Religion, the book 
he published with Grote under the pseudonym Philip Beauchamp. 
Mill’s Scottish context, however, is much harder to discern from his manuscripts. For 
whilst Bentham’s influence can be read in Mill’s private writings even when he is not 
directly cited, it is more difficult to perceive the presence of works from any Scottish 
Enlightenment authors that previous studies have perceived as influential to Mill. With 
                                                 
458
 See for example Mill, CPB I, 32
v–34v. 
459
 For the importance of Plato to Mill’s intellectual history, see Antis Loizides, “Taking Their Cue from 
Plato: James and John Stuart Mill,” History of European Ideas 39, no. 1 (February 6, 2012): 121–140, 
doi:10.1080/01916599.2011.632255. 
205 
 
regards to Thomas Reid, a key example, only a solitary reference to his work exists in 
the entire corpus of Mill’s manuscripts, a citation from his An Inquiry into the Human 
Mind in volume III of the common place books. This is not to deny the importance of 
Scottish thinkers specifically and the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment more 
generally to an interpretation of Mill’s intellectual history, however, since examples of 
influence do exist, albeit sparingly. The thought of Adam Smith, for instance, is crucial 
to Mill’s conception of the moral sanction in his religious ideas. Similarly, Mill’s 
thought regarding theoretical knowledge and his philosophical approach to legislation 
also had hallmarks of the Scottish conjectural history tradition, as did his belief in the 
progress of human knowledge, if, in the words of Thomas Brown, reason could be 
unshackled from blind authority. But if a bibliographical study of existing scholarship 
on Mill, such as that given in the introduction to this thesis, suggests a distinct Scottish 
essence to his ideas, it is certainly curious that relatively few references to such material 
are made in his common place books, considering their length, breadth and depth. 
Evidence for the extent of Mill’s intellectual influences has been recovered by 
examining the contents of the common place books, and the theme of recovery is one 
that pervades other aspects of the thesis. Primarily through a reliance on the painstaking 
detective work of Robert Fenn – the original transcriber of the common place books – 
the manuscripts have unveiled the tenets of the arguments Mill projected in private. 
Such private composition means they are largely considered to be exempt from the need 
for any moderation, be that for editorial, legal, religious or any other reason. This 
reconstruction of arguments was however by no means an exact science. The common 
place books were not akin to something like Bentham’s manuscripts, which frequently 
feature relatively complete drafts. But through judicious use of their contents, Mill’s 
manuscripts have facilitated a comparative approach undertaken between his published 
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and unpublished writings, which has salvaged from the latter arguments that were 
perhaps never intended to be advanced in the former. The thesis has drawn on works 
from Mill’s prodigious literary output – his essays Government, Education and Liberty 
of the Press for the SupEB, and his articles Schools for All and Ecclesiastical 
Establishments for The Philanthropist and the Westminster Review, respectively – and 
compared the ideas in them to material found in the common place books which is 
similar in terms of content, theme and date of composition. This has repeatedly pointed 
towards an important conclusion about Mill worth restating here: he was much more 
radical in thought than the ideas he advanced in his published works appeared to 
suggest. 
The recovered arguments from the common place books have established much more 
radical positions than are typically attributed to Mill by previous studies of his thought, 
which have examined only public expositions of his ideas. But many scholars have long 
suspected Mill subjected his writings to some kind of moderation or restraint.
460
 In 
summary, his views on libel law, which in published form hesitated over the problem of 
libels irrecoverably damaging reputations, are much more far-reaching in their 
unpublished form, where Mill comes down unequivocally on the side of a complete 
revocation of the law, in part based on the fact that the legal profession was corrupt, and 
arbitrarily made it ‘whatever it pleased’. His objective in this regard was to secure a 
truly liberal press free from state interference, and for it to be unleashed in search for 
what he termed ‘true truths’. Meanwhile, the extension of the suffrage, which in 
Government is controversially limited to men over 40 with attendant property 
qualifications, with women completely excluded, is by contrast truly universal in the 
sections in the common place books pertaining to parliamentary reform. Mill’s ideas in 
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this regard were unequivocal. Only with a representation of the interests of all the 
population could a government exist for the benefit of the community at large; any 
dilution of representation, such as that suggested in the Whig reforms which argued for 
‘virtual’ or ‘variegated’ representation, would deliver only further corruption, and 
ensure the continued political dominance of an aristocratical body. 
The role ascribed by Mill to the subject of education in the common place books had a 
very similar radically democratic application to Mill’s private ideas about the extent of 
his parliamentary reforms. Rather than being concerned with the specifics of schooling, 
Mill argued in the working material for the essay Education that the population above 
all had to be instructed in the use of their reason. Only through this ability could they 
hope to pursue their own interest, which, when collated into the interest of the 
community at large could be an effective check on the aristocratical body which was 
intent on profiting from corrupt government. Mill was keen for the nation at large to 
throw off the shackles of deference to authority, since it was only the exercise of 
rational thought which could inspire progress in human knowledge. This theme was 
also very apparent in the final topic of this thesis’ interest, concerning Mill’s religious 
ideas and, more specifically, his attitude towards established religion or ecclesiastical 
establishments. Mill’s arguments for disestablishing the Church of England had been 
strongly hinted at in his 1826 article Ecclesiastical Establishments. In his manuscripts, 
such a position is emphatic, and the philosophical arguments arranged in support of 
such a motion drawn from a complex array of intellectual influences, from 
Chillingworth, to Locke, to Bentham. Mill’s religious ideas also incorporated a highly 
controversial critique of the corporate clergy and their corruptive practices in both 
political and religious domains which, like his earlier material on the conduct of lawyers 
regarding the law of libel, was simply not publishable in the contemporary context. The 
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spiritual domination of established religion greatly impinged on the ability of man to 
exercise his own judgment of truths. This corrupted man’s ability to use his reason, an 
argument which in turn placed the Church of England at the heart of the political 
corruption of nineteenth-century Britain, where it found employment as a ‘prop’ of the 
state. 
The extent of Mill’s ideas found in his manuscripts and the subsequent comparative 
study between the public and private versions of his arguments proves beyond doubt 
that Mill moderated his literary output. This practice of dissimulation, explored in 
specific reference to the ideas Mill published on libel law, reform, education and 
established religion, appears to have been a typical approach for radical writers of 
Mill’s kind who wished to not fall foul of contemporary arbitrary and repressive libel 
laws, of which both an outline of their current state and a brief history were found in 
chapter 1. Bentham, for example, was strongly advised by Romilly to delay the 
publication of his Elements of the Art of Packing which, though printed in 1809, was 
only published in 1821.
461
 But Mill is also a rather unique case in the sense that he 
published consistently throughout his lifetime, and he appeared to choose to shield the 
more radical aspects of his argument from view rather than delay or abandon 
publication of such work completely. Mill thus appears unwilling to stake his personal 
and professional reputation on the publication of opinions that would have led to at best 
considerable intrigue from both government and religious authorities, and at worse 
prosecution for seditious libel. Evidence from his biography can explain at length the 
personal reasons as to why this was the case. Mill has eked out a precarious existence as 
a journalist in the first half of his time in London, and the position as an examiner at the 
East India Company, which he had attained in part thanks to the scholarly reputation 
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garnered from writing the History of British India, was a source of much financial 
stability. It is not difficult to be sympathetic to Mill’s behaviour, which we see 
conveyed in his letters to Macvey Napier, the editor of the SupEB, because he had so 
much to lose.
462
 By way of straightforward comparison, an argument can readily be 
made for Bentham’s position, which was independent by virtue of much greater 
financial means, as being at much less risk. 
The notion of dissimulation in Mill’s public writings alluded to thus far in this 
conclusion is important for the links it forms to a third justification for the overarching 
approach employed by this thesis: the analysis it has provided of the political context 
just prior to, and during the time Mill was living in London. In establishing the fact that 
significant discrepancies in strength exist between published and unpublished versions 
of Mill’s arguments which relate to his political thought, an important derivative 
question to ask is exactly what can account for such differences. Many such reasons are 
found in the hostile political atmosphere prevalent in Britain in the last decade of the 
eighteenth and the first three decades of the nineteenth century, a period that has 
frequently been referred to as the ‘Reform Crisis’. The legacy of the French Revolution 
and its ensuing wars critically influenced this context, where reform efforts were 
systematically crushed by a combination of conservatism on the part of both Whigs and 
Tories both in and out of Parliament (to be addressed presently), fear of revolution and 
the destruction of property amongst the population, and suspicion, intrigue and statutory 
intervention from the government, which ran from Pitt’s ‘Reign of Terror’ and the 
treason trials of 1794 to the massacre at Peterloo in 1819 and the subsequent era of the 
Liverpool government’s ‘Six Acts’. Mill’s attitude to the French Revolution is itself 
highly revealing. He portrayed it as a ‘true gift from heaven’ to conservative enemies of 
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reform, because of the particular damage it did to the reputation of philosophy as a 
device for establishing sound political laws. Whilst we can certainly read an abhorrence 
of revolution in Mill’s assessment of the violent legacy of 1789, his real frustration lay 
in what that legacy had bequeathed to philosophy, which was manifested in the 
obstinacy of the government seemingly towards any matter of political reform. 
The political context of Mill’s time also saw a need to address certain intellectual 
opposition to reform ideas. It is in the shape of the Philosophic Whigs associated with 
the Edinburgh Review that this is primarily of relevance to Mill, especially since he too 
was once a reviewer for that organ. The debate between Mill and notable Whigs such as 
Mackintosh and Macaulay highlighted the fact that there was a significant mass of 
philosophical resistance to the political reforms envisaged by the Philosophic Radicals 
which was not entirely based on a perceived threat of violent insurrection. These Whigs 
had broadly argued that any reform should be inductive, that is to say experimental, that 
it should above all be moderate, and that parliamentary reform in particular was a matter 
of political expediency rather than principle. Whilst Mill’s attitude to the French 
Revolution sees him portrayed as a subscriber to reform as opposed to revolution, this 
Whig approach was predicated on a distinctly ‘Burkean’ or gradualist conception of 
reform, which greatly contrasted against the deductive method of legislation Mill 
employed at length in his essay Government, which was the subject of detailed 
investigation in chapter 2. Mill stated in his manuscripts that to conduct politics in the 
method prescribed by the Whigs was disastrous, because legislation ‘under the 
dominion of practice [was] an attempt to put it under that which just so far as it acts 
upon it, is sure to act wrong.’463 Unfortunately, Mill’s political context, as has been 
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described throughout this thesis, dictated that this type of moderate reform was likely to 
be the best-case scenario he could envisage. 
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Epilogue: ‘Unbounded Confidence’ 
In politics, an almost unbounded confidence in the efficacy of two things: representative 
government, and complete freedom of discussion. So great was my father’s reliance on the 
influence of reason upon the minds of mankind, whenever it was allowed to reach them, that he 
felt as if all would be gained if the people could be universally taught to read, if all sorts of 
opinions were allowed to be preached to them by word and writing, and if through the suffrage 
they could nominate a legislature to give effect to their opinion when formed. 
John Stuart Mill, Autobiography
464
 
In drawing this study to a close, last words must be reserved for a concluding overview 
of Mill’s political thought, the topic of pursuit stated in this thesis’ introduction as its 
overarching objective. Also advanced in that introduction, however, was an at the time 
rather offhand comment about Mill’s intellectual legacy, which asserted that, along with 
Bentham, the figure of John Stuart Mill often casts a shadow over attempts to recover it. 
Since Mill’s common place books have allowed a recovery of this legacy to be 
undertaken, it is not without a sense of irony that it is actually from John that the most 
effective conclusion of his father’s political thought is drawn. What is striking about 
such an analysis, however, is how it too conveys the importance of the constituent areas 
of ideas that have been explored in this thesis – those of parliamentary reform, freedom 
of the press, education and reason free from pernicious influence – to what can be 
considered a conception of Mill’s overarching political thought. 
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